Canadian Prime Rate Increase?

A lot of talk in the last couple of days about the Bank of Canada making a choice on the direction of the prime rate. I think too much press. If they do raise it by .25% as expected, life will go one. This is not a pattern of high interest rate increase in the Canadian mortgage market. In fact the 5 year fixed rate has dropped in Canada mortgage market. We should actually be below the 4.00% mark fir the benchmark 5 year fixed rate. A .25% increase in the Canadian prime rate amounts to a $39 increase per month on a mortgage amount of $300,000. I believe Canada economy will survive after this increase.

Approaches to efficiency: LMS vs LSWR - some facts and some thoughts

This week I read an excellent journal article by Roy Edwards, of Southampton University's Management school, titled 'Job analysis on the LMS: mechanisation and modernisation c.1930-c.1939'. The article focussed on how the London, Midland and Scottish Railway (LMS) came to the decision to modernise, reorganise and rebuild many of its freight depots on the network in an attempt to reduce labour costs and increase efficiency. This was part of an attempt by the company to make the LMS freight haulage services more competitive with the road hauliers that, by the mid to late 1930s, had attracted vast swathes of the company's traffic onto the roads. I hope Roy doesn't mind if I give a very brief synopsis of his article.

He describes how the LMS in 1933 employed Lewis C. Ord to investigate performance at goods yards and depots and he analysed the work using the measure of how many hours it took for a ton to move through the depot (hours per ton). His test case was the reorganisation and mechanisation of goods sheds at the company's Blackburn depot. Here he tried many experiments and reduced the time that it took for each ton to move through it. So, for example, in the forwarding goods shed a ton's movement dropped from 2 hours to 1.1 hours. He also tried experiments at the Oldbury yard.

The LMS, based on guidance in Ord's final report, thereafter began to reorganise, redesign and mechanise goods sheds. A department was set up at the LMS headquarters to examine shed design and the instillation of mechanical equipment. In attempts to bring costs under control, the department used systematic analysis of information gathered at terminals, such as the total tonnage moved, the total hours it took and the hours per ton. Yard agents then used this data to analyse operational efficiency. The information was also collated weekly for a monthly report that would aid in the control of yard and shed expenditure. In addition, a sub-section of the divisional superintendent of operation's staff was set up in 1931 to look at the shunting methods. Its remit was extended in 1937 to include 'modernisation proposals and additional monitoring.' Further, other statistical measures were gathered such as 'Daily Analysis of Work,' 'Detailed Analytical survey of work' and the district goods managers were informed of efficiency via the 'Handled tonnages and wages return.' These figures were all collated and forwarded to the monthly district goods managers meetings for analysis.

This data collected therefore became a contributory factor in decisions regarding the rearrangement, rebuilding and mechanisation of goods terminals. In 1933 Lemon, the vice president of the Institute of Transport congress, estimated that these changes could save the company £1.5 million on the wages of handling staff. However there was a problem. While reducing labour costs seemed good for the struggling company, economies that were made on staff reductions did not factor in the cost of the investment, and thus what savings were made were in many cases wiped out. Edwards describes how at Walsall economies of savings on staffing costs were estimated at £1000, but that the outlay on the modernisation cost £9950. At Tipton, the board noted that an outlay of £51,000 would result in savings in labour costs of £550 per annum, with additional charges resulting from traders using the LMS's facilities amounting to approximately £2460. The reason for this, was that the benefits of investment were not known and on many occasions the justification for investment was broad. For example at Oldbury all the directors could state was that there would be 'quicker turnaround, reducing delay, less congestion and improved service to the public'. Indeed their opinion was that, 'economy cannot be estimated.' At Tipton Edwards states that there would be 'other advantages which cannot be evaluated e.g. improvements in the shunting arrangements and in the mobility of the wagon stock.' Simply put, the benefits of investment were never worked out and never truly known.

Edwards' conclusions are clear. Firstly, the LMS was groping its way forward with regard to the systematic statistical analysis of their operations, from a point where previously there had been little, and there was the development of more sophisticated management measures to analyse the efficiency of the workplace. However, secondly, there was little accurate analysis of the financial costs and benefits that would be incurred by the investment and thus increased efficiency was not rarely remunerative. In short the LMS made their operations more efficient, and they knew it, but it came at a cost. If you feel so inclined, the article is excellent and really gives a good insight into the mindset of late 1930s railway managers operating under difficult circumstances. It can be found in Vol. 20, No.1. pp 91-105 of Accounting, Business & Financial History.

This paper really made me think about the way that the London and South Western's (L&SWR) managers thought about cost control. Indeed, I was stimulated to think about what linkages can be made between the way pre and post-1922 railway management made decisions. Edwards' research has shown that while there was increased data gathering and analysis before and after a yard was modernised so as to measure efficiency, the actual benefits were unknown, and the LMS relied on impressions and 'hunches' to make decisions. My question is why was this so? Where did this evidently deficient way of analysing investment come from? I believe that my work, that ultimately focusses on decision making in the L&SWR, may hold the answer.

