Lets get this straight, by the 1990s British Rail was very efficient!

On Monday I watched the despatches program that everyone is talking about that criticised the modern railway network. Boy, did I get frustrated. I wasn’t particularly concerned with the lack of descent analysis, nor with the dominance of subjective opinions. No, as a historian of the railways I got annoyed with the words of Steven Norris, one of the architects of British Rail’s (BR) privatisation in the early 1990s. In his view, BR was an inefficient and lazy organisation that did not give the taxpayer ‘value for money.’ Furthermore, he asserted that privatization was the only way to solve its internal problems. While I acknowledge British Rail did have a long history of inefficiency, what annoyed me was that this opinion flies in the face of all the evidence. Indeed, by the 1990s BR was, by all reasonable measures, one of the most efficient railways in Europe. Indeed, this post is about bursting Steven’s annoying little bubble. All figures are taken from the highly detailed history of British Rail by Terry Gourvish.

Firstly, a bit of background is required. From 1982 onwards the government shrunk BR’s budgets. Indeed, in 1982 central and local government funded BR to the tune of £1330.8 million (constant at 1989/90 prices). By 1986/87 this had shrunk to £950.8 million, and by 1989/90 the total funding was £568.8 million.[1] This reduction forced BR to become more customer focussed and led to a massive reorganisation of the company, named ‘sectorisation.’ Most importantly, it forced BR to become a more efficient organisation

If we consider that Britain's railways since the 1930s had never made overall profit, and consequently always required a subsidy from government to fund their operations, the level of loss that BR incurred in the 1980s and 90s would be indicative of the performance of the business. The central principal for BR operations under sectorisation was that the profitable parts of the business, such as Intercity, would actually reduce the burden on the taxpayer as they would mitigate losses incurred by other sectors that were loss-making, such as Regional Railways. The table below shows the profit and loss of BR's different operational sectors in certain years, as well as its overall total.

Source: Gourvish, Terry, British Rail 1974-97: From Integration to Privatisation, (Oxford, 2004), p.476-479

As shown, in 1982 Intercity, Railfreight and Network South East were all poor performers, with only Railfreight making a slight profit. However, all three became far more profitable by 1993/4, whether it be through cost control, greater efficiency, growing their trade, better public service or increasing their prices. Only BR’s Parcels service and Freightliner, the latter of which was a relatively new part of the business, did not improve their performance by 1993/4. Furthermore, Provincial and Regional Railways, which ran local lines and were effectively cross-subsidised by the other BR sectors, also became more efficient by 1993/4. Overall, the result was that by 1993/4 the burden on the taxpayer was £724 million, or 73.21 per cent less than it did in 1982.

Furthermore, most elements of BR’s costs reduced in the period. As an example I will look at maintenance costs, which declined significantly. The results are shown in the table below.

Source: Gourvish, Terry, British Rail 1974-97: From Integration to Privatisation, (Oxford, 2004), p.207

This indicates that between 1983 and 1989/90 BR’s maintenance costs dropped by 19 index points. However, the cost per train mile, which essentially relates BR's overall expense to the amount of work done by the organisation, fell by a massive 24 index points. While some of this reduction could be down to changes in the price of materials, there is no doubt that some, if not most, could be attributed to better cost control, improved operational practices and better project management.

But where did BR's efficiency stand against other European operators? The table below shows the number of kilometres that BR’s trains ran per member of staff in the period, against the average for the fourteen 'Community of European Railways' members (excluding BR).

Source: Gourvish, Terry, British Rail 1974-97: From Integration to Privatisation, (Oxford, 2004), p.292

Evidently, per staff member BR’s trains went further than thos of European operators. This was despite, in some cases, the British railway network being of a higher density than in many countries and requiring greater maintenance, more administration and having greater intensity of train movements. This means that BR was more productive per staff member than the European operators and that taxpayers were getting better ‘value for money’ from its operations. 

Lastly, because of efficiencies, the level of support that BR received in real terms also reduced over the period. The table below indexes the funding of British railways against three major European operators between 1975 and 1991.Source: Gourvish, Terry, British Rail 1974-97: From Integration to Privatisation, (Oxford, 2004), p.292

While the real terms funding of French and Italian railways by their governments increased over period (Italy  by a substantial amount) the German and British Governments reduced theirs. However, BR's superior performance is shown by the fact that the German government’s funding of Deutsche Bahn rose in the late 1970s, falling off in the early 1980s; whereas BR’s funding was reduced overall, reaching its lowest level in 1989. Indeed, of the four operators BR had had the least success in securing government funding over the period. Thus, while reducing its operating losses substantially and increasing some sectors' profitability, this data indicates that BR was, at the point it was privatised, highly efficient in comparison.

Therefore, Terry Gourvish’s figures have shown that in the 1980s and first half of the 1990s BR improved the profitability and performance of its business, reducing the burden on the taxpayer. By the mid-1990s it was one of the most efficient railway operators in Europe, if not the most efficient. Of course, I have only scratched the surface of what actually went on within BR here, and its story in the period wasn’t one of unabated progress. Yet, this data shows that claims by Steven Norris (and others) that BR was inefficient in the 1990s are just plain wrong. Indeed, if privatisation hadn't happened there is no telling how efficient or productive Britain's railways may have become after 1997.

If you would like to read more about BR's business, I would really recommend Terry Gourvish's book. 

[1] Gourvish, Terry, British Rail 1974-97: From Integration to Privatisation, (Oxford, 2004), p.455-456

The Railways and the Comprehensive Spending Review

This afternoon I listened to a Comprehensive Spending Review which I despised. Naturally, transport was the one area of government expenditure that I was keeping an eye out for. My honest opinion is that things could have been much worse for the railways. Just to clarify, I’m not saying that I liked what was announced, it was just that with all the hype that preceded the CSR I felt that transport, and more specifically the railways, were going to be clobbered to a much greater extent.

