Discovering the factors that caused Accidents to Railway Workers in 1884 - Part 2

 In my last post (here) I looked at possible factors that may have affected the number of accidents British railway workers suffered in 1884. I did this through correlating the accident rates of thirty-one English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish railway companies’ against other operational statistics (Included were 21 English and Welsh companies, 4 Scottish and 6 Irish). I concluded that working for a Scottish railway company, as opposed to English, Welsh or Irish one, put a railway employee at greater risk. Furthermore, in what was ultimately a futile exercise, I discovered there was no correlation between the accident rates in each company and the number of staff they employed. In this post I will examine whether the proportion of goods and passenger traffic the companies carried played a role in accident rates. Furthermore, I will assess if the intensity of train operations on companies’ lines was a factor.

Throughout the period every company carried different proportions of goods and passenger traffic. So, for example, 84.12% of the Taff Vale railway’s (in south Wales) train miles were run by goods trains. However, for the the Metropolitan Railway, serving London and suburban districts, the proportion was a mere 0.46%. Thus, I figured that given goods trains invariably required more human labour to load and prepare than passenger trains, that railways where a higher proportion of goods train miles were run than passenger train miles would have more accidents. Indeed, passengers were self-loading, while goods trains required more shunting and had to be loaded and unloaded by hand. Thus, the scatter graph below shows the number of deaths, injuries and accident overall per train mile against the proportion of goods train miles each company ran.

Personally, I would have expected that as the proportion of good operations increased, the frequency of death would also rise. However, the evidence slightly suggests otherwise. Firstly, as the goods train miles increased proportionately, there is weak evidence to suggest that the number of deaths per train mile also decreased. However, there are significant anomalies. Indeed, the Furness railway, of which 54.40% of train miles were run by goods trains, had a very low fatality rate, with one death every 1,311,973 miles. However the correlation is so weak, and skewed by these anomalous results, that there isn’t enough evidence to suggest that the regularity of deaths changed dependent on the level of each company’s goods operations.

This said, there is much stronger evidence in the graph that as the proportion of goods train operations increased, so did injury rates. Indeed, The Metropolitan and District railway, on which only 0.60% of train miles were run by goods trains, suffered one injury every 457765 train miles. However, 84.12% of the Taff Vale Railway’s train miles were undertaken hauling goods and it suffered one injury per 590278 miles.

Lastly, as the third set of data indicates as the proportion of goods train miles went up, the frequency of accidents, irrespective of the outcome, also increased. Indeed, this is the best correlation, and no figures are included in that can be considered wildly anomalous. Thus, overall, there clear evidence that working for a company that hauled more goods than passengers, was more dangerous.

But perhaps another factor played a role: intensity of train operations. To determine this figure I calculated the number of train miles run by each company per mile of track they owned (route miles), and plotted this against the number of route miles to each accidents (overall), death and injury. Thus, this would show if companies that on average had the most intense operations per mile of track, suffered more or less accidents. The results are shown in the scatter graph below.

Firstly, the evidence suggests the intensity of train operations did not really affect the fatality rate. While the linear line goes down, the actual results are wildly scattered, with very little correlation at all. Thus, the mere fact that companies had higher intensity networks did not realistically impact on the number of employee deaths, suggesting that other factors played a role, for example the nature of the company's traffic, as shown above.

Furthermore, the number miles per injury were not, seemingly, affected by the intensity of the companies' networks. Indeed, while their are many anomalous returns, the majority spread out in a line along the x-axis. Additionally, the figures for route miles per accident, irrespective of outcome, show that higher intensity operations did not affect overall accident rates. These are the best results, and the returns spread out with lowest deviation above and below the linear line.

Thus, from the statistics considered in this and the last post, the location of railway companies and the type of traffic they transporting have been shown to have affected accident rates in 1884. Indeed, a company operating in Scotland and having a higher numbers of goods trains compared to passenger must have been a very risky employer. However, it should also be remembered that other considerations, which cannot show up in these figures, would have affected accidents rates further. Indeed, some of the responsibility for varying accident rates must be placed on managerial factors, such as companies having a diverse range of safety regimes, the technologies they purchased, different rules and regulations and the quality of employee supervision. Thus, as with very post I write, more research needs to be done.