It is clear that the L&SWR managers were not as advanced as those on the LMS years later. They exhibited the same uncertainty in decision-making as those that followed them on later railway companies. If there is a consideration of efficiency measures that were implemented throughout the company's history Edwards' assessment that there was 'little' or no cost-benefit analysis and that decisions were made on impressionistic grounds, are more prolific in the period before 1922.

For example, in 1879 a special committee of L&SWR directors instructed their senior managers to proffer 'any suggestions that may occur to them upon it or any method by which the revenue of the company may be increased. Also any information as to possible reductions of Train mileage, reductions of trains or reductions of working expenses.' Accompanied with no analysis, the result was a list of ideas from the different departments, some of which were highly speculative with regard to their benefits in terms of cost or efficiency. For example, amongst the suggestions were included, better timetables and advertising, more powerful engines that would save fuel, better organisation at the Nine Elms goods yard, the expedition of workshop improvements at Nine Elms and improved services between Southampton, Salisbury and Portsmouth.

This said, there were some suggestions where the savings would have been much easier to quantify, for example, reductions in gas and water consumption, dispensing with the stores' department's branch offices, e.g. at Bishopstoke, reducing the number of travelling inspectors overall and restricting numbers of guards on goods trains to one. Indeed, another economy drive in 1885 categorised some of the company's ongoing buildings works by their immediate necessity to operations, enabling it to put on hold a number and enabling the company to defer identifiable costs. However, overall in the long run there was no way that they could determine the benefits of these measures using rudimentary assessments.

Further, day to day decision making in committees, for example the building of new goods sheds, extra sidings for traffic, new rolling stock and extra staff, all tended to have no cost-benefit conducted beforehand. In the case of many station alterations, decisions to augment facilities are simply made without any detailed job or process analysis, rather investments were made, in some cases, simply on the recommendation from the Traffic Manager, Superintendent of the Line, or even the Station Agent. Therefore, I have become aware of a major difference in the decision-making process between the majority of the decisions that the L&SWR made between 1850 and 1922 and the those made by the LMS that relied on more detailed job analysis. Whereas the LMS tried to work out the efficiency of the operations and attempted to improve them, even if the cost-benefit analysis was lacking, the L&SWR's whole decision-making process was based on untested justifications. Therefore, I feel I may have found a reason why their was such a laissez-faire attitude towards analysis of investment, and it has already been hinted at.

It is quite evident that the managers of the L&SWR had one constant that shaped the way that policy was dictated from the 1830s right through to the end of the company in 1922. This was the expectation that traffic levels would continue to increase unabated. In 1860 the L&SWR, whose main goods depot was at Nine Elms, started to find that because of traffic increases that this site was getting cramped, especially as it was shared with the Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon works of the company. A special committee of the board was formed to discuss the question. One option was to move the works into the country. This was not done, and eventually they were relocated to the southern side of the main line so the goods yard and sheds could be expanded. In the course of the discussions the Traffic Manager of the company, Archibald Scott, stated that in the 20 years after 1860 'should the Traffic increase as was seasonally expected,' the land given over to the Traffic department would be insufficient for its management. This statement illustrates a possible mindset of the L&SWR management before 1922.

The period before 1922 was when the railways had the biggest share of the market with regard to traffic movement. They were a virtual monopoly and as such, with the increasingly expanding economy, traffic continued to rise exponentially. Therefore the most pressing issue for managers was how the infrastructure would cope with this fact. Cost reduction, except in the Locomotive department (for which a whole paper could be written) was not an ongoing concern like on the LMS where they attempted over time to reduce costs of operations. Cost reduction in major affairs was simply a matter of the company instituting economy drives when profits dropped, like the special committees noted above, or the company securing the cheapest contractor when contracts were put out to tender. Operational effectiveness was not assessed, and possibly this is because the expectation was that eventually any investment would be covered by the constantly rising revenues.

One last point, isn't it interesting that the LMS only started looking at its operational practices in detail when the company was under financial pressure, whereas the L&SWR, who never had the same strained and was graced with constantly rising traffic and revenue, never felt the need to assess how their operations worked in half as much detail. Of course I hope to develop my ideas further, and this has been a rushed effort at developing a theory, but I hope that I have made a good start. Oh, and thank you Roy for stimulating me.

Sources: Edwards, Roy, 'Job analysis on the LMS: mechanisation and modernisation c.1930-c.1939,' Accounting, Business & Financial History, (2010) Vol. 20, No.1. pp 91-105

Image source: http://www.railalbum.co.uk/ - A great site with loads of railway images

Canada Mortgage and House Prices Falling?