Firstly, some transport policies that I like, such as the building of Britain’s second high speed rail link, tube upgrades and the completion of Crossrail to improve London’s transport network, will go ahead. Indeed, after the Department of Defence, the Department for Transport has received the highest capital funding of £33 billion over the next three years. Although, we shouldn’t get too excited; the electrification of the Midland and Great Western main lines, and the replacement of Britain’s High Speed Trains through the Intercity Express Programme, were conspicuously not mentioned. Overall, we’ll all find out the details of the capital expenditure next week when the Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond, will make announcements regarding where the investments will actually be. Subsequently, at this stage no planned investment can be guaranteed to progress as expected (if at all).

Yet, the most definite policy that was announced with regard to the railways was that from 2012 regulated fares, which include savers and season tickets, will rise for three years at the rate of RPI+3%, whereas currently they rise at a rate of RPI+1%. Richard Hebditch, the Campaign for Better Transport’s campaign director, estimated (via the medium of Twitter http://twitter.com/RichardHebditch) that based on the government’s own estimations of the level of RPI and inflation over the course of this parliament, the rise in fares would be 31% overall. This is horrible and will hit commuters hard, especially in areas where there aren’t good tube links. While many will be able to absorb the increased transport costs into their household budgets, a great number will not.

I am a firm believer in the concept of transport poverty; the idea that the prohibitive cost of rail travel limits job opportunities for many people, keeping the standards of living down for them and their families. If the cost of travelling to higher paid employment wipes out any potential increases in people’s pay packet, then they simply won’t apply for those jobs. Further, if people don’t use the railways to travel longer distances to work, their employment opportunities in an area are limited as car commutes are generally shorter than rail ones. Lastly, if the up-front costs of season tickets are too high, so as to wipe out a person’s salary for a month or two, this will also limit where individuals look for work as they will be unwilling to make the initial commitment of funds.

Thus, in terms of transport policy all this CSR will serve to do is further hurt the poorest in society by limiting their opportunities to travel to better paid employment. Further, it will solidify a divide between the ’transport rich’ and the ‘transport poor.’

Increased Fares Means Increased Transport Poverty

While tackling the deficit, the coalition government has also wedded itself to the idea of decreasing the divide between rich and poor and increasing social mobility. Yesterday, on the 100 day anniversary of the coalition partnership, Nick Clegg said, "Our determination to fix the deficit is matched by our determination to create a more socially mobile society." Yet, the government still aspires to do this on the backdrop of savage cuts in every area from health to defence. While I am sure that they understand the inherent contradiction in trying to improve the lives of Britain’s poorest, while at the same time cutting their benefits and employment opportunities, I don’t think, with the level of cuts proposed, it can be done.

I am not alone though and the coalition’s proposed policies have been frequently attacked from the left, right and all those in between. There is an increasing body of comment and detailed statistical analysis in the blogosphere and elsewhere, that shows that if anything the proposed cuts will only serve to increase divisions in Britain between rich and poor. Kevin Meagher at Left Foot Forward recently quoted Danny Dorling, professor of Human Geography at Sheffield University, as saying that “Britain is a country pulling itself apart” along a North-South rich-poor divide (To be found HERE)Meagher went on to argue that the removal of Regional Development Agencies and their replacement with Local Economic Partnerships, will only exacerbate this divide as the latter will not have the scope because of their smaller sze to make an impact on the national economic imbalance. Indeed, he again quotes Dorling as saying that “The recession is exacerbating those [existing] differences and I suspect the dividing line will also move southwards as the government’s cuts take effect.”

Additionally, the TUC released yesterday a list that showed that cuts in education, health, housing, welfare and social care have the greatest impact on the poorest in our society. The 100 cuts that they can be found HERE. Furthermore, cuts in government run organisations and local authorities will disproportionately affect people above the north-south divide, as in these regions government is the largest employer. Therefore, the result is that the inevitable redundancies may lower many individual’s and family’s standards of living, and may even force them into poverty. These two examples are simply a small portion of the attacks on the government’s claims of fairness. Overall, my assessment is that the coalition government cannot really talk about ‘fairness’ and ‘social mobility’ when it is demonstrably true that their policies so far will only serve to breed inequality.

So what does this have to do with the railways? I have always been an advocate of the idea that there is a concept of ‘transport poverty,’ a divide between richer and poorer travellers. Many people are simply priced out of rail travel, and choose to make their journeys solely by car, because of their financial positions. This, therefore, has the obvious negative effects on the environment and the congestion on the roads, but it also disproportionately affects the poorest in our society. It was for this reason that I was pleased to see that in the Lib Dem manifesto there was a commitment to lowing fares. This was, however, watered down in the coalition agreement to simply a promise of ‘fair rail pricing.’ While less direct than the original Lib Dem manifesto, I originally thought, in the context of my own beliefs of course, that ‘fair’ meant exactly what it said on the tin; reasonable prices for all, which would subsequently increase accessibility to the rail network.

We have since learnt from the Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond, that ‘fair’ is a word that can be twisted to mean whatever you want it to do. At the House of Commons select committee on Transport, in response to the question ‘You are committed to fair pricing. Fair to whom?,’ he stated ‘I think there are two aspects on this. First of all, there is the question of overall fairness policy on the railway and ensuring that any increases in fares can be justified in terms of improvements in the service that passengers receive. [....] It is not just about fares; it is about value for money for passengers. [...] It is about making sure that [passengers] are given proper information about the most advantageous fare available to them, that the information that is published is clear so that passengers can get the best deal that is possible within any given framework of any given fare structure.’ So basically, the coalition meant that prices would be ‘fair’ within the existing pricing framework. But then again, prices are not ‘fair’ if large numbers of people won’t use the railways because of the pricing structure, if the prices are some of the highest in Europe (in some places 60% higher) and if rail travel is therefore reserved for the better off half off society.