Discovering the factors that caused Accidents to Railway Workers in 1884 - Part 1

Railway workers in the Victorian period were employed in a perilous industry. In 1884 British railways (including Ireland) killed 546 railway workers and injured 2319. Historians have understandably looked at the way government tried to improve safety through legislation. However, almost nothing has been said about different accident rates within different companies. Indeed, little study has been done on whether safer to work for company ‘A,’ rather than company ‘B.’

For this post I will investigate whether the size of the company’s staff affected how likely accidents were to occur. While theoretically it should not, I chose this question as I considered that the larger companies may have had more formalised rules and money to invest in safety devices, which may have improved their safety records. Additionally, in a period before many safety devices were required to be installed by law, when the hours that employees could be made to work were not regulated and when the companies’ managements were becoming more professional, this question goes right to the heart of whether larger, more impersonal companies are better or worse to work for.

I will use two files from the year 1884 to answer this question. The first is the Board of Trade’s accident returns that detailed the number of railway workers killed and injured in the course of their duties. [1] The second was a return of the numbers of people the railways employed on the 31^st March.[2] From these files I have extracted data relating to thirty-one British railways which employed over 1000 people. Twenty-one were English and Welsh, four were Scottish and six were Irish.

From thirty-one railways, employing 351,889 individuals in 1884, there were 508 fatalities (0.14%) and 2,242 (0.64%) injuries. However, before analysing whether company size affected safety, I noticed that the country in which individuals worked in seemed to be a factor in accident rates:-

It is evident that working for a Scottish railway company was rather more dangerous than working elsewhere. In 1884 the four Scottish companies killed 0.24% of their staff and injured 0.80%. This was while on English and Welsh and Irish railways 0.14% of the staff died, and 0.64% and 0.19% were injured respectively. Indeed, this suggests, in 1884 at least, that Irish railways were the safest to work for. The exact cause for Scotland’s higher accident rate is unknown at present, and only more research will give a definitive answer. However, one possibility, which ran through my head, is that the harsher weather of Scotland made working conditions more treacherous.

Turning to the relationship between size and accident rates, there seems to have been no correlation the fatality rate and staff body size. Of the eleven companies that employed over 10,000 people, the largest proportion of fatalities was attributed to the North British Railway, who killed thirty-five of its 13,896 employees (0.25%). The safest railway was the Great Western, who only suffered thirty-four deaths amongst a staff of 39,547 (0.09%).  However, a great range of proportions is also found in the case of the smaller railways. Of the ten companies that employed fewer than 2,500 people, the Waterford and Limerick Railway killed four of its 1503 workers (0.27%), the heist proportion of fatalities of any of the thirty-one companies. However, the Metropolitan railway did not kill any of its 1685 staff. Therefore, because of the range of figures within the samples, for both large and small companies, it suggests that other factors were important in determining how many deaths occurred, for example the technologies the companies were using, the training that staff received and the decisions managers made.

However, when examining injuries it is found that the size of the company’s staffs did have a loose correlation with the number of accidents that occurred. Of the eleven companies employing above 10,000 people, the Lancashire and Yorkshire had the highest injury rate with 284 of its 20,962 employees (1.36%) suffering some minor or major accident. However, the safest company in this regard was the Midland Railway, where only 121 of its 43,699 (0.28%) employees were injured. Amongst the ten companies employing fewer than 2,500 workers, the worst to be employed in was Somerset and Dorset where seven employees out of 1089 were injured (0.64%). The best was the Dublin, Wicklow and Wexford Railway, where only two of the 1089 staff members were injured (0.18%). Indeed, the average injury rate for the largest 11 employers was 0.69%, whereas for the smallest ten it was 0.33%. The (exceedingly) loose correlation is shown in the scatter graph below.

Given the very weak nature of the correlation I would not like to venture a suggestion without further study. Indeed, the injury rates should, theoretically, be subject to the same forces as the death rates.

Therefore, in my next post I will examine how the intensity of the different companies’ networks affected their accident rates and whether companies that moved more passengers and goods in 1884 harmed more of their workers.

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[1] House of Commons Parliamentary Papers [HCPP], Return of Accidents and Casualties as Reported to the Board of Trade By the Several Railway Companies in the United Kingdom, During the Year 31^stDecember 1884, p.17

[2] 1884 (242) Railways (number of persons employed). Return of the number of persons employed by each of the railway companies of the United Kingdom on 31 March 1884 (classified according to the nature of the work performed by them); &c.

