An Important Piece of Railway Stationary - The Guard's Journal

The stationary of Britain’s railways is not the most fascinating subject in isolation. Yet, every piece of paper that the Victorian railway companies did have a purpose and relating stationary to its purpose is, therefore, more interesting. The guards journal was probably one of the most unchanging pieces of stationary in British Railway history, being developed in the industry’s formative years and surviving right through until (at least) the 1960. By virtue of its long life it suggests that they were crucial to the efficient management and operation of Britain’s railways.

The journals were simply pre-printed notebooks in which the guard of a train recorded the details of the journey. The 1853 London and South Western Railway (L&SWR) rule book specified that goods guards were required to note the following details:-

1.The number of Waggons in a Train (loaded and empty) at the beginning of the journey. 
2.The number picked up and left at intermediary stations
3.The supposed and actual times of arrival and departure from stations 
4.Any remarks relating to the journey.

The only variation on this in the Passenger Guards journal was that there was no requirement to record the number of carriages a train.[1]

There is no indication that the basic information recorded in the journals changed up to the 1910s on the L&SWR. A blank version of a Passenger Guard’s Journal from the period (it having inside 191_) required the same information to be recorded as in previous years, but with many additional pieces of evidence. The full list of what had to be entered by gaurds can be found below.

1.Day, Date and Time of Journey
2.Time at which train arrived and departed ‘stations, junctions or signal boxes.’
3.The lateness of the train at each scheduled place.
4.Formation of the train
       a.Description of the Vehicle
       b.Painted Number
       c.Number of Wheels
       d.Block or Set Train Number
5.Vehicles taken on or off the train
6.Engine Number
7.Weather Conditions
8.Driver Name
9.Number of Inches of Vacuum Maintained
10.Name of the Assistant Guard.
11.Service Book Number
12.Special Notice Number
13.Service Number
14.Explanation of Delays, remarks &c[2]

Once again, the only difference with the goods guards’ journals was that the guards still had to record the number of wagons in a train and where wagons were picked up and dropped off.

The importance of the journals came after the journey had been finished. On arrival at the trains destination, the guard would deposit the journal in the office of a senior Traffic Department manager (either the Superintendent of the Line[3], or District Superintendent[4]). The clerks of the office would set to work on them, extrapolating the data contained within.

Senior managers would subsequently receive reports on how efficiently the trains were running, how overloaded with wagons they trains were, how to time the trains were operating, where wagons were dropped and taken on the train, and any occurrences of note that was occurring on particular parts of the network. Subsequently, decisions could be made by them, for example to increase the number of goods trains on a certain line to reduce train loading, build new types of locomotive to increase pulling power, schedule more trains on a particular line, increase or decrease the number staff at stations or yards dependent on the level of traffic coming from them, or notify other departments that repairs to the trains, rolling stock or the line were required.

But the value of the guards’ journals went beyond just aiding the efficiency of the Traffic Department. In 1857 the Locomotive Committee of the L&SWR asked the Traffic Committee (that had charge of the running of the trains through the Traffic Department) if the Locomotive Department could have access to them. They required use of them to ascertain the mileage of all the company’s rolling stock, and subsequently monitor how much it cost the department to maintain carriages and wagons for each mile that they travelled.[5] This was allowed, and the journals were subsequently viewed by Locomotive Department clerks in the Superintendent of the Line’s Office.[6] From the returns that have been seen within other companies, it is suspected that this was a universal industry practice. This enabled senior Locomotive Department managers to see whether it was prudent to replace, rather than renovate, rolling stock, whether to increase the repairs schedule, or attempt to make cost savings in the repairs procedure.

It is, therefore, understandable that the guards’ journal remained central to railway operations for well over 100 years, as they was central to shaping decision makers policies on how the line was operated and its efficiency.

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[1] London School of Economics Library [LSE], HE 3020.L L84, Rules and Regulations for the Guidance of Officers and Servants of the London and South Western Railway Company, 28^th April 1853, Rule 24, p.77

[2] Author’s Collection, Blank Passenger Guard’s Journal, 191?