There has been a lot of press lately regarding the downfall of Canadian house prices. They state facts from numerous sources to make the argument valid. Is it valid? We are in times that old economic models do not even come close to forecasting. Yes the world is in a lot of uncertainly, Canada is doing good though. Canada has strong banks, well regulated policies and all the natural resources that the world needs. Now is the time to look at the other side of the slope and the positive things that are happening. More importantly the great opportunities that lie ahead. Whatever we focus on is what is going to happen to us. Why not focus on the good things.

Are the North and South, Rich and Poor in Transport Terms?

I don't think that it would surprise you if I said hat London's transport network gets more money than those in the other regions of the country. Truth be told, most people can acknowledge this fact without having travelled around Britain extensively. Indeed, when I went on a little jaunt round Britain last year this difference was something I noticed. Being a regular user of public transport in London, the seats I sat on, the information boards I looked at and the trains I rode on, were not up to the standard I was used to. This was a contrast especially stark when travelling in the north of the country. I did not, however, complain, and put the differences down to underfunding.

Yesterday I got some basic evidence delivered to me that confirmed my belief. The difference in the funding for transport, especially between the North and the South of Britain, is quite simply stunning. A short report, written by the Passenger Transport Executive Group (PTEG), detailed where money spent on transport services goes, region by region. PTEG, it should be noted, is best placed to do this review. It represents Britain's 6 Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs) in Greater Manchester, Merseyside, South Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear, West Midlands and West Yorkshire, as well as Nottingham City Council, Strathclyde Partnership for Transport and Transport for London. All 'provide, plan, procure and promote public transport' in their regions. Yet while PTEG is supposed to promote the interests of all of these member organisations, I don't think it will actually do this evenly. With the majority of these organisations in the north of the country and with TfL being a significant political force on its own that has the backing of the Mayor of London, it is unsurprising that PTEG favours the interests of their non-London members. This, I think, is why the '2010 PTEG Funding Gap report' came about.

Now for some statistics. Please don't go to sleep, they really do make interesting reading. Using data from the Office of National Statistics (ONS) from 2008/2009, the report states that Londoners had, per head, £641 per year spent on them. However, those living in North West of Britain, had only a mere £287 spent on them each. Even worse luck befell those living in the North East, where the figure was only £234. This meant that Londoners had, per head of population, on average two and a half times more transport money spent on them than those living elsewhere in Britain. But it apparently gets worse. Of all money spent on transport in this country, 30% was spent in London which has only 15% of the entire population. Yet, the West Midlands, as an example, has 11% of the population and received only 9% of the transport budget. Further, PTEG present statistics that show that the recent disparity is part of a historical trend. Taking the comparison of London and the North and West Midlands, in 2004/05 the London spend per head was £533, whereas in the North and West Midlands it was £216. Skip forward to 2008/09 and the difference is that in London the figure was £641, whereas in the North and West Midlands it was £262. Awake? Right, let's move on.

What is good about the report is that there is no commentary or analysis, leaving that job to people like me. It would be easy for me to jump to conclusions about how unfair the spending difference between the north and south is, and I do think that there is an element of this. But at the end of the day my subjective view point is, however, playing a role in this judgement. The problem is that the statistics in the report actually tell us very little with regard to the issues surrounding public transport. The report measures the spending per head of population, but this is far too basic a measure that doesn't take into account a number of other factors.

My primary complaint is that it doesn't factor in how the services that the money pays for are used. The key statistic would not, therefore, be the number of individuals living in an area, but rather it would be the number of journeys made by public transport. Take for example two stations in roughly the same situations, Berrylands in South West London and Mossley Hill (shown) in Liverpool. Both are in densely populated suburban areas, and both have approximately four trains an hour. In 2005/2006 329,000 people passed through Berrylands station, however Mossley Hill only had 133,128 visit it (one of which was me). This would therefore mean that despite Berrylands being smaller and having fewer platforms (2 verses 4), the facilities would require more frequent maintenance because of higher ware and tare and the trains would need to be longer and at very least require more frequent cleaning. The costs incurred by the operator of Berrylands station would therefore be higher per user and per head of population.

Further, another complaint is that the report doesn't factor in that London's transport services move types of passengers that other British transport systems do not to the same degree. Firstly, the bulk of Britain's prosperity is now, very sadly, focussed on London. Taking figures of Gross Value Added to the economy in 2006, London comes out on top, adding £26,192 per capita. Other regions perform much worse, for example the West Midlands contributes £16,583 per capita and the North West £16,234. Therefore, in London transport links to and from the city, offices and businesses, need to be maintained at a high standard as they are vital to the economy.

Additionally, the majority of Britain's tourism is based in London. London is the world's most visited tourist location and in 2006 played host to 15,640,000 individuals. Manchester, where the second largest number of tourists visit sits at 73 in the world rankings as it only accommodated 912,000 people. Additionally, the top three British tourist attractions, The Tower of London, St Paul's Cathedral and Westminster Abbey, are all London based, the next being the Roman Baths in Bath. Therefore, tourism would put greater strains on London's infrastructure and would need to provide more facilities for these customers.