"Whilst Passing over or Standing on Buffers During Shunting" - British Railway Accident Rates in the 1880s

Sadly, railway accidents were common occurrences in the Victorian railway, and both passengers and employees could not fail to be aware of the scale of the loss of life and limb in the period. Indeed, the July 1888 the South Western Gazette, the London and South Western Railway’s staff magazine, published details on all the accidents that occurred on Britain’s Railways between 1880 and 1887. Thus, this gave a useful snapshot of the state of railway safety for both employees and passengers in the period.

The first table that the Gazette presented was a list of those individuals killed or injured in accidents on trains between 1880 and 1887 (above). This showed that over the course of the 1880s that the number of accidents dropped and in 1880 51 individuals had been killed, whereas in 1887 the total was 25. However, the Gazette commented that the 25 passengers who lost their lives in 1887 did so in one accident at Penistone on the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway, and had not been for this event ‘some 800 millions of passengers without the loss of a single life.’ More significantly, the number of injuries declined, which is more indicative of changes of railway safety. While in 1880 1,023 individuals had been injured, by 1887 the total was 647.

The decline in train accidents can be attributed to improvements in railway safety. No major safety legislation was introduced in the 1880s, but two technologies were gradually spreading through the British railway network.

The first was the block system of train control.  Originally trains were allowed to proceed along lines only after and interval of time. This meant that if a train got delayed, the one behind would be given permission to proceed after a set duration, which would put both at risk. However, in the 1870s and 1880s this was gradually replaced by block systems. This was where the track was divided up into sections, and a train following another was not allowed to enter the ‘block’ section in front until any preceding train had left it. Most train movements in and out of block sections were controlled by individual signal boxes connected by telegraphs. While the technical details of the block system, which is still in use today, are unimportant, its gradual introduction in this period by railway companies dramatically improved safety.[1]

Secondly, continuous brakes on locomotives and passenger vehicles became more widespread. The principal of continuous brakes was that when the driver applied the brake on the locomotive, the wheels of the coaches did the same. While legislation on this was not in place until 1889, after the Armagh Accident, many companies began to fit three competing brake systems to their rolling stock from the early 1880s. The detail of which systems were adopted by which companies is unimportant. However, two systems used a vacuum maintained by the train, and another, the Westinghouse system, was an air brake.[2] Therefore, this improved the reliability of braking systems generally, as now whole trains could be brought to a halt. Indeed, this explains the drop in injuries, as now in the when a train applied a brake sharply, carriages did not smash into each other as easily.

Despite improvements in accident rates on trains, there was seemingly no improvement in the number of other accidents that occurred elsewhere. The table above shows that between 1885 and 1887 the number of people killed on railways in total increased. The numbers injured decreased, however, this was only because of the decline in injuries to people on trains.

Interestingly, the article also gave the most common causes of injury (left) in 1887. The most number of injuries, 355 in total, were attributed to ‘other accidents during shunting operations, not included in the preceding’ (the preceding being: ‘while moving vehicles by capstans, turntables props &c. during shunting – 187 accidents.’) The second most common form of accident occurred ‘whilst coupling and uncoupling vehicles,’ 232 happening in this manner. Fatalities predominantly occurred in shunting operations. The most number of deaths, 99 in total, were when individuals were ‘working on the permanent way, sidings &c.’ Following this, 93 individuals were killed ‘whilst walking, crossing, or standing on the line on duty.’ Thus, it was people actually working on the line itself that most frequently were killed.

What individuals were doing when they were killed or injured was reflected in the types of employee were involved in accidents the most (right). As expected, those individuals who were involved with coupling together trains were injured the most, and 337 Brakesmen and Goods Guards, 309 Porters and 292 shunters, were so. Furthermore, it is unsurprising that the individuals who were killed the most were platelayers who maintained the line, and 106 died, presumably through being knocked down by a train.

Overall, this small study has revealed that while the railway was an increasingly safe place for those travelling by train, whether they were passengers or railway workers, for those who were actually employed by the railways the risk involved did not diminish. This would challenge any idea that in this period railway work became safer for employees, when only a small proportion benefited from the safety devices that were introduced.