But rail prices, I suspect, are about to become more unfair. In years past the Train Operating Companies (TOC) have been allowed to raise ticket prices by the retail Price Index (now at 4.8%) plus 1%, a total of 5.8% this year. But it has been reported this week (To be found HERE) that in an attempt to reduce the £5 billion annual subsidy the Department for Transport (DfT) gives to the TOC’s, it may be ready to break this rule and allow the companies to increase the ticket prices by up to a possible 10%.

I think that this is a severe mistake for a number of reasons. If prices did rise by this much, a greater proportion of the population would be priced out of using rail travel. This would put greater pressure on the road and motorway network, increasing congestion on both long-distance and suburban routes. With increased car journeys being made this would, of course, be detrimental to the environment. The other possible implication could be that individuals would be more inclined to search for work in their locale, rather than further afield, because they would be unwilling to pay the higher train fares on long-distance journeys. Thus, this would also affect their economic situation. Lastly, it would increase the hardship on people who cannot, or do not, drive for whatever reason and who have no option to use the railways for work or leisure.

But, I do feel strongly that there are other ways to keep the level of the subsidy to the TOCs constant, while at the same time maintaining (or reducing) current fare levels. It is no secret that Network Rail, one of the biggest draws on the Department for Transport’s finances, is terribly managed. Figures put the cost of maintaining Britain’s railway infrastructure at 30-50% above continental networks. Yet if the management was improved, efficiencies made and the organisation was streamlined, then some of that saved money could be used to keep the cost of fares down and keep the subsidy at the current level. This would increase access to rail transportation and reduce ‘transport poverty.’

Given the Government's track record on fairness so far, I’m afraid all I can foresee is that the fares will go up as reported. However, this will only serve to increase the numbers of people who won’t pay the extortionately high price of railway travel, increasing the ‘transport poverty’ divide.

What will happen on the railways in the next 5 years...some musings

Ah, so all the budgets of all government departments are going to be cut by 25%. Well, all the budgets except the ministry of health and international development. This is therefore going to be a scary time for the railway industry, especially as they take up the majority of the Department for Transport's (DfT) expenditure. I honestly, do not think that any idea, project or whim will escape the axeman's wrath. Nor do I think that the existing rail network will be immune. In short, start screaming now. I will now attempt to rationalise what is going to happen, or at least may happen.

1.Firstly, those projects which have already been stopped won't have any chance of being restarted soon. Even under the previous Labour Government some things had been kicked out of the park. For example, the Intercity Express Project, that was designed to replace Britain's ageing HSTs and Intercity 225s, was put on hold by Lord Adonis. But the new Government has already cut schemes such as Network Rail's 'Better Stations Project' that was going to improve some of Britain's most passenger-unfriendly stations. Lastly, as I discussed in an earlier Blog post, over 700 new carriages are not going to appear. The overall theme therefore is that comfort on rail journeys is not an important thing in the new era of fiscal tightening. You are going to be squeezed, pushed and jostled on your journey. In a way I don't mind so much, I have to say I expected this. Is comfort really the most necessary thing when everyone in the country is having to pitch in to reclaim the debt? In truth, I don't thinks so, but I just really wish it wasn't happening.

2.The raising of fares will also be on the agenda...naturally. While I think a lot of people will jump to blame the new government, but then I'm not unfair. I should point out that increasing the price of tickets actually was on the cards under Labour. They wanted to reduce the amount of money that they paid to the Train Operating Companies (TOC), who in turn would have to put up the train fares to make up the funding shortfall. My only concern now is that with the DfT turning increasingly pro-road under Philip Hammond, they will allow a much more fervent rise in fares that may price people out of rail travel even further. This, however, in a way makes sense, especially given what I said above. If there is less space on the trains, a few less passengers would probably make my journey less stressful. This said, I'm not happy about it. Nothing should ever be done to discourage the public to use the trains.

3.So what of the big capital projects. Well, of course there is Britain's second High Speed Line (HS2), which was to link London with Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds through new whizzy trains. I have to be honest, I don't think this'll happen. Firstly, it's just WAY WAY WAY too expensive. Simple. But more to the point, with the cost being roughly £34 billion, and with a 25% cut in the amount of money available to the DfT, I am convinced that that the cash will be needed to maintain the existing network. Further, when I think of the way that the project was talked about before the election, in that the issue was sustained by the fact that no party wanted to pull their support for it, I think that the government will realise that that it was a political marketing stunt and as such it will loose its importance. With the new coalition, I suspect, it will get quietly dropped. On top of this, I suspect that the electrification of the Great Western Main Line will be dropped...again quietly. All in all I feel the message for the railway industry in the next 5 years will be to make the best out of the country's existing infrastructure.

4.Lastly, I think that the government will be much more cautious about renewing franchise agreements. On the 18th June the DfT put all franchise renewals on hold and extended the length of time that the East Coast franchise would remain in public hands. Some part of me thinks that this move is a precedent and that the DfT has seen that renationalising franchises by stealth is the cheaper option. My hope is that over the next 20 years privatisation will fizzle out. Yea, this is whimsy. There's no chance. I just think they will take more time to formulate what they want from the franchise agreements, and then make them longer. This hasn't really been a bad thing, the Chiltern franchise, that is 20 years in duration, has been one of the consistently the best performing. Thus, I think that longer franchise agreements may actually be good for the traveller and will deliver better services. However, it may also mean that the DfT restricts the amount of money they put into the franchises and force the TOCs to put up fares and reduce the quality of the travelling experience. I think in the new anti-rail era, the latter is more likley.