Lastly, history that plays a role. Once the railways came to London, the city quickly developed a dense commuter belt. For example, the London and South Western Railway (L&SWR), which had a dense suburban network, always derived above 72% of its revenue from passenger traffic. Further, in 1900 the average clerk in London could live at a distance from the city where it would be impractical to walk from, whereas in smaller cities, Manchester or Liverpool for example, he possibly could have made his way to work on foot. Further, because of the fact that there were more industrial workers in the north, than in the business-orientated south, there were fewer individuals that could afford to use public transport in an era when the cost was still rather high. Lastly, many of the railways that served the north, such as the London and North Western and Great Northern Railways, tended to focus on attracting freight as this generated more profit. Historically therefore your average railway historian would tend to see northern railways as 'freight railways' and many of the lines built in the dense industrial regions of the north, while having stations on them, were essentially constructed to facilitate this transport. London, therefore, has always been a city used to using public transport and has it far more ingrained in its woodwork. Public transport in London is therefore used more and has a greater role to play in keeping the city moving.

Overall it seems that the report is very flawed. Just saying that regions other than London receive less money is failing to address the differences in transport patterns and realities of transport in this nation. There needs to be more complex, more detailed and more intelligent figures gathered before spending on transport can be properly assessed.

But then again, with all this in mind, I do still feel that there is an underlying unfairness in the amount of transport funding between London and the regions. The counter argument, to all my points above, is simple. If not enough money is not spent on public transport outside of London, to develop, improve and add to the existing services , then people will not move onto the trains or buses. They are right. The question underlying this is what role do we want our transport systems to play in the future? Do we want them to just continue to service those existing patterns of usage, or do we want them to be an instrument of greener travel and economic growth? I will go with the latter option. I would argue that the challenge to public transport providers and the government, is to increase spending on public transport throughout the nation, so as to expand the opportunities for people to use it. In the quest to be a greener nation, to reduce congestion on our roads and to grow local economies, transport spending needs to increased so that getting on a train or bus anywhere in the country, is as pleasant an experience as it is in London. With the economic crisis we'll see what happens, but in truth, increased and more evenly distributed spending on public transport can be, and should be, a positive thing for all in stimulating economic recovery. Only by making transport spending fairer, will this happen throughout the nation.

Read the report HERE

Three Station Masters at Hampton Court - The Odd Bunch

I have been always been interested in the lives of railway workers, and what has particularly peaked my interest are those individuals that worked at my local station, Hampton Court, in the Victorian period. Astoundingly, between 1849, when the station was built, and 1895, Hampton Court only had four station agents (later called station masters). The line, which came off the London to Southampton main line just past Kingston Station (now Surbiton), was built throughout 1848, and opened for traffic on the 1^st February 1849. The London and South Western Railway had been interested in the tourist traffic going to the Hampton Court Palace since 1839. Therefore,those individuals that took up the position of station master is of interest as this was a prestige post.

The first Station Agent or Master was John Madigan. Like most of the staff based at Hampton Court in the period, Madigan was not from the local area. A minute of the Traffic and coaching committee of the 23rd February 1849 boasts that the company's three major projects at the time, the extension of the line from Nine Elms to Waterloo, the Windsor line and lastly the Hampton Court Branch were all 'manned without adding a single individual to the company's staff.' This indicates that Madigan had joined the railway at an earlier point. Indeed, Madigan had started as a clerk at Nine Elms in 1840, had been moved to Winchester in 1841, Botley in 1842 and Wareham in 1847.

But what of his background? On the 1851 census it shows that Madigan was from Ireland. He was 29 year old, meaning he was born in either 1822 or 23, was married, and was listed as living in the 'Corn House Building'. Having come from Ireland it is quite possible that Madigan had brought his young family over during the Irish Potato famine. Many of the Irish who came over to work on the railways during this period only took positions as navvies. However, Madigan's employment shows that as time progressed more immigrants went into the operational side of the railways taking on administrative jobs. The position of Station Agent was not as prestige as it became in the later Victorian period, yet for an Irish immigrant of only 29 years of age, running a station would have been quite an achievement. Madigan was moved to Windsor in September 1851 and the station agency was taken over by William P. Legh.

Like Madigan, Legh was not a local being born in Windsor in 1810. He was very well educated. In his notice of retirement in 1882 the South Western Gazette, the company's staff magazine, notes that he was at Eton and was a contemporary of the sitting Prime Minister at the time Gladstone. Legh obtained his first railway job when he entered the company as a clerk in the Stores Department at Nine Elms in 1847 . The formal process of job appointment was through a process of nepotism and he would have been nominated by one of the directors of the company. It is possible that his family knew some company directors, perhaps through an Eton contact.