[3] TNA, RAIL 411/178, Locomotive, Carriage and Stores and Locomotive committees, Minute No. 321, 5^th November 1857

[4] SWC, London and South Western Railway Appendix to the Book of Rules and Regulations, 1^st January 1911, p.140

[5] TNA, RAIL 411/178, Locomotive, Carriage and Stores and Locomotive committees, Minute No. 303, 8^th October 1857

[6] TNA, RAIL 411/178, Locomotive, Carriage and Stores and Locomotive committees, Minute No. 321, 5^th November 1857

The Problem with the Late Victorian British Railway Industry

The declining performance of the British railway industry in the late Victorian period is something that I have referred to repeatedly in my blog, but which I have never fully explained. Indeed, this topic is central to my PhD, which will, hopefully, determine how well the London and South Western Railway was managed between 1870 and 1914. Generally, we know that across this period, while gross railway company profits continued to rise, the profit margin of the industry declined.

Probably the best way to measure this decline is through studying the industry’s the operating ratio. This shows what cost of running the railway industry was as a proportion of its total revenue. Using figures provided by Pollins in Britain’s Railways: An Industrial History, the operating ratio for the British railway industry increased as follows between 1870 and 1902:-

1870 – 48%

1874 – 55%

1878 – 53%

1882 – 52%

1886 – 52%

1890 – 54%

1894 – 56%

1898 – 58%

1902 – 62%

Thus, running Britain’s railways became progressively less profitable and more costly. Thus, historians, mostly writing in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, tried to determine why this was so. Yet, there has not been any consensus on the issue.

On the one hand, many historians have argued that the railway industry’s decreasing profitability was caused by external pressures. Ashworth argued that in the mid-1870's traffic growth occurred in low-margin sectors, such as third class passenger and short-haul bulk goods. Companies were subsequently forced into building new facilities because they were too vulnerable financially and politically to refuse carrying traffic. Further, 'pricing and service policies enforced by government and transport pressure groups,' worsened the companies’ situations after this.[1] Irving added to this, arguing that because the public and politicians saw the railways as a service, and put pressure on them to act in such ways, that the companies tried to preserve their commercial freedoms by increasing the 'quality and supply of transport.' This 'involved disproportionate increases in costs and staff.'[2] Further, in an environment where the cost of labour was rising, expensive railway technology was required by law, and there were proportionately falling charges, this meant that the companies' rates of return fell. [3]

On the other hand, the opposing view is that the railway industry became progressively poorly managed over the period 1870 to 1900. Aldcroft accepted that the industry faced the external pressures cited,[4] however, he charged railway managers with a range of failures such as excess line capacity, corporate empire building, under-utilization of fixed equipment, duplicate facilities[5], a failure to relate prices to costs[6] and poor traffic handling.[7] These factors all forced costs up. Further, Cain argued that 'managerial motives,' such as the appointment of overbearing department heads and corporate empire building, were a factor in the decline in profitability. Yet, his main point was that competition between companies increased costs, subsequently doing the greatest damage profitability.[8]

Lastly, Arnold and McCartney, while rejecting the thesis that the railways built too much infrastructure, argued that the period 1870 to 1914 was one of 'structural stasis' in the industry, where the interests of ordinary shareholders were progressively abandoned. In their opinion there was a 'tacit alliance' between railway directors and senior managers that satisfied the short term interests of 'industrial customers and the state.'[9]

Therefore, the state of play in the literature is that no comprehensive answer has been given to the question of why the railway industry declined in profitability up to 1900. Yet, in that my opinion these studies suffer a sever weakness that hampers their pursuit of an answer. None of these historians looked at what was going within the companies themselves. Rather, these historians only used the financial results of the railway industry to make conclusions about the quality of management. Therefore, in my PhD I hope to look at what was going on within one company, the London and South Western Railway, to determine how the quality of management and decision-making affected the company’s profitability. Hopefully, any answers I find can add to the debate.