For all my speculation what will actually happen is a mystery. However, if the railways are going to be cut in such a horrific way one thing does need to happen that I don't think has happened in a long time. The government, DfT and all involved need to ask themselves one crucial question...what do we want our railways to do? Yes...we need a strategy. At the moment they are simply being looked on as an expense, a position that I think that will become more prevalent under the Conservative government. The railways to state their purpose, to define their role within the nation, within the economy and within the public's lives. If we know what the railways are for, if we have a clear-sighted goal, then all those involved can work towards making it (whatever it is) a reality. At the moment the TOC's, NR, the DfT, simply do their job without any purpose. They spend their time fighting, maintaining the status quo and not really affecting real change. What we need is a concerted effort to make Britain's railways the best they can be, for everyone who lives here so that we can survive the cuts to come.

Proving that Philip Hammond, the Transport Secretary, is pro-car, anti-rail...Sardine time!

The new Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond, is still a worrying figure. I never know what he is going to do next. Last week he announced that the last government's train carriage procurement programme would undergo an “urgent reappraisal.” This programme was put in place by Labour in March 2007 to build for Britain's railway network 1,300 brand-spanking, shiny new carriages by March 2014. By March this year 526 had been delivered with around a 100 more on order. The carriages were introduced to ease the capacity problems that have the potential to make everyone feel like a sardine in the near future, as it was estimated that by March 2014 there would be a 17 per cent (64,900) increase in peak commuter traffic into London, and a 27 per cent rise (17,400) in the numbers of people travelling into other cities.

With the economic crisis in full swing, it was unlikely that these sorts of projects would be immune from cuts. Lets face it, while capacity is a severe problem between 8 and 9 am, when there is on weekdays half the day's inward London commuter traffic, capacity is not a problem at other times. Therefore, the rational for vast expenditure on just one hour of traffic is not as great as safety equipment, new lines or maintenance. After all, people can just travel earlier if they don't like it. That is, at least, what some people think.

The backdrop for the “urgent reappraisal” of the project was the National Audit Office's (NAO) report on the government's plans to address the potential capacity problems. Now the report, which has been framed by almost every news outlets as being a 'hammer-blow' to the project and a shocking indictment of profligate Labour spending, was quite measured in looking at the programme from a viewpoint in a changed economic environment. If people had bothered to read it (well I've read the summary) they would have realised this.

It stated a number of things that perhaps we should have really expected with an economic downturn. Firstly the growth in commuter passengers is unlikely to materialise as predicted. We're not, however, talking a 20% drop, not even 10%, but only a meagre 5%, and even that is a bit pie-in-the-sky as the report suggests that “There are some signs that the recession has indeed reduced the use of rail but the extent of the impact is not yet clear.” Secondly, the report stated that the cost of building the new carriages has gone up since 2007, which means that the Department for Transport would either have to incur more cost to fund the same number of carriages, or keep spending at the same level and purchase fewer carriages. This was, quite naturally, a good chance for the Daily Mail to attack Labour by accusing it of wasteful spending.

But in reality the report was a mixed one for the former government. It criticises the model that they used for predicting passenger rises, stating that the sample of information used was not large enough. The predictions also did not take into account the relationship between economic growth and passenger numbers, and made assumptions that simplified the realities of the real world so that result could be obtained. Thus these factors may have distorted the predictions. But let us not get totally disheartened. Overall the report stated that the forecasting was 'robust' and was based on a 'good knowledge of the railway network.' Indeed, it also states that the real world assumptions were inevitable given that it is incredibly difficult to predict some passenger behaviour, for example when a passenger changes off their 'preferred' train because they don't want to be on a crowded one. Further, it also stated that the models used for economic growth were 'in line with treasury guidance,' and on this count the DfT cannot be blamed as they wouldn't really go elsewhere for this information now would they? Therefore, there may be some room for justifiable criticism of the forecasts, but in reality I will give the Labour DfT 6/10, as some things were done right.

Indeed, Philip Hammond saying that the former government was profligate with money actually contradicts the report. It states that the Department, 'is assessing each scheme again for value for money before approving them.' While on a cursory reading this may seem that these assessments were introduced by the current government, the NAO was actually compiling information for the report between July and October 2009. It was, therefore, the previous government that was assessing each project's value for money, and for Hammond to make this claim when the initial rational for the procurement project was sound and the change in economic environment was unknown in 2007, is verging on ridiculous. Let us not forget, it was they who actually commissioned the report, and there is nothing to say that they wouldn't have decided to put the new carriages on hold as well. Hammond is therefore just using the report to bash the previous government. While that is something I am never afraid of doing, I won't do it unfairly.

In truth, I think it is sensible in the short-term for the government to reassess the building of new carriages, especially as the cost is now higher than it was before. What has really got me worried, what has really made me stir, is Hammond. I suspect this will be used by him as the basis to rule out, for the term of this government, any new carriage procurement or capacity-increasing measures. It will mean that as the passenger traffic continues to grow (and remember they can't prove yet that there has been any drop in numbers) the government will simply allow passenger trains to become more crowded. I can't prove for sure that this is Hammond's long-term thinking, but it wouldn't surprise me given the evidence that I will now present proving his pro-road, anti-rail perspective.

Now I have banged on about Hammond's suspected pro-road attitude before in the blog, citing comments he has made that I think allude to it. Yet I (and the rest of the media apparently) have found nothing concrete, nothing solid, that confirms all the fears of those in the railway industry or in the press that he holds these views. Hammond, as the head of the Department of Transport, isn't exactly going to state that he prefers one form of travel over another is he (and congratulations to Norman Baker, Minister of State for Transport for dodging the question on the Daily Politics Show earlier). To come out explicitly favouring one sort of transport when he hasn't been long in the job would be lunacy.