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[1] Farrington, John, ‘Block Working’, in Simmons, Jack and Biddle, Gordon (eds.), The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997), p.34

[2] Weaver, Rodney, ‘Brakes’, Simmons and Biddle (eds.), The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, p.41

All other information from: South Western Gazette, July 1888, p.11

‘No Imagination can Conceive of the Ruin' - Dickens and the Staplehurst Accident

On the 9^th of June 1865 at Staplehurst an accident occurred that went down in history. This wasn’t because it was one of the most horrific accidents in British railway history, although 10 people died; nor was it because it was the first major accident. It was famous because one of its passengers was Charles Dickens. Dickens had been travelling with his mistress Ellen Ternan and her mother in the first class compartment of the South Eastern Railway’s (SER) 2.38 am boat train from Folkestone.[1]

The accident occurred on the viaduct over the ‘muddy stream’ of the River Beult. Over an eight to ten week period the engineering team, consisting of 4 carpenters, one labourer, 3 platelayers and one foreman, were replacing the viaduct’s baulks (basically wooden timbers) which were placed between the iron girders to hold the track up. These were to be replaced during the passing of passenger trains, and up until the end of the project everything ran smoothly with train services passing without incident. 

SER company regulations stated that fog detonators placed on the tracks at 250 yard intervals up to 1000 yards from where the engineering works were to protect them. At 1000 yards a flagman was to also be placed. However, on 9^th of June the foreman of the Beult viaduct works, John Benge, had not ordered the detonators placed and the flagman was stationed only 544 yards from the works. This disregarding of the rules was compounded by the fact that Benge had failed to read his timetable accurately. Because the boat train was left Folkestone dependent on the arrival time of the steam packet, which was determined by the tide, this meant that each day it arrived at different points along the line at different times. On the 9^th June, Benge expected to arrive at the time stated for the 10^th, which was two hours earlier and subsequently his team had started to remove two tracks. The result was that when the train arrived at the viaduct the driver saw the flag too late and was unable to stop the 13-carriage train in time.

What happened next would shape the rest of Dickens’ life. Firstly, the locomotive, tender and leading break van managed to cross the viaduct on the beams. However, the tender broke the viaduct wall. The second class carriage directly behind stayed on the viaduct, while the first class carriage, in which Dickens and his party was in, came to be lodged precariously halfway off the viaduct. The rest of the carriages went over the side into the stream. Dickens, went to the aid of the victims and described in a letter to Thomas Mitton four days later what he had saw: ‘no imagination can conceive of the ruin of carriages, or the extraordinary weights under which people were lying, or the complications into which they were twisted up among the iron and wood, and mud and water.’ He received praise for his actions, however, because of his travelling companions he shied away from the limelight.[2]

Most commentators point to the fact that this accident had a profound effect on Dickens’s health, and no one can deny that it did. Dickens had, as Ian Carter states, the ‘ominous signs’ of post-traumatic stress disorder thereafter. He refused to travel by express train, and always opted for the slow trains. Indeed, it is said that he never recovered from the shock of the accident and he died five years to the day after it on the 9^th June 1870.[3]

However, what is not so commonly known is that after 1865 Dickens pushed more vehemently the issue of railway safety, particularly improved signalling. In a letter a month after the accident to the author Bulwer Lytton, he stated that the railways of Britain had developed an ‘enormous no-system,’ which had ‘grown up without guidance…Its abuses are so represented in Parliament by Directors, Contractors, Scrip Jobbers, and so forth, that no Ministers dare to touch it.’ Indeed, because of this lack of responsibility amongst railway officials and their presence in parliament, those to blame for such accidents were protected. [4]

Dickens’ primary concern was the idea that knowledge was so crucial to the safe working of the railway and he believed that this aspect of the railways needed improving. Thus, Dickens’ magazine All Year Round featured an article on the highly advance signalling system at Victoria Station and particularly a signal box that was referred to as the ‘hole in the wall.’[5] Furthermore, his collection of short stories from 1866, Mugby Junction, featured a story called the Signalman, where a ‘disturbed and isolated’ signalman was killed by a train after seeing a ghoul who had warned him previously about two other deaths (see my last blog post HERE).[6] Thus, the story addressed the idea information systems failing and causing accidents.
 

