Counting customers - railway traffic before Christmas in the 1800s

There is no doubt that the four or five days before Christmas are some of the busiest for Britain’s railways as people travel home to see their friends and relatives, or return bleary eyed from Christmas parties and gatherings. No doubt the flooding in Britain has reduced the number of trains running in the period this year. However, nationally, 22,247 trains were scheduled on the 21 December; 20,436 on the 22^nd; 11,588 were supposed to run yesterday and 18,968 are due to run today.^[1] Most Train Operating Companies have not supplement their regular scheduled services,^[3] Chiltern being the only one.^[2] Thus, with largely regular Saturday and Sunday timetables in operation on the 22^nd and 23^rd December, and with trains stopping early today, many passengers will feel like they have travelled in tin cans by the end of the festive season.

However, it is no comfort to say so, but crowded trains are what the Christmas passenger has experienced for over a century. In the nineteenth century particularly, the various railway companies provided the press with a plethora of data on their Christmas traffic. In the days after the 25 December how many passengers to and from stations were commonly mentioned in newspapers, especially as the numbers usually grew each year. 

The number of passengers who travelled in the festive period from London via the Great Western Railway (GWR) perfectly shows this growth. In 1895 the number booked at the company’s City and West End Offices and London Stations between Friday 20 December and Thursday 26 December at noon was 40,750. This was an increase on 1889’s total of 37,000. Indeed, in 1895 5,953 passengers travelled from Paddington on Saturday 21 December; with 8,992 being conveyed on Christmas Eve.^[4] Therefore, with Christmas passenger numbers increasing so rapidly year on year, it is quite possible that individual travellers found themselves progressively squeezed as the railways struggled to keep pace with the changing demand.   

However, as we are currently told passenger numbers in this country continue to grow, it would be interesting to see this year whether the 374 and 307 trains scheduled leave Paddington on the 21 and 24 December respectively are on average they are more packed than those on the same day in 2011. ^[5]

But passenger data was not the only information the newspapers featured; and the amount of parcels handled by stations also appeared alongside it. Those passing through the London and North Western Railway’s Euston Station were of particular interest and, as I related in a blog post last year, special arrangements were established there in the 1840s to handle this vast and growing traffic. Statistics have been found which show that number of parcels arriving at Euston in the three days before and the morning of the 25 December grew most years. They were as follows:

1848 - 12,000 [6]

1849 - 15,000 [7]

1850 - 10,000 [8]

1851 - Inward and Outward: 40,000 (figures for the week before Christmas) [9]

1852 - 12,000

1853 - 12,500 [10]

1864 - 17,000 [11]

Therefore, by digging into nineteenth century newspapers we can gauge how the railways became an integral part of Christmas for Victorians; performing the same function as do for passengers today, through taking them from home to merriment and delivering them all they needed for Christmas cheer.

Much thanks must go to Tom Cairns for the data he provided on current train operations.

A Very Merry Christmas

My other Christmas posts are as follows:

'Pretty Festoons of Holly Leaves Are Displayed' - The Decoration of Railway Stations Before 1900

"Christmas fare from the provinces" - Euston Station and the Distribution of Festive Goods in the 1840s

"An EXTRA TRAIN will leave Shoreditch" - Trains on Christmas Day before 1900
A Victorian 'Railway' Christmas - Parcels, Pastimes, Profit and Poetry

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[1] Data kindly provided by Tom Cairns http://realtimetrains.co.uk and Twitter: @swlines

[2] http://www.nationalrail.co.uk/service_disruptions/seasonal/Christmas_2012/index_custom.html

[3] http://www.nationalrail.co.uk/service_disruptions/seasonal/Christmas_2012/index_custom.html

[4] Morning Post - Friday 27 December 1895

[5] Data kindly provided by Tom Cairns http://realtimetrains.co.uk and Twitter: @swlines

[6] The Morning Post, Tuesday, December 26, 1848

[7] Daily News, Wednesday, December 26, 1849, Issue 1119

[8] The Era, Sunday, December 29, 1850

[9] The Standard, Saturday, December 27, 1851, p.1

[10] The Essex Standard, and General Advertiser for the Eastern Counties, Wednesday, December 28, 1853

[11] Jackson's Oxford Journal, Saturday, January 9, 1864

Did the Management Ever Control Britain's 19th Century Railways?