So I did a bit of digging on a wonderful site called 'They Work For You', looking for any comments that Hammond has made on his possible love of cars as opposed to railways. I did not expect to find the evidence that follows. This evidence conclusively proves what I have come to suspect in the last few months. In a debate in Parliament on regional policy in January 2003 Hammond made this comment:-

“Although everyone would like railways and airports in their regions that will help to generate economic development, such transport investments depend on volume and critical mass to deliver effective services. I am afraid to say—because it flies in the face of much Government thinking—that only roads, as a form of transport infrastructure, are likely to deliver the short-term immediate benefits to the regions where economic development needs kick-starting.”

How about this this one from a debate in November of 2003 on the Quality of Life, when he said:-

“If those people go by train, they will have plenty of time to ponder on the longer journey times and decreased reliability of a railway that is soaking up ever-larger volumes of taxpayer's money. And they will perhaps have a chance to consider the Government's extraordinary feat in turning a poorly performing element of our infrastructure—our national railway—into a worse performing one, which now seems to need to double as a bottomless pit for public finance, if we are to avoid its imploding completely. If they go by car, they will be able to contemplate the £45 billion in taxes that Government impose on motorists, while considering that Britain's spends the lowest proportion of motoring taxes on transport of any country in the western world.”

His last comment is from the Finance Bill, debated in June 2008, in which he uses a 'road' example and breezes over rail investment as being good for business:-

“One can envisage such situations with railway or new road infrastructure, if we are trying to encourage private companies, as the Government have done with the M6 toll motorway for investment in road infrastructure. Similar considerations would apply—very long payback periods for very durable pieces of investment.”

I will let you read what you will into these comments individually. However, joining the dots between them, which are all clearly on the pro-car side of the fence, and his more recent statements that I have detailed in a previous blog entry, (To be found HERE) the evidence suggests that we have a Secretary of State for transport that is very anti-railways and very pro-roads. Therefore, having Hammond as Transport Secretary may potentially mean that rail investment as a whole will suffer, while the car reigns supreme. I feel I need to be dipped in Oil, it's Sardine time!

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Conservative transport policy...time to be scared?

I have been thinking a lot about the new Conservative Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond. As someone interested in having better railways in Britain, I instinctively worry about Conservative Governments. They have in the past been about as useful as a bacon slicer in a cheese shop; it may do something, but ultimately you'll end up gooey and with half your finger sliced off.

This fear isn't irrational though. It doesn't automatically stem from a loathing of all things Tory, (however I do have to confess that as a disgruntled Lib-Dem I am quick to condemn them) nor does it come from a default loathing of the fee market, which history tells us they love, cuddle and, given the chance, would have coitus with. It doesn't even originate from erroneous idea that since the beginning the Conservatives have always historically been the ones to mess up the railways. Indeed, some of the greatest policy errors, including the Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1894 and parts of the Railways Act of 1921, both of which restricted the way that railway companies could charge for their services and therefore damaged their profits, were both enacted by Liberal governments.

My worry, profuse in nature and massive in my head, is that over the last 50 years Conservative Governments have persistently damaged Britain's rail network. Now, I'm not saying that that's what Conservative Governments set out to do, but I can't help discerning a pattern of destructive policies and loathing towards the railways that was ongoing. It is my hope, however, that the new Conservative-Lib Dem Government doesn't go the same way.

The first real pain that the Conservatives inflicted on Britain's railways was installing one Richard Beeching as chairman of British Railways (BR) in 1961. He was appointed by Ernest Marples (shown), the Conservative Minister for Transport, who brought him from his position as Technical Director at ICI. It is in his new position that Beeching came to be considered a 'Railway Satan.' He was tasked with moving BR into profitability. He shared the view with the Government that BR should be run like a business and not solely in the public interest. In his 1963 report, The Reshaping of British Railways, he proposed closing 6000 of the country's 18000 miles of railway, most of which were rural and cross country lines. This would also mean shutting 7000 stations and allow BR to shed 70,000 jobs over three years. He estimated the recommended changes would make BR profitable by 1970 and as a result Marples implemented most of them.

The Beeching Report, as we now know, was terrible for many reasons. Firstly the report did not take into account the social benefits of railway lines serving communities that had no other transport links. These small communities, that still shape our view of the sleepy little English village, had existences that revolved around their railway lines. Suddenly, like a whirlwind, these services were gone. Secondly, Beeching's cuts were based on traffic figures that were gathered in the spring when some places that had heavy tourist traffic were at their quietest, such as lines on the North Cornwall coast. Therefore when these lines were closed it destroyed industry and tourism in these regions. North Cornwall, to this day, still has a failing economy. Thirdly, there was no attempt to decrease cost through other means, such as modernisation, (despite the failed BR modernisation plan of the 1950s) that would have allowed some lines to stay open. Beeching's sole cost-cutting policy was to apply the axe when a line failed to pay its way. Lastly, the cuts went too far. The plans did not foresee that roads would fill up and did not anticipate any future transport needs. These are just some of the many criticisms of the plan, and in the end Beeching's goal of profitability was never reached. What it most certainly did do was cost many people their livelihoods.

Now I am not automatically going to knock Beeching himself and I have always though that it was Marples particularly that was at fault. Firstly, Marples was a man who's background looked a bit suspect. Marples co-owned a construction company, Marples-Ridgeway, that was heavily into road building. Indeed, surprise, surprise, it was Marples that authorised the M1 be built from London to Nottingham and it was Marples-Ridgeway that built it. Further, and this is important, Beeching only made recommendations in his report, it was Marples who actually gave the order to close the lines. Therefore, when the line between London and Nottingham closed, forcing travellers onto the M1, the fishiness is plain to smell. Marples evidently used his position, and the Beeching report, to further his own business interests. Secondly, Marples brought in a businessmen in Beeching and that in itself was going to mean harsh cuts were going to be proposed. My point is that if you place a wolf in a chicken coup, don't expect that it'll imitate the chickens. Businessmen will act as businessmen if they are simply told to make something profitable. Indeed, it was Beeching's narrow terms of reference, simply to bring BR into profit, that meant he looked at things simply in terms of profit and loss. Thus, he acted accordingly. Overall I feel that it was Marples who was the man to blame for the cuts, as he was driven by a pro-road agenda. Beeching, I feel, simply did his job, even if he did it badly.