The effects of Dickens’ activities (amongst others) on safety are hard to pin down. However, it wasn’t long after the Staplehurst accident that Acts were passed by government on block signalling (1871), interlocking points and signals (1873) and Automatic Vacuum Brakes. (1878)[7] Thus, while it wasn’t Dickens voice alone that forced through these changes, he can be said to have been important in raising the profile and disseminating knowledge about issues of railway safety amongst the public. Indeed, he eventually became a voice that reflected the public’s concerns that were rife at the time. He did this so the fate of those listed below, the victims of the Staplehurst accident, occurred less frequently in the future to others.

Name Occupation

Emma Beaumont Spinster

Anne Bodinham Wife of Frederick Bodinham, Solicitor

Charlotte Chaunhay-Faithful Wife of Faithful, Judge at Bombay

Hannah Cundliff Wife of Martin Cundliff, Hotel Keeper

James Dunn Warehouseman

Adam Hampton Surgeon

Hippolite Mercia Cook

Amelia Rayner Wife of Lloyd Rayner, Merchant

Lydia Whitby Wife of George Whitby, Merchant

Caroline White Spinster

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[1] Carter, Ian, Railways and Culture in Britain, (Manchester, 2001) p.91

[2] Pope, Norris, ‘Dickens’s “the Signalman” and Information Problems in the Railway Age,’ Technology and Culture, Vol. 41, No.3, (July, 2001) p.444-445

[3] Carter, Railways and Culture in Britain, p.91

[4] Pope, ‘Dickens’s “the Signalman”,’ p.448

[5] Pope, ‘Dickens’s “the Signalman”,’ p.450

[6] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mugby_Junction

[7] Gourvish, T.R., Railways and the British Economy: 1830-1914, (London, 1980), p.52

'At the time of catastrophe’ - Railway Passenger's Accident Insurance - 1849-1914

In the period 1874 to 1878, on average 35 passengers were killed per year on Britain’s railways (against 687 railway employees). High profile accidents such as Abergele in 1868, in which 32 people died, combined with the attendant hysteria, did much to put fear into the heart of the travelling public.[1] How then could the passenger avoid leaving their family destitute if they had the misfortune to be in an accident? The answer – railway passenger’s insurance.

The most prominent company to provide this was the Railway Passengers Assurance Company (now part of AVIVA). Formed in 1849, ‘for the purpose of Insuring Passengers by railway against accidents,’ it started with a capital of £1,000,000 ‘to inspire confidence in its ability to pay £1000 for a threepenny premium.’[2]

After establishment, the company quickly made deals with the railway companies of Britain to sell tickets and policies at stations. Initially the tickets, purchased from booking offices at station, would insure the passenger for the journey that they were about to undertake (irrespective of length). In 1849 passengers could pay threepence on a first class ticket, twopence on a second class ticket and onepence on a third class ticket would, which, in the case of a fatal accident, would entitle their family to £1000, £500 and £200 respectively. In the cases where accidents were non-fatal, but where there had been injury, the company would pay out ‘a sum of compensation that they consider just.’ If the amount paid out was disputed by the claimant, the company would go to arbitration.[3] The company also issued periodical insurance tickets (usually for a month), and, irrespective of class, any fatal accident would permit the family to claim £1000. The original cost of this tickets have not been determined.[4]

Despite much scepticism in the press regarding the viability of the new company, insurance policies and single journey tickets sold well. At the company’s first annual general meeting in March 1850, it was reported that in the period between August 1849 and the end of the third week in February, 65,353 single journey tickets had been sold (15,710 first class, 24,586 second class and 25,047 third class). Additionally, 1,683 periodical passes had also been sold.[5]

As the insurance was sold at stations there had to be some pay-off for the railway company. A London and South Western Railway 1858 guide to Station Agents stated that Booking Clerks that issued and received insurance tickets were to receive a 10 per cent commission from the Assurance Company as remuneration for their trouble. Indeed, they were required to process the tickets also, and clerks were to send a weekly return of the number of tickets issued and received to Waterloo Audit office.[6] However, the selling of tickets wasn’t always looked on favourably by the railway companies themselves, and many Booking Clerks were instructed by management not to invite the selling of insurance as talk of accidents on the railways may have increased anxiety among travellers.[7] Despite this, the company remained successful.