Alfred Chandler

The rise of what Alfred Chandler called the ‘visible hand’ of management has dominated the business history literature for forty years. Simply put, Chandler argued that managers came to dominate American business in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As technology was introduced to companies and markets expanded, their processes of distribution and then coordination became more complex as they increased in size. Consequently, this generated a need for better administrative control of the organisations’ activities, leading to the rise of the ‘visible hand’ of management. Indeed, as managers grew in number within firms, they increasingly steered their destinies, wrestling control of corporate strategy from companies’ shareholders, financiers and directors. Chandler called this ‘managerial capitalism.’[1]

In the United States this process occurred first in the railroads. When faced with challenges such as safety concerns, then the increasing volume, speed and complexity of traffic on the line, companies quickly developed hierarchies of railway managers to coordinate their activities, leading to the rise of the ‘visible hand.’ Ward argued that a situation had developed on the Pennsylvania Railroad by 1873 where ‘paramount executive authority had emerged’, directors were by then ‘pliant acceders,’ and shareholders were virtually impotent.[2] Indeed, there is no doubt that Chandler admired railroads, such as the Pennsylvania, where managers had seized control of the organisation, arguing they were the best managed and innovative. They adopted high-level strategic direction, with considerable authority delegated to operating units and complex administrative practices were developed.[3] Indeed, Zunz also argued similar of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, which he considered an exemplar of good management practice because it was controlled by the company’s management class.[4]

The question, therefore, is to what extent this process was replicated in the British context? How much control did British railway managers have over their companies’ directors and shareholders in the nineteenth century, and, ultimately, their destinies? Chandler argued that because of the nation’s smaller size British railway managers were challenged less than their American counterparts to develop new and innovative management techniques.[5] Therefore, this possibly implies that British railway managers did not secure the same level of control as some American managers. However, Channon countered this by arguing that British railway managers were challenged in different ways because of the country’s high-density, expensive and intensive network, which was, unlike in the United States, complete in its operating and physical details in a much shorter time period after the industry’s establishment.[6] Therefore, while not ruling out a rise of the ‘visible hand’ of management, this may suggest that a different pattern of managerial development occurred within British railways. Nevertheless, neither of these perspectives really answered the question of whether there was a rise in the ‘visible hand’ of management in the British railway industry in the nineteenth century.

No comprehensive history of British railway management before 1914 has been written. Therefore, I have had to compile what I know about the rise of the ‘visible hand’ from case studies. However, some historians have broadly attempted to assess when the railways’ management class, particularly within larger companies, came to dominate the industry’s direction. Cain argued that General Managers, who were usually at the top of railway companies’ hierarchies, were the most important decision-makers in the industry by 1870.[7]  Channon made a similar claim, stating that before 1870 managerial ascendency ‘cannot be assumed.’[8] I believe both were wrong, and using a number of case studies I will suggest that management cannot be said to have ascended into a position of control before the 1900s.

Richard Moon

Terry Gourvish’s book on Mark Huish, the London and North Western Railway’s General Manager between the company’s formation in 1846 and 1858, is an enthralling text. It relates the story of a railway manager who during his administration and after his death was considered ‘unscrupulous, dictatorial and Machiavellian’; controlling the companies' policies. At face value this would suggest he was the first ‘managerial capitalist’ in Britain’s railway industry. Yet, Gourvish’s research showed the reverse. He argued that while Huish had more control of the company’s policies than his contemporaries, he did not possess the ‘dictatorial’ influence in decision-making often ascribed to him.’ Indeed, his resignation was forced on him 1858 as he did not satisfy the board’s requirements regarding inter-company diplomacy.[9]