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[1] Gourvish, T.R., Railways and the British Economy 1830-1914, (London, 1980) p.44

[2] R.J Irving, 'The Profitability and Performance of British Railways 1870-1914', Economic History Review, Vol.31 No.1 (Feb., 1978), pp.55

[3] Irving, 'The Profitability and Performance' , pp.65

[4] Gourvish, Railways, p.44

[5] Aldcroft, British Railways p.11

[6] Aldcroft, British Railways p.18

[7] Aldcroft, British Railways p.19

[8] Cain, P.J. 'Railways 1870-1914: the maturity of the private system', in Freedman, Michael J. and Aldcroft, Derek H. Transport in Victorian Britain, (Manchester, 1988) p.115

[9] A.J. Arnold and S. McCartney, 'Rates of return, concentration levels and strategic change in the British Railway industry 1830-1912', The Journal of Transport History, 25 (2005), pp.57

If a wagon label could talk

Did you know there is one major question that vexes me as a railway historian? Simply put, it is that I don't know how the railway companies organised the movement of freight wagons before 1914 (and it is vague right up until the 1950s also). Of course we know the logical things, the goods were loaded up in place 'A', were shipped to yard 'B' where they were unloaded. On the face of it, it is all quite simple really. However, knowing this seemingly logical sequence of events does not reveal the myriad of other questions that are still a mystery to me regarding freight's movement.

So, for example, if a wagon was going from Glasgow to Southampton which route did it take? Did it travel by the Great Western Railway (GWR) via Bristol, or make its way via the London and North Western (L&NWR) via London. Also, if in 1893 a wagon had come from the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway and was going onto Brighton via Birmingham and London, which company took it from Birmingham to London? After all, in this year the city was served by the Midland Railway, the GWR and the L&NWR. Essentially who decided which route it would take and why did they make their choice? There is also the underlying question that I don’t know how companies kept their costs down and whether train controllers naturally developed an awareness of what was the 'cheapest' option with regard to train movements. In all honesty railway historians haven't really had the information to determine the answers to these questions.

But why is this important? Well as I have stated in a number of blog posts before, historians, both past and present, have pointed out that in the period 1870 to 1914 the profitability and performance of the British railway industry declined. In the past historians such as Aldcroft and Cain argued that duplicate facilities, a failure to relate the cost of goods transportation to the rates charged, and managerial empire building caused these problems. More recently a number of econometricians have concluded that there were cost inefficiencies and that productivity within firms did not improve with time. These latter assertions have, however, been made by only using the company's financial returns and without reference to what actually went on within companies. Therefore, how the companies worked out the cheapest way to run their operations is of central importance to me.

It was on this background that I was musing about the wagon label. It occurred to me that the wagon label is the ‘forgotten’ piece of paper (well card actually) amongst the many varied bits of railway ephemera that survives from the period. Wagon labels were placed on wagons so that those marshalling them through their journeys could attach them to the correct train. Examples of labels are pictured. As you will see various pieces of information are on them, such as where the wagons started their journeys, where they ended them and any major places they went ‘via.’ I presume any location placed under the ‘via’ category was a large goods depot or marshalling yard. They also contain the date of the wagon’s movement.

The 1912 London and South Western Railway (L&SWR) Appendix to the Rules and Regulations stated: ‘Every Wagon or other vehicle (except Empty L.&S.W. Wagons worked on Special Trains consisting wholly of such vehicles running from starting point to destination without intermediate stoppage), whether empty or loaded, despatched by Goods Train must be properly labelled on both sides, and in cases where vehicles are labelled upon Private Sidings the Traders should be requested to conform to this Regulation.’ I think that says it all.

The wagon label is therefore a decision made by one individual at one point in time at one place on the network. As such my challenge is to determine the thinking of the people who wrote out the wagon labels. It should be noted here that this wasn’t actually a management decision. Of course, management would have established the framework for wagon movement and labelling (evidenced above by the quote from the L&SWR’s Appendix), but the actual act of deciding the route a wagon would take (especially when there were two options) was surely decided by an individual based on a range of as yet unknown factors.

For example, perhaps inter-company alliances and rivalries may have meant that certain companies sent wagons moving off their network by one company who was friendly to them, rather than by another company who was their rival. It also may show ingrained inefficiencies. For example, if one particular depot or yard got into the habit of sending rolling stock via one route, when the map clearly evidences that there was a quicker one, this would represent a severe problem of efficiency. So how will I utilise the wagon label?

I do have a plan. I have always been aware that wagon labels in turn up great volumes on ebay and are also held by private collectors. My idea is to gradually (over what I presume will be a very long period of time) gather the transit data off as many wagon labels from the pre-World War One period as I can. Their routes can then be plotted on a map of Britain’s railways from each decade that roughly represents the extent to which it grew. Hopefully, as the routes of more and more wagons are added the major thoroughfares of goods transit can be seen visually. Hopefully this will reveal the way that rail-freight was managed in this nation before 1914 and give a guide as to how the efficiency of the industry changed. The map, when completed, (if it ever will) will possibly show where the inefficiencies were found and some of the factors involved.