After the formation of the company the types of accident insurance that could be taken out proliferated and some of the old schemes became more standardised. An 1897 guide for Station Agents shows that there was insurance for journeys not more than 35 miles and journeys of any length. The compensation was also dependent on how much the purchaser paid. There was also the option for individuals to purchase accident cover for 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 5 years, 10 years or the entire length of their person’s life. Furthermore, the subjective assessment of how much individuals should receive if they were maimed or injured had been replaced with formalised payments for those who suffered ‘death or loss of two eyes or limbs,’ ‘total disablement’ and ‘partial disablement.’[8] (see image for more details)

While the Railway Passengers Assurance Company held sway over 19^th century passenger insurance, the scheme of the periodical Tit-Bits should be noted. Tit-Bits was launched by the innovative publisher George Newnes in 1881. In May 1885 Tit-Bits announced in bold and capitals ‘A NEW SYSTEM OF LIFE ASSURANCE.’ The scheme was as follows: ‘ONE HUNDRED POUNDS WILL BE PAID BY THE PROPRIETOR OF"TIT-BITS" TO THE NEXT-OF-KIN OF ANY PERSON WHO IS KILLED IN A RAILWAY ACCIDENT, PROVIDED A COPY OF THE CURRENT ISSUE OF "TIT-BITS" IS FOUND UPON THE DECEASED AT THE TIME OF THE CATASTROPHE.’

This had been suggested to Newnes by the wife of a dedicated reader who had been killed in an accident. Seeing the potential to increase the periodical’s circulation and his profits, Newnes used the idea. The first successful claimants were the family of a 40 year old coachbuilder who had fallen between the train and the platform at Hatfield station and had been run over. The coroner proclaimed ‘accidental death.’ However, crucially, four witnesses testified that the man had Tit-Bits in his pocket. Subsequently, two claims a month on average were made and by September 1891 Newnes had paid out to 36 families. How far this scheme increased the circulation of the Tit-Bits is unknown. However, it provided the publication with gripping stories for individuals reading it on the commute.[9]

[1] Simmons, Jack, ‘Accidents’, The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997), p.2-4

[2] Author’s Collection, Instructions to Station Agents – Railway Passenger’s Assurance Company, 1897

[3] The Era, Sunday, March 4, 1849; Issue 545

[4] Trewman's Exeter Flying Post or Plymouth and Cornish Advertiser, Thursday, November 22, 1849; Issue 4381

[5] The Morning Post, Thursday, March 07, 1850; pg. 3; Issue 23788

[6] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 1035/269, 1858 - RAIL 1035- Abstract of instructions which have from time to time been issued to the Station agents &c Previous to 1st May 1858, p.14

[7] Harrington, Ralph, ‘The railway accident: trains, trauma and technological crisis in nineteenth-

[8] Author’s Collection, Instructions to Station Agents – Railway Passenger’s Assurance Company, 1897 century Britain,’ http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/irs/irshome/papers/rlyacc.htm

[9] Jackson, Kate, ‘The Tit-Bits Phenomenon: George Newnes, New Journalism and the Periodical Texts,’ Victorian Periodicals Review, Vol.30, No.3, (Fall, 1997), p.217-218

'Preferred in Finer Weather' - Early Third Class Passenger Accommodation

I don’t often write about the rolling stock of Britain’s railway on this blog. In fact, I don’t think I have so far. I don’t know why. The development of rolling stock on Britain’s railways relate to many aspects of the social, managerial, governmental and technological history of the railway network. But, as will be shown, the earliest third class accommodation was appalling because of the profit motive of the earliest railway managers.