Archibald Scott

Indeed, it was the career of the man who instigated  Huish’s resignation, LNWR director Richard Moon, that truly shows that the ‘visible hand’ of management did not really control policy on the British railway network until long after it had on many American railroads. Moon was appointed chairman of the company in 1861 and stayed in the post for thirty years. Before his ascendency becoming chairman, he had a reputation for taking a highly detailed interest in most of the company’s operational affairs, even when they were beyond his remit. Indeed, most railways’ boards met twice monthly, with directors meeting in committees the day before. Yet, Moon would be active in the company’s affairs every day of the week. Thus, when made chairman his controlling instincts were let loose. His biographer, Peter Braine, described him as being ‘not only a managing director, but also effectively his own General Manager,’ throughout his chairmanship. [10] Indeed, the company’s General Manager between 1858 and 1875, William Cawkwell, was very much under his and the board’s control.[11]

But directors having control of companies’ strategic direction was not unusual in the period. Lord Salisbury, chairman of the Great Eastern Railway between 1868 and 1871, looms large in the company’s history. On his appointment the GER was in chancery. Yet, he successfully turned it around and it began paying dividends again in the 1870s.[12] On the London and South Western Railway, as I will explain in my thesis, policy was dominated by directors until the 1881 when they gave the General Manager, Archibald Scott, more ‘general control’ over the concern’s affairs.[13] However, even then he was still under their control and did not have a decisive role in corporate decision-making. Lastly, on the Great Northern Railway in the 1850s, 60s and 70s it had directors who ‘thought they knew more about the business than the company’s senior officers.’[14] Therefore, this would suggest that the dominance of company boards was still present in the industry as late as the 1870s.

Indeed, from the 1860s there also appeared controlling positions within companies which would now be described as managing directorships. In most cases the individuals taking these positions were ex-managers, who on retirement became controlling directors. The most prominent examples of this were Edward Watkin and James Staats Forbes. They were fierce rivals, with Watkin chairing the Manchester Sheffield and Lincolnshire (1864-1894), South Eastern (1866-1894) and Metropolitan Railways (1872-1894); while Forbes was chairman of the London, Chatham and Dover (1873-1898) and Metropolitan District Railways (1872-1901). Both men had served as railwaymen and then had moved onto railways’ boards where they dominated policy.[15] The other example of this was the managing directorship of the Daniel Gooch on the Great Western Railway. Gooch had been the company’s Locomotive Superintendent between 1837 and 1864, and when he resigned took up a position on the board. He then became the company’s chairman, and had a position akin to a managing director between 1865 and his death in 1889.[16] Furthermore, James Ramsden on the Furness railway also was in such a position between 1866 and 1883.[17]

Myles Fenton

But by the late 1880s the dominant power of railway managers was coming through more widely within the British Railway industry. Between 1885 and 1897, as my thesis will show, Charles Scotter was the dominant General Manager of the London and South Western Railway, controlling almost all aspects of policy, large and small. Cornelius Lundie, General Manager and Superintendent of the Line of the Rhymney Railway between 1858 and 1904, ran the railway as he wished with little or no reference to the board’s interests.[18] Even Watkin  relied on the General Managers at each of his companies for their safe and efficient operation. They were the SER’s Myles Fenton, William Pollitt at the MSLR and John Bell at the Metropolitan.[19] Indeed, Hodgkins argued that because Pollitt and Bell were rivals a proposed link between the MSLR and Metropolitan in the 1890s would have been difficult to arrange. Therefore, this suggests that despite Watkin’s domineering chairmanship of his companies, his chief executives still heavily influenced their railways’ policies.[20]

George Gibb

These cases were, however, only the start of a shift of towards the absolute control of the ‘visible hand’ of management within Britain’s railways. In 1891 George Gibb was appointed General Manager of the North Eastern Railway. Gibb reformed the company’s operations and, through dominating the company’s board and staff, dragged it into a position where experts acknowledged it was a model of good management practice.[21] But Gibb was just the first of a new breed of railway executives. Indeed, as a crisis hit the industry around 1900, as passenger, goods and revenue growth stalled, the cost of fuel and materials increased, and railway securities became less favoured as investment opportunities, the role of reversing  the industry’s financial situation fell onto the shoulders of executives.