However, I do have to confess that in large part this is a bit of wishful thinking. I messaged one of my academic colleagues regarding this embryonic project and he wasn’t optimistic that I could find enough wagon labels to get accurate results. In truth I doubt I will also. But I am one of those insufferable types that likes to stay optimistic. So I will, in line with my PhD, be restricting this project to the L&SWR and using it as a test balloon. At the current time I have 6 wagon labels for the company and are looking for more. I will also still collect off ebay and from anywhere else the details of wagon labels from as many companies as possible so that if it is successful the data can be worked on. All I can say is wish me luck!)…I think I’ll need it. Also if you have any labels, or if you know anybody who does, please send me the details!

Beeching, Serpell, McNulty and the Future of Britain's Railways

Apparently, and I am not entirely sure how this passed me by, there is a ‘value for money’ review being undertaken on Britain’s railways. The man at the helm is Sir Roy McNulty (shown) who apparently is an air transport specialist and was the former head of the Civil Aviation Authority. Exactly, therefore, how worrying his appointment is, is uncertain, as McNulty’s career history includes both public and private activities. The reason for my confusion stems from the fact that those who have previously tried to get more ‘value for money’ out of the railways, namely Sir Richard Beeching (the Railway Satan as he has been called) and the more forgotten Sir David Serpell, had two different backgrounds that clearly shaped the way they conducted their reviews of the costs of the network. Therefore McNulty’s mixed career history means that his report could be anything from fair and even handed to a massive axe-swing in the direction of Britain’s railways.

So how should Beeching and Serpell’s reports be judged in light of their career histories? First, let us turn to Beeching. Beeching, who came to British Railways from ICI, doesn’t really have a good reputation amongst the public. But then again I have always felt that the man has been treated unfairly in that he was brought in to do a job and he did it. In 1963 he wrote his famous report, The Reshaping of British Railways. His proposals rather cheesed people off as he proposed closing 6000 miles of railway (out of 18,000) and shutting 7000 stations. This would make it possible for British Railways to lose 70,000 employees over three years. But then again it was the Secretary of State for Transport, Ernest Marples, who brought Beeching in, and Marples was the one who actually implemented the report’s recommendations. Additionally, Marples was a fan of road transport given he had owned road-building company (Marples-Ridgeway) who had just got the contract for the M1. Therefore, it is clear that the prism through which Marples saw the railways was simply as a wasteful, inefficient business, and it is unlikely that he acknowledged its social or economic benefits to the nation, especially as he was so married to road transportation. Simply put, the railways were only a drain on the nation’s finances. Therefore, in response to the profitability problems of British Railways, he brought in a businessman (Beeching) to solve a business problem and once his recommendations were implemented they did irreparable damage to the network. Beeching was, however, not a railway professional and didn’t have experience in network industries. As such he simply looked at the railways as a business and not its social or economic benefits. Therefore, was the outcome really that surprising? I think not.

While the Beeching cuts are well known about because they actually occurred, the Serpell report, released in March 1983 has largely sunk into the bog of history because none of it got implemented. On a backdrop of a suffering economy, British Rail’s revenues decreasing and the lowest number of passenger journeys taking place in the network’s history, it was ordered by the Thatcher Government to look at the long-term role of Britain’s railways and make British Rail pay. After much work Sir David Serpell, a long-term civil servant, recommended a range of ‘options’ to change the network. The first, Option A, would reduce the rail network by 86% and the passenger train miles by 56%. In short, all that would be left would be the East, West, Great Western and Great Easter main lines, as well as a number of main lines to the south coast (the plan is shown). Yet, while everyone has focussed on this option, principally I presume because it looks so horrible, people forget that he presented three others. In Option B the cuts proposed in Option A would be implemented, but with the suburban network remaining. Option C kept much of the network in place, but with the removal of loss-making services (however there were three sub-options that can be looked at on Wikipedia if you so wish). Lastly, option D ignored the main goal to make the railways profitable and retained lines to populated areas with over 25,000 people. However, many small stations would be closed.