So where to next? Oh yes, the privatisation of British Rail in the early to mid 1990s. This is, in some ways, a more erroneous action by a Conservative Government that the Beeching cuts. Beeching, effigies of which railway enthusiasts still stick pins into, at least was brought in to solve a specific problem. British Railways was unprofitable, its cost tax payers money, Beeching was tasked with reversing this. However, John Major's Government of the 1990s broke up British Rail because of ideology. The free market was their God, and they worshipped it to the max. Their goal was to make Britain's railways efficient and innovative by the introduction of competition. Silly arses.

By the early 1990s British Rail was actually running very efficiently. Maggie, bless her cotton socks, had restricted BR's budget quite considerably. This had had the effect of scaring its bosses so much that the aim of Beeching, railway profitability, actually became a reality in some parts of the organisation. Certain services, such as intercity and Network South East, actually started to make money. The Thatcher Government also shocked everyone when it authorised the electrification of the East Coast Main Line and purchased new rolling stock. Everyone involved stood back and applauded. BR was, by 1994, at its most cost-effective. Then Thatcher was out and Major came in.

Thatcher, it may surprise everyone to know, was actually against the privatisation of the railways. However, Major, under the influence of the 'Adam Smith think tank,' pushed forward with privatisation in the Railways Act 1993. This created an infrastructure company, Railtrack, that maintained all the working parts (track, signals, major stations etc.), three ROSCOs that owned the rolling stock and who leased it to the 25 Train Operating Companies (TOCs) who actually ran the trains. Further, BR's engineering department was split up, as was the freight services that were now under the control of 6 private companies. This is the very basic version of how BR was split up. To go through the number of companies that were involved and the cack-handed way that BR was destroyed, would take endless Blog posts that would make me into a hermit.

The split up of BR caused many problems, and what follows were the key ones. Firstly, the track ownership was separated from the trains. This currently causes problems as there are conflicts between the operators of trains and the Network Rail. Secondly, the infrastructure maintenance was privatised , leading to cost cutting, sloppy maintenance and a string of crashes. The Southall accident in 1997, Ladbroke Grove in 1999 and Hatfield in 2000 all contributed to Railtrack's downfall. In 2001 it was placed in administration and in 2002 all of its assets were transferred to the state owned, not-for-profit company, Network Rail. Thirdly, the railways now cost the taxpayer far more money than is necessary. Because in the privatisation process someone forgot to flag up that railways don't make profit, it means that many franchises, such as South West Trains and National Express East Anglia are subsidised simply so that they have profits high enough to pay their shareholders dividends. Yet at the same time many Train Operating Companies still have to pay money back to the government as part of their contracts, and failure to do so sees them stripped of their franchises, for example National Express East Coast last year. Overall, these weird arrangements mean that we pay over the odds as taxpayers for the train services. In 1994 government funding for BR was £1,627m, approximately £2,168m in 2005 terms. In 2005 government support came to £4,593m. I could list more faults, but the general consensus is that a Conservative Government privatised the railways very badly, when they were at their most cost-effective, simply because it sat well with their ideology.

What, therefore, does the future hold with this government? Are those who, like me, are interested in having good railways quaking in their boots? Railway commentators were shocked and worried last week when the new Secretary of State for Transport, Philip Hammond (shown), laid out a possible change in direction for the Department for Transport. I wrote a few Blogs back about how I felt that Lord Adonis was probably the best Secretary of State for the railways in a long while, and how his enthusiasm for railways should be continued. However, Hammond was quoted last week as saying that Labour's "war on the motorist" was going to be ended. Is there a war? I didn't hear gunfire. All I heard were Clarksonesque individuals who like to feel victimised mouthing off. Hammond was referring to an illusory conflict and it was a worrying portent. I read this statement as meaning the new government was taking a pro-roads stance and could hear Marples' footsteps in the background. If he was going to view transport policy through a prism of pro or anti different forms of transport then he was simplifying a complex issue.

As I speak the Government's 'Programme for Government' is being unrolled through the news outlets. In the transport section there is a lot of good news for those interested in better railways. There will be longer franchises, Network Rail will be more accountable to it customers (i.e. us), high speed rail is supported, with options to expand it beyond the basic plans already drawn up, there is support for Crossrail, support for electrification (which I honestly didn't think would still be on the cardsunder the new Government), the rail regulator will become a strong passenger champion and, lastly, there is a commitment to fair rail pricing. Some things have been left out, such as improvements to Thameslink, re-opening closed lines and the Intercity Express Program. However this plan for the next 5 years is, on the surface of things, a very good result for the railways given the financial constraints of government.

History has taught me to fear Conservative transport policies when it comes to the railways, that they are essentially a destructive party in this respect. Therefore, naturally, I suspect that many of the above policies have the Lib Dem's fingerprints all over them. Yet if the Government adheres in the next 5 years to what it has set out today, then I might start to change my opinion. I wait and see...

The child who sits out games...the Tories and High Speed 2

Now I didn't think I could get away without mentioning a little announcement that came on Thursday regarding plans to build a second high speed line northwards out of London. However as an avid reader of left-leaning and liberal blogs, I was surprised not to find any criticism of the Conservative position on High Speed 2 (HS2) beyond the established press. OK I may not have been looking that hard, but at least I did look. In truth I, and most rational people, feel that High Speed 2 should not be a party-political problem, as its development and construction will take place over a period of 20 years. Therefore given it could take four parliaments, possible alien invasions, and hover-boots to get going, the parties have to work together to make this happen.