After 1900 a raft of new and innovative managers came to the fore within British railways. Sam Fay, an ex-LSWR employee, became the Great Central Railway’s General Manager in 1902, and through his dynamic leadership transformed it from being a poorly performing to concern into one that, while never rich, made great advances and innovations in operational practice.[22] On the Midland Railway Cecil Paget, the company’s Chief Operating Officer, devised a whole new method of train control that added greatly to the company’s operating efficiency,[23] reducing delays to freight trains from 21,869 hours in 1907 to 7,749 hours in 1913.[24] Lastly, in 1912 Herbert Walker became the LSWR’s General Manager. Through dominating the company’s directorate he reformed its management and introduced electric traction onto its ailing suburban network.[25]

Of course, not all railways had General Managers that were as dynamic as these three. However, generally by the early twentieth century executives controlled the strategic direction of most of the largest companies within the British railway industry. Furthermore, the process of the rise of the ‘visible hand’ was also helped, as my thesis will relate and as Channon discussed,[26] by directors having less time to dedicate to the companies they served. Before 1900 the many took an active interest in their railway companies as they had little else to occupy their time. However, from around 1900, as the British corporate economy grew, they took on other external responsibilities, such other directorships. Thus, large numbers of directors were occupied by these activities, leaving vacuum of control into which railway executives could step.

Herbert Walker

Therefore, it is not surprising that on the formation in 1912 of the Railway Executive Committee, established to organise Britain’s railways in wartime, all its members were General Managers of the country’s largest companies. Indeed, the diminished role of the railway directors in the administration of the industry by that time was reflected by the fact that not one was present on the REC. Consequently, Britain’s railways in World War One was completely managed by the ‘visible hand’ of management,[27] the final proof that it had secured strategic control of the industry by 1914.

Overall, this survey [tentatively] disproves Channon and Cain’s claims that railway managers were universally important to British railways’ policies by 1870, and there was much variance in who controlled their direction. Overall, in the contrast with experience of the American railroads, the rise of the ‘Visible Hand’ of management occurred relatively late in the British context; only truly emerging after 1900. But why this was so?

I think that Chandler was correct to some extent in arguing that British railway managers were challenged less than their American counterparts because of the country’s smaller size. Despite the dramatic traffic growth throughout the century, the smaller size of British railway companies meant that there was never a point until after the 1890s when the internal administrative control required by them was beyond the ability of one director or their boards to organise. Indeed, the highly centralised management structures of British railway companies throughout the period, where decisions could be made by a small group of directors or managers at the top of the hierarchy,[28]  meant that dynamic and knowledgeable individuals, irrespective of whether they were directors or a managers, had the possibility of controlling their railways. Thus, this is why it is unclear before 1900 if management had 'ascended' within the industry. Indeed, one factor in an individual controlling a railway in the period was his personality; and all of the men mentioned were certainly characters. 

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[1] Channon, Geoffrey, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940: Studies in Economic and Business History, (Aldershot, 2001), p.5

[2] Ward, James A., ‘Power and Accountability on the Pennsylvania Railroad, 1846-1878’, Business History Review, XLIX (1975), p.58

[3] Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.5

[4] Zunz, Oliver, Making America Corporate: 1870-1920, (Chicago, 1990), p.47

[5] Chandler, Alfred D., Scale and Scope: the Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, (London, 1990) p.253

[6] Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.29

[7] Cain, P.J., ‘Railways 1870-1914: the maturity of the private system,’ in Freeman, Michael J. and Aldcroft, Derek H. (eds.) Transport in Victorian Britain, (Manchester, 1988), p.112

[8] Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.44

[9] Gourvish, T.R. Mark Huish and the London & North Western Railway, (Leicester, 1972), p.167-182