Serpell I think has also got a bad reputation, however I think he was a better man for the job he was asked to do than Beeching was for his. If I listed his civil service career between 1937 and 1982 it would take a whole paragraph. However, some of the major departments he had worked in were the Ministries of Food, Fuel and Power and Trade, the Treasury, the Department of Education and the Board of Trade. He also had worked for National Conservancy Council, the Ordinance Survey Review Committee and had been a member of the British Railways Board (BRB) between 1974 and 1982. In sum, Serpell had had a varied career that brought him a lot of experience in many government departments and plenty of these dealt with social, rather than economic, issues. He also had some (unquantifiable) experience of railways being on the BRB. Therefore, given the cost cutting nature of the Tory Government of the early 1980s and the tremendous economic constraints that government put the nation under, I feel that perhaps Serpell did well given his circumstances. Everyone screams and shouts about the first option, however the range of options that he presented does suggest that he was thinking more deeply than Beeching about the rail network. Firstly, in the age of austerity of the early 1980s he satisfied his brief of presenting different options to make Britain’s railway network pay. Fair enough, that’s what he was asked to do. However, the mere fact that he presented Option D, that defied his brief, suggests that despite being constrained by his environment of economic stringency and a cost-cutting Conservative Government, he did have an eye on the social and economic implications of rail transport. This, I would suggest, may have in part stemmed from his varied civil service background that showed him that how a range of different government agencies added to the nation’s health indirectly. I think, for Serpell, he had to show that railways were not just about the ‘bottom line’ as they were for Beeching, Marples and many in the Thatcher Government.

Thankfully, the Serpell report was dropped quietly because of the outcry. Indeed, throughout the mid and late 1980s passenger numbers rose and the issues confronting the network seeped away. However in the current climate we face new challenges and the coalition has deemed it necessary to commission another report looking at the ‘value for money’ of the rail network. As stated this will be under Sir Roy McNulty, the former head of the Civil Aviation Authority. He will also be assisted by some unspecified ‘rail professionals.’ Considering his background alone, McNulty has some of the attributes of both Beeching and Serpell. Firstly, like Beeching, he has had an extensive career in business, working at Chrysler UK, Harland & Wolff, Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., Short, Bombardier Aerospace, Norbrook Laboratories Ltd, and the Ulster Bank Ltd (amongst other things.) Yet, in his more recent years, like Serpell, he has worked for the government on the Olympic Delivery Authority, the Steering Group for UK Foresight Programme, the Northern Ireland Growth Challenge, the Technology Foresight Defence and Aerospace Panel and the Department for Trade and Industry’s Aviation Committee. Admittedly, these were consultancy and committee posts, and not like Serpell’s career in the Civil Service, yet, it does mean he was engaging with governmental activities of a social and economic nature. Lastly, very much like Serpell, he had his spell on a high-profile transport body as he was head of the Civil Aviation Authority.

Therefore, with this résumé it seems that the impending report could go one of two ways. He possibly may do a Beeching and recommend cuts to services, lines and the suspension any new developments. However, he could, and I think this is more feasible given the record rail usage at the moment, recommend cuts and efficiencies within Network Rail (which has infrastructure costs 30-50% higher than those on the continent), the suspension of any large capital investment, changes to the franchise structure and the cutting of some of the most unremunerative services. Thus, this would in part be like of some of the less violent options put forward by Serpell. One thing is for certain, the cost of maintaining and running the British railway network has to come down, and McNulty’s background and experiences will in some part shape the outcome of the review like those of who were tasked with the same job before. On the flip side, we don’t know what part of his past will have the greatest effect on the report and therefore we wait…biting our nails.

Approaches to efficiency: LMS vs LSWR - some facts and some thoughts

This week I read an excellent journal article by Roy Edwards, of Southampton University's Management school, titled 'Job analysis on the LMS: mechanisation and modernisation c.1930-c.1939'. The article focussed on how the London, Midland and Scottish Railway (LMS) came to the decision to modernise, reorganise and rebuild many of its freight depots on the network in an attempt to reduce labour costs and increase efficiency. This was part of an attempt by the company to make the LMS freight haulage services more competitive with the road hauliers that, by the mid to late 1930s, had attracted vast swathes of the company's traffic onto the roads. I hope Roy doesn't mind if I give a very brief synopsis of his article.