As a well-educated clerk in the Traffic Department in 1847, Legh's promotion prospects were good, and he was quickly moved to the Booking Office at Nine Elms station. In 1848 he was made Station Agent at Adlestone Station, after which he moved in 1850 to Hounslow. In 1851 he was transferred to Hampton Court. The system of advancement on the London and South Western Railway was quite erratic and promotion was based on a number of factors, such as how good the employee was at their job and their degree of contacts within the company. Another possible explanation is that the Traffic Managers at the time, Mr Stovin up to 1852 and Mr Scott after, were actively trying to advance Legh. Employees of the company were not allowed to enter the company as station master at the time, and the majority of employees in the main were expected to work up from the bottom. Legh starts in a very cushy position as a Clerk in the stores department and rapidly worked his way through gradually more important stations. Thus, he may have been subject to further nepotism after his appointment. As a result in 1853 he became Assistant Superintendent at Waterloo.

This was short lived and in 1855, for an unknown reason, he was moved back to Hampton Court. He never married and lived in the station building until his retirement in 1882 at the age of 72. On his retirement he was on a wage of £110 a year, at the top end of the scale. He retired with a yearly allowance of £95 from the pension fund. He died on the 9^th July 1883 and was buried in West Molesey Cemetery on the 12^th July 1883. (Molesey is actually where the station is built and on the other side of the river from the Palace) The funeral was attended by Mr Chalwin the Goods Clerk, Mr Whittington the delivery agent, Inspector Nicholson of Waterloo Station and by the new station agent of Hampton Court, John McDougall. Clearly, Legh's appointment indicates that the position of Station Agent was gaining in prestige, as being appointed after an Irish immigrant, the ex-Eton student's posting suggests that the company wished to have an employee in the position of a higher social standing. It is, however, unusual for someone who had such impressive education to be placed in such a position, especially as the majority of station agents, when they first became clerks, would only have had basic elementary schooling.

I have found a lot more about Legh's successor, John McDougall. Once again McDougall did not come from Molesey, rather he was born in the Scottish Borders at Gordon near Kelso in 1831. He joined the railway company in 1860, becoming a porter at Waterloo in 1860. He started as a guard based at Hampton Court almost immediately after, and was appointed as an Inspector at the station in 1873. In the 1871 census he is recorded as being a married and living at 7 Creek Road, aged 40. In the 1881 census he is listed as living in Osborne Villa in Matham Road with his wife, Annie, his daughter Rosa, and two other railway employees. By this point however he was already reliving the ailing Legh of some of his administrative work, something that presumably precipitated his rise to the post of Station Master. In February 1880 The Locomotive committee paid McDougall £5 for filling in the Locomotive Department returns for a year. This he did for a number of years.

There is also evidence that McDougall was gaining the respect and profile of a Station Agent, and this is why he is one of the most unusual appointments to such a post that I have encountered for a long time. On two occasions, in April 1880 and in December 1881, the Traffic Committee of the L&SWR reported being petitioned at first by the residents of Molesey and then by the local board for him to be the next Station Agent. This was eventually confirmed on the 15^th February 1882, when he was put on a wage of £95 per year. Most station masters had to start as junior clerks and work their way upwards. McDougall, however, was not a clerk and therefore was only advanced to agent on the basis of the love that the people of Molesey had for him. This is shown through a lot of evidence in the South Western Gazette.

It is obvious that McDougall was a popular, efficient and good natured station master. On two occasions McDougall organised charitable donations for worthy causes. In 1881 each station, including Hampton Court, had a donation box for employees at Christmas. He suggested that each member of the station staff should donate a small portion to the London and South Western Railway's Widows and Orphans fund. 10 shillings was given by 16 men. In February 1884 there was an accident at Nine Elms, the main goods depot of the railway, in which a member of staff lost both his feet. McDougall organised a collection for the injured man, raising 9s 3d. This was again from the Christmas box.

McDougall also received a good number of honours and accolades from both the travelling public and local residents. The most notable came from Baron Pawell Von Rammingen, and his wife HRH Princess Frederica Von Rammingen. They lived in the palace and were regular travellers. On December 26^th 1881, while he was still and inspector, the Princess presented him with a 'massive gold scarf pin set with pearl and pale coral.' She also gave him £4 to be divided between the station staff. In May 1885 the Baron presented him with a gold horseshoe pin set with Pearls as a new years gift. The last present that I have found was given in 1890 when they presented McDougall with a gift of a cut glass inkstand with silver tap and silver tray. On it was inscribed, “Presented by HRH Princess Frederica and the Baron Pawell Von Rammingen to J. McDougall, Station Master, Hampton Court.”