Unlike today, where the majority of us sit in what is now ‘standard class,’ a much smaller proportion of customers travelled by the lowest class in the earliest days of Britain’s railways. Yet, this was not necessarily by choice and the railways before 1850 were reluctant to provide third class accommodation on many services. A return from 1847 showed that in the year ending June 1846 just over 6 million 1^st class passengers were conveyed in Britain (14.07%), just under 17 million 2^nd class passengers travelled (38.66%). The rest of those conveyed were about 18.5 million 3^rd and Parliamentary class passengers (the latter of which more will be mentioned in a moment) (42.26%). However, the preference for carrying 1^st and 2^nd class passengers was logical considering they contributed £3.6 million of the £4.7 million (76.18%) of the revenue generated by passenger traffic in that year.[1]

Thus, for early railway managers providing accommodation for third class passengers forced up operating costs, reduced revenues and ultimately diminished profits. Indeed, on many railways, for example on the opening of the Hampton Court Branch of the London and South Western Railway, the company didn’t mention third class travelling arrangements at all.[2] Furthermore, many companies did not attach third class carriages to the regular passenger services, instead attaching them to goods trains. Of course, this wasn’t to say that the addition of third class carriages to a train that was ‘running light’ didn’t add profit to the overall service, but in the main, railway managers preferred to convey the more profitable first and second class traffic.

Furthermore, the low rate of return on conveying third class passengers also affected the quality of their accommodation which was, especially in winter, dreadful. Thus, early third class accommodation rarely had a roof, glazing, and almost always forced the passengers to sit on wooden seats. In short, these coaches were little more than slightly modified goods wagons.[3] However, by not spending large amounts of money on the coaches for third class travellers, railway managers were reducing the overall cost of conveying them. On the opening of the Sheffield and Rotherham Railway one reporter tried to make the best he could of the third class coaches which were ‘of common appearance but substantial in structure, and being open will probably be preferred in fine weather.’[4]

However, such poor accommodation carried with it substantial risks when an accident occurred. While individuals had come to harm falling from the coaches,[5] it was an accident on the Great Western Railway on Christmas Eve 1841 that brought the matter to the government’s attention. Late in the evening a luggage train, which was comprised of three third class coaches and some heavily loaded goods wagons, was going from Bristol Temple Meads to London Paddington and was passing through Sonning Cutting, east of Reading Station. Rains had caused a landslip which had covered the track with earth. In the dark the train hit this and derailed, causing the third class carriages, which were between the engine and the goods wagons, to be crushed. Eight people died at the scene, and one died in hospital a day later. 16 people were seriously injured.[6]

The accident report stated that one of the principal causes of fatality was the lack of protection afforded to the passengers within them. Indeed, many of the passengers had been thrown out of the carriage on impact.[7] As such, the Board of Trade initiated a general inquiry into the conveyance of third class passengers nationwaide, culminating in the 1844 Regulation of Railways Act. This compelled all companies that derived a third of their revenue from passenger traffic to provide one train daily calling at all stations, that did not go less than 12 miles per hour, which did not cost the traveller not more than 1d per mile and, crucially, used enclosed carriages with seats. These were called ‘Parliamentary Trains.’ Reflecting the fact that the operation of these services would be a financial burden for the railway companies, any company meeting these requirements would not have to pay taxes on the fares.[8]

While this piece of legislation was a landmark, given it was the first by government that actively intervened in railway affairs, it also showed the future of the third class carriage. Of course, the legislation did not stop the usage of open coaches immediately, and they continued to be used until as late as the early 1870s. Yet, what this story shows is that the from the very earliest days of the railway industry it was the government that had to intervene to restrict the railway’s earliest urges simply to make as much profit as possible. Indeed, it is also possible that this early intervention by the government instilled in railway management the idea that they had an obligation to the public, something that would have an effect on railway profitability in later years.

[1] House of Commons Parliamentary Papers [HCPP], 1847 (706) Railways. Summary of returns, showing the number of passengers carried on 63 railways of the United Kingdom during the year ending 30 June 1846, the fares of each class, and the receipts from each class of passengers, and for goods.

[2] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 411/227, Traffic & Coaching Committee Minute Book, 19^th January 1849, p.301

[3] Harris, Michael, ‘Carriages,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997), p.76

[4] The Sheffield Independent, and Yorkshire and Derbyshire Advertiser, Saturday, November 03, 1838; pg. 2; Issue 908

[5] The Champion and Weekly Herald (London, England), Sunday, October 27, 1839; Issue 163.