[10] Braine, Peter, The Railway Moon – A Man and His Railway: Sir Richard Moon and the L&NWR, (Taunton, 2012), p.477

[11] Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.44

[12] Barker, T.C., 'Lord Salisbury, Chairman of the Great Eastern Railway 1868-1872' in Marriner, S., Business and Businessmen: Studies in Business, Economic and Accounting History, (Liverpool, 1972)

[13] The South Western Gazette, December 1881, p.2

[14] Simmons, Jack, The Railway in England and Wales 1830-1914, (Leicester, 1978), p.247

[15] Gourvish, T.R., ‘The Performance of British Railway Management after 1860: The Railways of Watkin and Forbes’, Business History, 20 (1978), p.198

[16] Cain, P.J., ‘Railways 1870-1914: The maturity of the private system’, in Freeman, Michael J. and Aldcroft, Derek H. (eds.) Transport in Victorian Britain (Manchester, 1988), p.113

[17] Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales 1830-1914, p.247

[18] Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales 1830-1914, p.247

[19] Gourvish, ‘The performance of British railway management after 1860’, p.188-191

[20] Hodgkins, David, The Second Railway King: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Watkin, (Melton Priory, 2002), p.609

[21] Irving , R.J., The North Eastern Railway Company: An Economic History, 1870-1914,  (Leicester, 1976)  p.261-264

[22] Dow, Andrew, ‘Great Central Railway,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (1997, Oxford), p.191-192

[23] Burtt, Philip, Control on the Railways, (London, 1926), p.144-151

[24] Edwards, Roy, ‘Divisional train control and the emergence of dynamic capabilities: The experience of the London, Midland and Scottish Railway, c.1923-c.1939, Management and Organisational History, 6 (2011), p.398

[25] Klapper, C.F., Sir Herbert Walker’s Southern Railway, (London, 1973), p.33-76

[26] Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.187-188

[27] Pratt, Edwin A., British Railways and the Great War: Organisation, Efforts, Difficulties and Achievements – Vol. 1, (London, 1921), p.40-50

[28] Bonavia, The Organisation of British Railways,p.17-18

A Misinformed but Devious Take-over of a Railway

The Somerset and Dorset Railway in 1875

The ultimate point of my PhD on the London and South Western Railway’s (LSWR) management between 1870 and 1910 is to determine the quality of managers' and directors' decisions in the period. Therefore, I deal with questions surrounding what drove decisions and what decision-makers knew when making them. One event I focus on is the LSWR and Midland Railway’s lease of the Somerset and Dorset Railway (SDR) in 1875.

The LSWR and Midland Railway's Lease

The SDR was formed from a number of small companies in 1862. Yet, after connecting to Bath in 1874 it got into financial trouble, even though the trade with the Midland at that place and the LSWR at Templecombe was healthy.[1] Consequently, the beleaguered company approached the Great Western Railway (GWR) with the proposal that it would purchase the SDR. Thereafter, the GWR and its Bristol and Exeter Railway (BER) allies engaged in protracted negotiation with the SDR,[2] and by early August a deal was close. On the 12 August 1875 James Grierson and J.C. Wall, the GWR and BER General Managers, visited the LSWR’s General Manager, Archibald Scott, at Waterloo. The LSWR and GWR were fierce competitors, but as an act of good faith Grierson and Wall informed Scott of the negotiations and offered the LSWR a working agreement on the southern part of the line between Templecombe and Wimborne.[3] Scott expressed his alarm at the proposal[4] and requested another meeting on the 16 August to give him time to consult the LSWR’s board.[5]