It has already been shown how respected McDougall was around the town. However, another accolade came on the occasion of his 20 years at the station in 1885 when it was “thought by many of the travelling public that so long a term spent in one place fairly deserved some recognition.” As such a committee was formed by local residents including the Reverend W.F. Reynolds, Rear Admiral Wilson, Capt Lonsdale, Mr Evan McGregor C.B., and Messrs Fletcher, Kennedy, Payne, Keeling, Young-Adams and Garland. Mr Athelstan was honorary secretary. The goal was to invite subscriptions for a testimonial, and a circular that was issued stated their efforts were in recognition of McDougall's “invariable courtesy and attention to the travelling public in general and the residents in this vicinity in particular during the past 20 years.” The call for subscriptions was widely heeded and Rear-Admiral Wilson sent McDougall just over 40 guineas, which, accounting for inflation, would be be worth around £1700 today. At the end of the letter that accompanied the gift it stated that the contributors hoped that McDougall would 'enjoy health and strength to continue the performance of his duties with the same credit to himself and comfort to others.”

Yet there was one point at which the station master's character, integrity and good nature was attacked. In September 1888 McDougall was summoned to court by Edwin Elphick, a cab driver, for using 'abusive, threatening and insulting language, with an intent to create a breech of the peace in the station yard.' All the evidence was stacked against Elphick. McDougall had seen that Elphick was drunk and asked his boss Mr Bowery not send him into the yard. Yet the next day Elphick reappeared, at which point McDougall ordered him out of the cab yard. Elphick became abusive towards the station master. The judge ruled in favour of McDougall and the case was thrown out before the defence could call any witnesses.

Towards the end of 1894 McDougall's health started to fail him. A Traffic Committee Minute of 23rd of February 1895 stated that at 64 years of age, and at the top of his pay scale of £110, he wished to retire as he had been certified permanently incapacitated. He was retired on the 1st February and was replaced by Mr F. Molyneaux, formally agent at Sunningdale.

The station masters at Hampton Court were probably the most unusual group of people to occupy the position of station agent at one location. An Irish immigrant, an Eton-educated man and an member of the Traffic Department's non-clerical staff, were three groups of people that were all very unlikely to be appointed to such posts. It is, therefore, unusual that an example of each were all located in the same place. Hampton Court doesn't therefore represent employment patterns typically found elsewhere in the company and makes an interesting case-study.

PLEASE NOTE: This is something I wrote 4 years ago. It was copied and pasted from a talk script I knocked up at the time, as being knocked off my pedal bike has rendered my left hand unable to type.

Conservative transport policy...time to be scared?

I have been thinking a lot about the new Conservative Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond. As someone interested in having better railways in Britain, I instinctively worry about Conservative Governments. They have in the past been about as useful as a bacon slicer in a cheese shop; it may do something, but ultimately you'll end up gooey and with half your finger sliced off.

This fear isn't irrational though. It doesn't automatically stem from a loathing of all things Tory, (however I do have to confess that as a disgruntled Lib-Dem I am quick to condemn them) nor does it come from a default loathing of the fee market, which history tells us they love, cuddle and, given the chance, would have coitus with. It doesn't even originate from erroneous idea that since the beginning the Conservatives have always historically been the ones to mess up the railways. Indeed, some of the greatest policy errors, including the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1894 and parts of the Railways Act of 1921, both of which restricted the way that railway companies could charge for their services and therefore damaged their profits, were both enacted by Liberal governments.

My worry, profuse in nature and massive in my head, is that over the last 50 years Conservative Governments have persistently damaged Britain's rail network. Now, I'm not saying that that's what Conservative Governments set out to do, but I can't help discerning a pattern of destructive policies and loathing towards the railways that was ongoing. It is my hope, however, that the new Conservative-Lib Dem Government doesn't go the same way.

The first real pain that the Conservatives inflicted on Britain's railways was installing one Richard Beeching as chairman of British Railways (BR) in 1961. He was appointed by Ernest Marples (shown), the Conservative Minister for Transport, who brought him from his position as Technical Director at ICI. It is in his new position that Beeching came to be considered a 'Railway Satan.' He was tasked with moving BR into profitability. He shared the view with the Government that BR should be run like a business and not solely in the public interest. In his 1963 report, The Reshaping of British Railways, he proposed closing 6000 of the country's 18000 miles of railway, most of which were rural and cross country lines. This would also mean shutting 7000 stations and allow BR to shed 70,000 jobs over three years. He estimated the recommended changes would make BR profitable by 1970 and as a result Marples implemented most of them.

The Beeching Report, as we now know, was terrible for many reasons. Firstly the report did not take into account the social benefits of railway lines serving communities that had no other transport links. These small communities, that still shape our view of the sleepy little English village, had existences that revolved around their railway lines. Suddenly, like a whirlwind, these services were gone. Secondly, Beeching's cuts were based on traffic figures that were gathered in the spring when some places that had heavy tourist traffic were at their quietest, such as lines on the North Cornwall coast. Therefore when these lines were closed it destroyed industry and tourism in these regions. North Cornwall, to this day, still has a failing economy. Thirdly, there was no attempt to decrease cost through other means, such as modernisation, (despite the failed BR modernisation plan of the 1950s) that would have allowed some lines to stay open. Beeching's sole cost-cutting policy was to apply the axe when a line failed to pay its way. Lastly, the cuts went too far. The plans did not foresee that roads would fill up and did not anticipate any future transport needs. These are just some of the many criticisms of the plan, and in the end Beeching's goal of profitability was never reached. What it most certainly did do was cost many people their livelihoods.