He describes how the LMS in 1933 employed Lewis C. Ord to investigate performance at goods yards and depots and he analysed the work using the measure of how many hours it took for a ton to move through the depot (hours per ton). His test case was the reorganisation and mechanisation of goods sheds at the company's Blackburn depot. Here he tried many experiments and reduced the time that it took for each ton to move through it. So, for example, in the forwarding goods shed a ton's movement dropped from 2 hours to 1.1 hours. He also tried experiments at the Oldbury yard.

The LMS, based on guidance in Ord's final report, thereafter began to reorganise, redesign and mechanise goods sheds. A department was set up at the LMS headquarters to examine shed design and the instillation of mechanical equipment. In attempts to bring costs under control, the department used systematic analysis of information gathered at terminals, such as the total tonnage moved, the total hours it took and the hours per ton. Yard agents then used this data to analyse operational efficiency. The information was also collated weekly for a monthly report that would aid in the control of yard and shed expenditure. In addition, a sub-section of the divisional superintendent of operation's staff was set up in 1931 to look at the shunting methods. Its remit was extended in 1937 to include 'modernisation proposals and additional monitoring.' Further, other statistical measures were gathered such as 'Daily Analysis of Work,' 'Detailed Analytical survey of work' and the district goods managers were informed of efficiency via the 'Handled tonnages and wages return.' These figures were all collated and forwarded to the monthly district goods managers meetings for analysis.

This data collected therefore became a contributory factor in decisions regarding the rearrangement, rebuilding and mechanisation of goods terminals. In 1933 Lemon, the vice president of the Institute of Transport congress, estimated that these changes could save the company £1.5 million on the wages of handling staff. However there was a problem. While reducing labour costs seemed good for the struggling company, economies that were made on staff reductions did not factor in the cost of the investment, and thus what savings were made were in many cases wiped out. Edwards describes how at Walsall economies of savings on staffing costs were estimated at £1000, but that the outlay on the modernisation cost £9950. At Tipton, the board noted that an outlay of £51,000 would result in savings in labour costs of £550 per annum, with additional charges resulting from traders using the LMS's facilities amounting to approximately £2460. The reason for this, was that the benefits of investment were not known and on many occasions the justification for investment was broad. For example at Oldbury all the directors could state was that there would be 'quicker turnaround, reducing delay, less congestion and improved service to the public'. Indeed their opinion was that, 'economy cannot be estimated.' At Tipton Edwards states that there would be 'other advantages which cannot be evaluated e.g. improvements in the shunting arrangements and in the mobility of the wagon stock.' Simply put, the benefits of investment were never worked out and never truly known.

Edwards' conclusions are clear. Firstly, the LMS was groping its way forward with regard to the systematic statistical analysis of their operations, from a point where previously there had been little, and there was the development of more sophisticated management measures to analyse the efficiency of the workplace. However, secondly, there was little accurate analysis of the financial costs and benefits that would be incurred by the investment and thus increased efficiency was not rarely remunerative. In short the LMS made their operations more efficient, and they knew it, but it came at a cost. If you feel so inclined, the article is excellent and really gives a good insight into the mindset of late 1930s railway managers operating under difficult circumstances. It can be found in Vol. 20, No.1. pp 91-105 of Accounting, Business & Financial History.

This paper really made me think about the way that the London and South Western's (L&SWR) managers thought about cost control. Indeed, I was stimulated to think about what linkages can be made between the way pre and post-1922 railway management made decisions. Edwards' research has shown that while there was increased data gathering and analysis before and after a yard was modernised so as to measure efficiency, the actual benefits were unknown, and the LMS relied on impressions and 'hunches' to make decisions. My question is why was this so? Where did this evidently deficient way of analysing investment come from? I believe that my work, that ultimately focusses on decision making in the L&SWR, may hold the answer.

It is clear that the L&SWR managers were not as advanced as those on the LMS years later. They exhibited the same uncertainty in decision-making as those that followed them on later railway companies. If there is a consideration of efficiency measures that were implemented throughout the company's history Edwards' assessment that there was 'little' or no cost-benefit analysis and that decisions were made on impressionistic grounds, are more prolific in the period before 1922.