All the parties endorse high speed rail. Indeed it was the Lib Dems that committed themselves to it first, the Conservatives followed, and lastly Labour signed up. So with this consensus established, in January 2009 they rallied around the company set up by the Government to look into building this line, the imaginatively named 'High Speed Two Limited' (HS2 Ltd). This cross-party cooperation was consistently and unequivocally backed by the Secretary of State for Transport, Lord Adonis who stated that the issue should be “above politics.”

Get to mid-February and the Conservatives bolted from the consensus, refusing to see advance versions of HS2 Ltd's plans and waiting, like the rest of us, to see the report which was released on Thursday. In the process they also drew up their own plans using some 'industry experts.' Theresa Villiers, The Shadow Transport Secretary's, reasoning behind this lack of cooperation was that the Conservatives were "not going to give a political blank cheque to Labour." Withdrawing was a matter, or so she said, of holding onto their rights to draw up a separate alternative to the HS2 Ltd plan. She also stated that it would be “unfair” to make a deal behind closed doors. The problem with this argument was that it was all part-politically motivated, an attempt in an election year to separate themselves from what has, in all honestly, been a well thought out, well run, process.

Their arguments for withdrawing from the consensus were so wishy washy that you'd worry that the Conservatives were serious politicians. Firstly there was no indication that there was a political blank cheque anywhere. Such a thing would entail Lord Adonis standing up and saying “Look what I did! Praise the Labour initiative.” Well sorry Theresa, you can't win this one. Of course, the fact that Labour is in government means that they are the driving force behind the project, but Adonis has consistently and repeatedly stated that this is not a party political matter and has promoted this fact. In addition Lib Dem Transport spokesman, Norman Baker, said on the Guardian Daily Podcast, that he, and Villers, have had been given access to Lord Adonis, HS2 Ltd and all briefings. Additionally he said he was involved in the formulation of the proposals all the way. How then, Theresa, has the HS2 initiative been a blank political cheque when the project has consistently and loudly been shouted from the roof-tops as being cross-party and there has been no attempt by the Government to restrict the other parties' access? In truth the the fact that the Conservatives bolted is because it was an election year, and they would rather not be seen cosying up to Labour on anything. This was a mistake for them though. In reality the prominent cross-party nature of the project meant that, even in February, their rejection of this principal meant that they just ended up looking petty and isolated.

But it got worse on Thursday. It is not surprising that on day of announcement the Conservatives rejected, in part, the plan proposed by HS2 Ltd. While still wedded to the idea of the high speed line their two main objections were the proposed connections to Leeds and to Heathrow. Firstly lets take a look at the Leeds debate. In the HS2 Ltd plan the second stage of the route proposes that the line makes a Y shape after Birmingham, with one line going off to Manchester and another to Leeds. I would think this is a common sense approach considering that the aim of the line is to speed up the links between the North and South, and therefore stimulate economic growth. Well guess what, the Conservatives alternative plan rejected this logical simplicity. Their projected line would be run to Manchester and cross to Leeds in a L-shape. Why on earth would anybody wanting to go to Leeds travel to Manchester first, particularly when there is already a 2 hour link from London out of King's Cross? There would be no benefit in time saved for the traveller! This is a ridiculous plan, and just another attempt by the Conservatives to distinguish themselves from Labour.

The second bone of contention for the Conservatives was the Heathrow question. The line planned by HS2 Ltd would run out of Euston, through Old Oak Common, where travellers can connect with Crossrail and a 11 minute link to Heathrow through the Heathrow Express. There would be no direct link between HS2 and the airport. Again the HS2 Ltd plans were logical for a number of reasons that they set out, including the high cost of tunnelling under Heathrow itself and the fact that a direct route would add 15 minutes to the journey time from Birmingham. Thus the final route they proposed has been supported almost universally by the transport press, by Labour and the Lib Dems. It is the best plan, that avoids unnecessary effort and keeps an efficient and quick, albeit not direct, link between HS2 and Heathrow.

However on Thursday Theresa Villiers raised strong, but factious, objections to this plan. The Conservatives have been pushing for a direct link between HS2 and the airport from the start of the process, in an attempt to offset the mess they have got themselves into over the third runway. Villiers said that HS2 Ltd's plan was a 'betrayal' of the original vision and that not connecting Birmingham with Heathrow was a 'big mistake.' Thus the Conservative alternative proposals have the Heathrow embedded in them, like a tick, with a direct link between HS2 and the airport. This said, their plans actually don't have a perfect link between HS2 and Heathrow, and their route still means that travellers would have to get off the train just short of airport and get a shuttle bus service. Therefore how long would that take out of the passengers journey times? 11 minutes perhaps? Add the 15 extra minutes on the train journey and this adds a significantly large amount of unnecessary time onto journeys from Birmingham. Therefore, like their alternative route to Leeds the, the Conservative's Heathrow alternative has thrown logic out of the window, in an a paper thin attempt to differentiate themselves from Labour. This, however, has once again made them look ridiculous and confrontational.

In an interesting postscript to Thursday's events, yesterday Villiers' objections to HS2 Ltd's plans were further exposed as wishy-washy by resistance to the alternative proposals from individuals within her own party. Firstly Boris Johnson rejected the alternative scheme. While he did not commit to Labour's plan explicitly, he stated that, “A central London terminal is essential as well as an interchange with Crossrail to the west of London in order to whisk people to and from Heathrow as speedily as possible.” This, in essence, was a tacit acceptance of the HS2 Ltd plan. Further, on Thursday Villers made the foolish mistake of calling the Old Oak Common interchange site, which is in the Conservative controlled Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, “Wormwood Scrubs International.” This quite naturally brought ire of the local council, and Mark Loveday, the council's head of strategy came out saying “It is unrivalled as a site for west London's High Speed 2 interchange.” While I wouldn't like to speak for the whole of the Conservative party, it is clear that the illogical stance of the Shadow Transport Secretary has divided internal party opinion.