Now I am not automatically going to knock Beeching himself and I have always though that it was Marples particularly that was at fault. Firstly, Marples was a man who's background looked a bit suspect. Marples co-owned a construction company, Marples-Ridgeway, that was heavily into road building. Indeed, surprise, surprise, it was Marples that authorised the M1 be built from London to Nottingham and it was Marples-Ridgeway that built it. Further, and this is important, Beeching only made recommendations in his report, it was Marples who actually gave the order to close the lines. Therefore, when the line between London and Nottingham closed, forcing travellers onto the M1, the fishiness is plain to smell. Marples evidently used his position, and the Beeching report, to further his own business interests. Secondly, Marples brought in a businessmen in Beeching and that in itself was going to mean harsh cuts were going to be proposed. My point is that if you place a wolf in a chicken coup, don't expect that it'll imitate the chickens. Businessmen will act as businessmen if they are simply told to make something profitable. Indeed, it was Beeching's narrow terms of reference, simply to bring BR into profit, that meant he looked at things simply in terms of profit and loss. Thus, he acted accordingly. Overall I feel that it was Marples who was the man to blame for the cuts, as he was driven by a pro-road agenda. Beeching, I feel, simply did his job, even if he did it badly.

So where to next? Oh yes, the privatisation of British Rail in the early to mid 1990s. This is, in some ways, a more erroneous action by a Conservative Government that the Beeching cuts. Beeching, effigies of which railway enthusiasts still stick pins into, at least was brought in to solve a specific problem. British Railways was unprofitable, its cost tax payers money, Beeching was tasked with reversing this. However, John Major's Government of the 1990s broke up British Rail because of ideology. The free market was their God, and they worshipped it to the max. Their goal was to make Britain's railways efficient and innovative by the introduction of competition. Silly arses.

By the early 1990s British Rail was actually running very efficiently. Maggie, bless her cotton socks, had restricted BR's budget quite considerably. This had had the effect of scaring its bosses so much that the aim of Beeching, railway profitability, actually became a reality in some parts of the organisation. Certain services, such as intercity and Network South East, actually started to make money. The Thatcher Government also shocked everyone when it authorised the electrification of the East Coast Main Line and purchased new rolling stock. Everyone involved stood back and applauded. BR was, by 1994, at its most cost-effective. Then Thatcher was out and Major came in.

Thatcher, it may surprise everyone to know, was actually against the privatisation of the railways. However, Major, under the influence of the 'Adam Smith think tank,' pushed forward with privatisation in the Railways Act 1993. This created an infrastructure company, Railtrack, that maintained all the working parts (track, signals, major stations etc.), three ROSCOs that owned the rolling stock and who leased it to the 25 Train Operating Companies (TOCs) who actually ran the trains. Further, BR's engineering department was split up, as was the freight services that were now under the control of 6 private companies. This is the very basic version of how BR was split up. To go through the number of companies that were involved and the cack-handed way that BR was destroyed, would take endless Blog posts that would make me into a hermit.

The split up of BR caused many problems, and what follows were the key ones. Firstly, the track ownership was separated from the trains. This currently causes problems as there are conflicts between the operators of trains and the Network Rail. Secondly, the infrastructure maintenance was privatised , leading to cost cutting, sloppy maintenance and a string of crashes. The Southall accident in 1997, Ladbroke Grove in 1999 and Hatfield in 2000 all contributed to Railtrack's downfall. In 2001 it was placed in administration and in 2002 all of its assets were transferred to the state owned, not-for-profit company, Network Rail. Thirdly, the railways now cost the taxpayer far more money than is necessary. Because in the privatisation process someone forgot to flag up that railways don't make profit, it means that many franchises, such as South West Trains and National Express East Anglia are subsidised simply so that they have profits high enough to pay their shareholders dividends. Yet at the same time many Train Operating Companies still have to pay money back to the government as part of their contracts, and failure to do so sees them stripped of their franchises, for example National Express East Coast last year. Overall, these weird arrangements mean that we pay over the odds as taxpayers for the train services. In 1994 government funding for BR was £1,627m, approximately £2,168m in 2005 terms. In 2005 government support came to £4,593m. I could list more faults, but the general consensus is that a Conservative Government privatised the railways very badly, when they were at their most cost-effective, simply because it sat well with their ideology.