For example, in 1879 a special committee of L&SWR directors instructed their senior managers to proffer 'any suggestions that may occur to them upon it or any method by which the revenue of the company may be increased. Also any information as to possible reductions of Train mileage, reductions of trains or reductions of working expenses.' Accompanied with no analysis, the result was a list of ideas from the different departments, some of which were highly speculative with regard to their benefits in terms of cost or efficiency. For example, amongst the suggestions were included, better timetables and advertising, more powerful engines that would save fuel, better organisation at the Nine Elms goods yard, the expedition of workshop improvements at Nine Elms and improved services between Southampton, Salisbury and Portsmouth.

This said, there were some suggestions where the savings would have been much easier to quantify, for example, reductions in gas and water consumption, dispensing with the stores' department's branch offices, e.g. at Bishopstoke, reducing the number of travelling inspectors overall and restricting numbers of guards on goods trains to one. Indeed, another economy drive in 1885 categorised some of the company's ongoing buildings works by their immediate necessity to operations, enabling it to put on hold a number and enabling the company to defer identifiable costs. However, overall in the long run there was no way that they could determine the benefits of these measures using rudimentary assessments.

Further, day to day decision making in committees, for example the building of new goods sheds, extra sidings for traffic, new rolling stock and extra staff, all tended to have no cost-benefit conducted beforehand. In the case of many station alterations, decisions to augment facilities are simply made without any detailed job or process analysis, rather investments were made, in some cases, simply on the recommendation from the Traffic Manager, Superintendent of the Line, or even the Station Agent. Therefore, I have become aware of a major difference in the decision-making process between the majority of the decisions that the L&SWR made between 1850 and 1922 and the those made by the LMS that relied on more detailed job analysis. Whereas the LMS tried to work out the efficiency of the operations and attempted to improve them, even if the cost-benefit analysis was lacking, the L&SWR's whole decision-making process was based on untested justifications. Therefore, I feel I may have found a reason why their was such a laissez-faire attitude towards analysis of investment, and it has already been hinted at.

It is quite evident that the managers of the L&SWR had one constant that shaped the way that policy was dictated from the 1830s right through to the end of the company in 1922. This was the expectation that traffic levels would continue to increase unabated. In 1860 the L&SWR, whose main goods depot was at Nine Elms, started to find that because of traffic increases that this site was getting cramped, especially as it was shared with the Locomotive, Carriage and Wagon works of the company. A special committee of the board was formed to discuss the question. One option was to move the works into the country. This was not done, and eventually they were relocated to the southern side of the main line so the goods yard and sheds could be expanded. In the course of the discussions the Traffic Manager of the company, Archibald Scott, stated that in the 20 years after 1860 'should the Traffic increase as was seasonally expected,' the land given over to the Traffic department would be insufficient for its management. This statement illustrates a possible mindset of the L&SWR management before 1922.

The period before 1922 was when the railways had the biggest share of the market with regard to traffic movement. They were a virtual monopoly and as such, with the increasingly expanding economy, traffic continued to rise exponentially. Therefore the most pressing issue for managers was how the infrastructure would cope with this fact. Cost reduction, except in the Locomotive department (for which a whole paper could be written) was not an ongoing concern like on the LMS where they attempted over time to reduce costs of operations. Cost reduction in major affairs was simply a matter of the company instituting economy drives when profits dropped, like the special committees noted above, or the company securing the cheapest contractor when contracts were put out to tender. Operational effectiveness was not assessed, and possibly this is because the expectation was that eventually any investment would be covered by the constantly rising revenues.

One last point, isn't it interesting that the LMS only started looking at its operational practices in detail when the company was under financial pressure, whereas the L&SWR, who never had the same strained and was graced with constantly rising traffic and revenue, never felt the need to assess how their operations worked in half as much detail. Of course I hope to develop my ideas further, and this has been a rushed effort at developing a theory, but I hope that I have made a good start. Oh, and thank you Roy for stimulating me.

Sources: Edwards, Roy, 'Job analysis on the LMS: mechanisation and modernisation c.1930-c.1939,' Accounting, Business & Financial History, (2010) Vol. 20, No.1. pp 91-105

Image source: http://www.railalbum.co.uk/ - A great site with loads of railway images