Therefore from start to finish the position of senior Conservatives has been to go with their partisan instinct, rather than act with their brain, by consistently making this a party-political issue. They have consistently presented alternatives to the HS2 Ltd that are illogical and are simply different for difference's sake, in bumbling efforts to differentiate themselves from the consensus and Labour. However their plans, and their objections to the HS2 Ltd plans, have been rejected by the transport media, the other parties, and most notably voices within their own party. This has therefore made senior Conservatives look weak, confrontational and obstructionist. By separating themselves from the political consensus they are now simply the child who sits out games, when everyone else is having fun.

Your new train will not arrive

I suppose I couldn't write a new Blog entry without mentioning the plans announced by Lord Adonis to put the Intercity Express Programme (ICP) on hold. This programme was initiated by the Department for Transport (at that point under Geoff 'you send me an email and I won't give you my support' Hoon) in November 2007 and was designed to replace the ageing class 125 HSTs and class 225s currently at work across the network. The project would cost £7.5 billion, would be a 30 year commitment by the government and see the introduction of 1400 new carriages. The DfT specified that the trains were to be low-emission, have both diesel and electric variants (as well as a bi-mode) and would be suitable for both suburban and long distance routes, reaching speeds of up to 125 mph. Time passed and in February 2009 it was announced that the highly un-imaginatively named 'Agility trains,' a consortium led by Hitatchi, was the DfT's preferred bidder. And then we had mostly silence from the DfT...until now

What happened on Friday was that Lord Adonis simply said 'hang on a minute!' He postponed the programme, and asked Sir Andrew Foster, who was previously at the helm of Audit Commission, to look into the value for money of the project, as well as determining whether any other courses of action are viable. Originally all contracts were to be signed in April 2009, however as April has come and gone it is clear that the DfT was either dragging its heels, the circumstances within the railway industry changed or that there was a problem with the original concept.

Firstly I'll turn to Theresa Villier's, Shadow Transport Secretary's comments. She said "The intercity express programme has been blighted by Government incompetence at every turn.” She also charged the government with "micro-management" and costing the tax payer millions of pounds for no return. By now it is clear that what Villiers has done is just put on the old Tory record with three tracks, 'incompetence,' 'micro-management' and 'loadsamoney.' There is no real substance to the argument...but then that's what we've been used to from the Conservatives.

It is clear that the postponement is due to a number of quite logical factors. Firstly, like everything at the moment, lets blame the financial crisis. If we consider that the deadline for contracts to be signed was April, and that the Hitatch consortium was announced as the front runner in February, this indicates that at that point the DfT were on the verge of signing and meeting its target date. But as the financial crisis deepened the DfT held off committing the government and the country to a £7.5 bn project over the next 30 years. This is not, I'm sorry to say Theresa Villiers, incompetence. It it simple common sense not to flush shit-loads down the drain when the ability of the Government and the Taxpayer to bare the load was dubious. Therefore they just held up spending the money at this point, until things stabilise, especially as the money was probably needed elsewhere. This is evidenced by Adonis being very upfront about one of the reasons he held up the project, stating that "Over the course of the procurement there has been a reduction in the capacity of the debt market to support the transaction as originally envisaged, and passenger growth has also slowed." Thus it would be ill-advised to spend large sums of money when the country cannot afford it. But what's more the DfT's plans for the railways have changed, rendering the ICP project not as necessary as previously thought.

This is not really as surprise. Hoon, who initiated it, wasn't a railway man, or, to my knowledge, even had an interest. He was just given the DfT as a demotion after being Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Privy Seal and Minister for Europe. His instillation as Secretary of State for Transport was the twilight of his political career, and as much as I love Transport, being assigned the DfT is not glamorous and comes with next to no prestige. Therefore in the eight months I'm not sure how much enthusiasm the man could muster when he realised he had been put 'out for pasture' there. As such this was the only major new initiative he announced. To be fair it isn't a bad idea to replace the ageing trains, its just not that imaginative, and doesn't solve the real long-term problems of the railways.

However when he resigned last June to 'spend time with his family' and then plot against Brown, they got the Adonis in. Adonis came from a different direction having been Minister for Transport under Hoon. Here was a man who wasn't just interested in railways, but genuinely cared about them. It is an understatement to say that the majority of people like Adonis, even if they don't agree with him. In the eight months since his appointment has commissioned a report investigating a north-south high speed line, has kicked out a failing franchise holder, National Express East Coast, only to nationalise the service as well, and he has announced the electrification of various routes most notably the Great Western and Midland Main Lines. This, quite evidently, is a man that actually has a vision for the future of the railways and pushes for that vision within government. Hoon was, for the railways, a bit of a damp squib in comparison.

Importantly for the ICE programme is that by announcing the Electrification of some routes Adonis has changed the rolling stock requirements on them. This therefore would have been a considerable factor in the delaying further the project. Again, why should the taxpayer pay for a project that was unsuitable within the new framework of policy proposals that have been initiated by a man that sees the future of the railway network more clearly than anyone has in the last 25 years? Why should the DfT press ahead with a project that would not slot in well with the current thinking about what is needed for Britain's Railways? Villiers likes to charge the DfT with the usual problems, in reality I think the Tories would be jumping up and down far more if the government had signed contracts and committed the country to an unsuitable set of investments.

Yes money has been spent on the project, but the waste of a few millions, essentially small change for the Government, is far better than wasting 7.5 billion now isn't it? It is possible the postponement and reassessment could have been made sooner, however I tend to think that rushing decisions about such an expensive projects, even if they are going to be put on hold, is never a bad thing. Adonis, I feel, has taken his time and made the right decision.