What, therefore, does the future hold with this government? Are those who, like me, are interested in having good railways quaking in their boots? Railway commentators were shocked and worried last week when the new Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond (shown), laid out a possible change in direction for the Department for Transport. I wrote a few Blogs back about how I felt that Lord Adonis was probably the best Secretary of State for the railways in a long while, and how his enthusiasm for railways should be continued. However, Hammond was quoted last week as saying that Labour's "war on the motorist" was going to be ended. Is there a war? I didn't hear gunfire. All I heard were Clarksonesque individuals who like to feel victimised mouthing off. Hammond was referring to an illusory conflict and it was a worrying portent. I read this statement as meaning the new government was taking a pro-roads stance and could hear Marples' footsteps in the background. If he was going to view transport policy through a prism of pro or anti different forms of transport then he was simplifying a complex issue.

As I speak the Government's 'Programme for Government' is being unrolled through the news outlets. In the transport section there is a lot of good news for those interested in better railways. There will be longer franchises, Network Rail will be more accountable to it customers (i.e. us), high speed rail is supported, with options to expand it beyond the basic plans already drawn up, there is support for Crossrail, support for electrification (which I honestly didn't think would still be on the cardsunder the new Government), the rail regulator will become a strong passenger champion and, lastly, there is a commitment to fair rail pricing. Some things have been left out, such as improvements to Thameslink, re-opening closed lines and the Intercity Express Program. However this plan for the next 5 years is, on the surface of things, a very good result for the railways given the financial constraints of government.

History has taught me to fear Conservative transport policies when it comes to the railways, that they are essentially a destructive party in this respect. Therefore, naturally, I suspect that many of the above policies have the Lib Dem's fingerprints all over them. Yet if the Government adheres in the next 5 years to what it has set out today, then I might start to change my opinion. I wait and see...

Canadian Mortgages To Cause A Canadian Housing Bubble?

Below is a great article on the Canadian housing bubble done by the globe and mail.

House prices to rise ‘modestly’: CMHC
Steve Ladurantaye
House prices will increase this year and next despite the challenges posed by higher mortgage rates, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp. said Wednesday.
An “improved balance between demand and supply” will stabilize prices through the rest of this year, it said in its second quarter Housing Market Outlook. Prices will “rise modestly” in 2011, it said.
The agency, which insures almost $500-million of Canadian mortgages, said the average cost for a home by the end of 2011 should be $350,000. That would be a gain of 1.4 per cent over April’s record high of $344,968.
Forecasting higher prices next year puts it at odds with both the Canadian Real Estate Association and Toronto-Dominion Bank, which are calling for prices to drop by 1.5 per cent and 2.7 per cent respectively in 2011.
“It all comes down to the economy and what we’ve seen so far this year is a strong end to 2009 and through 2010 we’ve seen some effects from various fiscal measures,” said senior economist Bill Clark. “There was a big April gain in employment, and as the economy gets moving again people become more interested in housing.”
Read more:
• Housing: Bubble or not?
• Frantic housing market ready for calm
• David Rosenberg took your questions on housing
• Luxury homes sales through the roof as buyers seek stable investment
• Home listings reach all-time high
• Ask Don Coxe
• Report warns of housing bubble threat

While prices have rebounded strongly from the recession, economists have warned that higher mortgage rates and tougher qualification guidelines could price would-be homeowners out of the market in the second half of this year.
While prices were up some 12 per cent year-over-year in April, the number of listings increased by 100,000 units and helped temper the frantic market. Sales slipped 2.6 per cent, the third time in four months they declined. CMHC attributed much of the sales activity in the first half of the year to pent-up demand, as buyers returned to the market after sitting out during the recession.
“Once this demand is exhausted, and as mortgage rates gradually rise, the pace of activity in the resale market will ease,” said CMHC economist Bob Dugan.
CMHC forecast that between 484,000 to 513,300 houses will sell in 2010, and then slide back slightly in 2011 to between 443,500 to 504,900.
Investor Education:
• Should I buy a home now, or wait and save more money?
• Understanding house prices
• Is it better to buy a home, or choose some other investment? Charlie's story
• What makes buying a home different from other investments?
• What are some renovations that add value to my home?

The agency also said that after building 149,081 units in 2009, builders should construct between 166,900 to 199,600 units in 2010. In 2011, it said housing starts would hit between 148,600 to 208,800 units.
“Canadian housing markets have recovered from the low levels posted in early 2009,” said Mr. Dugan.. “Moving forward, housing starts will moderate as activity becomes more in-line with long term demographic fundamentals.”
It has been difficult to accurately make forecasts on the housing market through the recession, however. Its forecast for 2009 housing starts was off by 19.4 per cent. The agency was only off by 1.5 per cent the prior year, and its goal is to always be within 10 per cent of the actual figures.
“For the first time in several years, our forecast accuracy was not within the 10 per cent range because of volatile market conditions,” it said.


http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/investment-ideas/features/lets-talk-investing/housing-bubble-or-not/article1529213/