[6] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonning_Cutting_railway_accident

[7] Accident Returns: Extract for Accident at Sonning on 24th December 1841, http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=113

[8] Simmons, Jack, ‘Parliamentary Trains,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, p.369

Fog! - The Railway's Silent Killer - Part 2

In my last post I wrote about how fog was a silent killer within the Victorian railway industry. In this post I will look at one of the ways that the industry tried to mitigate its potentially lethal affects. In one respect, this is the story of one technology in particular, the Fog Signal and how it warned drivers of impending danger. In another respect, it is also the story of the Fog Signaller or ‘fogmen’ whose job was probably one of the least technological in the railway industry.

The Fog signal, or more accurately the track detonator, was developed by E .A. Cowper in 1841 as a way to provide an audible signal for drivers when visibility was limited, or at times when there was an emergency. [1] Ordinarily, when the sun was shining and a train driver could see all that was around, the ‘distant’ signal played a role of forewarning him of the status of a ‘home’ signal further ahead. However, in foggy conditions it was quite possible that both were out of sight in the murk. Therefore, fog signal was predominately used to supplement the distant signal.

The track detonator, which came to be used throughout the railway industry very quickly after its development, was basically a small, flat, round box, that was attached to the top of the rail. These were placed on the track by the fog signaller, a short distance before the distant signal when it was at danger. Within it was a small explosive charge, which detonated when a train rolled over the top. The driver, alerted to the danger ahead by the explosion, would then be on the lookout for the danger signal or the frantic hand waving from the fog signaller. In response, he would either slow or stop his engine until he had been given the all-clear to proceed.[2]

The poor sod, and I think sod is the correct word, to undertake the placing of fog signals was the fog signaller or fogmen. I wrote a few weeks ago about the dirt of the railway industry, the platelayers, and on many occasions platelayers doubled up as fogmen. However, this job was also taken on by other railway employees such as porters. These men were posted to small huts next to the signal and had to monitor the status of the distant signal constantly so as to know when to place the detonators. Some were also employed as ground men, which could pass messages to the signalmen in the signal box and inform him of the status of the trains.[3] Fogmen typically spent anywhere up to sixteen cold and hungry hours on duty, but for as little as 2d per hour.[4]

Looking at the 1884 London and South Western Railway (L&SWR) rule book, which was almost identical to all other British railway companies’ (they being standardised through the Railway Clearing House in 1876), gives us and insight into the duties of the Fogman. When a fog descended during the day, those employees allocated to be fogmen had to report themselves either to the station master or, if the posting was too far from a station, to the signalman covering a section of the line (Rule 62). If the fog occurred at night, they had to be sent for (Rule 63), and a list of the names and addresses of all fogmen were kept at the stations and signal boxes to facilitate this (Rule 64).

On arrival at the station or signal box they were provided with ‘no less’ that 24 detonators, a hand signal lamp (trimmed and lighted) and a green flag. They would then proceed to the signal where they would work (Rule 65). If during their duty the number of detonators became exhausted, they were to communicate with the station or signal-box and obtain more (Rule 66). If the fog continued for long periods of time, station masters or inspectors were to arrange for a relief to be sent, and station masters were to provide the fogmen with refreshments throughout their duties (Rule 67). It was up to the Station Masters to make sure that the fogmen had proceeded to their posts, and where there were ‘numerous’ along the line, a competent man was to visit them to see if they were doing their duties and to provide them with more detonators if required (Rule 68).[5] Established in the 1840s, this system of operation lasted well into the 20th century.

In a way, the relationship between fog signal and the fog signalman were part of a greater construct of interactions between the railway worker and railway technology that were replicated throughout the Victorian railway industry. While the fog signal itself was undoubtedly an important technological advance that saved many lives, it was still highly dependent on some poor individual sitting in miserable conditions to place them on the line. While today almost all technology serves us as there are safeties that are built in, in some respects, technology in the Victorian railway industry for many railway workers was a wild beast that had to be tamed. Therefore, the adequate functioning of fog signals was served by the misery of the fog signaller.

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[1] Pope, Norris, ‘Dickens’s “The Signalman” and Information Problems in the Railway Age,’ Technology and Culture, Vol.42 No.3 (July 2001), pp.454

[2] Foster, Richard, ‘Fog,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (London, 1997), p.165

[3] Foster, Richard, ‘Fog,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (London, 1997), p.165

[4] McKenna, Frank, The Railway Workers, 1830-1970, (London, 1980) p.66

[5] 1884 London and South Western Rule Book, Author’s Collection, p.37-42