James Allport

It was at that point that the LSWR out-flanked the GWR. Scott met his board on 13 August and was immediately sent to Birmingham to confer with the Midland’s Deputy Chairman and General Manager, James Allport.[6] By the 17 August they decided to work with the LSWR to offer the SDR a better deal than the GWR and B&ER's.[7] Yet, knowledge of Scott's trip was withheld from Grierson and Wall when he met them on sixteenth,[8] with Scott stating that a LSWR half-yearly meeting of proprietors had prevented the board considering the matter.[9] This gave the LSWR and Midland time to finalise their deal with the SDR board, who on 19 August rejected GWR and BER’s offer. The agreement between the LSWR, Midland  and SDR was signed on the 1 November.[10] Naturally, the GWR was angered by Scott’s actions and opposed the leasing Bill in Parliament.[11] However, against its many protestations, this passed on 13 July 1876.[12]

Decision-making

The question remains as to why the LSWR decided to go behind the GWR's back and secure the SDR for itself? Certainly, LSWR decision-makers thought their company would benefit from leasing the SDR and augmenting its infrastructure. Scott described its traffic as being ‘in its infancy’ and at the parliamentary committee investigating the lease stated that:

James Grierson

‘A considerable amount of money will have to be expended on the Somerset and Dorset Line to improve it and make it efficient for traffic purposes, and I have no hesitation in saying that the traffic to be carried over the Somerset and Dorset Line in connection with the South Western system and the Midland as well as locally, will be very large indeed.’[13]

However, the LSWR did not employ accurate predictions of the capital expense required to realise the SDR's revenue generating potential. Like Channon argued regarding the Midland’s London extension in 1869, LSWR decision-makers’ knowledge of costs and revenues was too incomplete for accurate predictions of these things to be made.[14] Furthermore, there was realistically not time enough between Scott being notified of the GWR and BER’s plans on the twelfth, and the agreement’s completion on the nineteenth, for accurate forecasts to be formulated. This is not to say LSWR decision-makers had absolutely no idea of the potential revenues and costs of taking over the line, and the proposal for the LSWR to operate between Wimborne and Templecombe was deemed objectionable because Scott recognised the region’s poor revenue generating potential. But this analysis was not systematic, and based on ‘gut-feeling’ and experience.

In reality, the potential profits the SDR could generate with investment was not the reason the LSWR joined with the Midland to lease it. Before 1876 the SDR generated little traffic for the LSWR. In 1871 freight moving from the SDR onto the LSWR’s system contributed to the latter revenue of only £38,282, rising to £54,482 by 1875, the increase being because the Bath connection opened. Yet, this still only constituted 2.19 per cent of the LSWR’s gross receipts in 1875[15] and it is unlikely this traffic alone justified the lease.

Rather, the timing of the LSWR’s approach to the Midland and SDR were determined by the GWR and B&ER’s actions. The LSWR's trade could have been potentially disadvantaged if they had taken over the line, and Portal, the LSWR Deputy-Chairman, stated that the GWR and B&ER’s proposals were ‘highly injurious to the interests of the public, contrary to the interests of Parliament and hurtful to the South Western Company.’[16] Strategically, the SDR was important for the LSWR, with trade coming through it from the north and South Wales to Southampton. In August 1875 Scott stated that ‘…naturally the South Western Company, [has been] interested…for so many years been in the traffic in connection with the Somerset and Dorset line.’[17] Therefore, the GWR’s proposals would have given it control of this traffic, possibly damaging the LSWR's revenue.

Thus, the LSWR’s concern to control its trade and territory on its own terms, overrode others regarding the investment the line needed or its revenue generating capacity. Indeed, LSWR decision-makers were attempting to protect a regional monopoly, as Dodgson argued occurred at the time in the industry more generally.[18]

Archibald Scott

However, the lack of accurate cost and revenue predictions played a role in LSWR decision-makers’ mind-sets when approaching the SDR takeover. Firstly, they had believed from as early as the 1840s that traffic and revenue would always increase irrespective of the state of the economy (as I prove elsewhere in my Phd). This fed the belief that territorial protection would always put extra traffic onto the LSWR’s system, which would ultimately be good for company profits. Consequently, because accurate project forecasting was largely absent and decisions were usually made based on gut-feeling, these largely assumed beliefs underpinned the rationale and timing of most decisions. Indeed, in the SDR's case, for the LSWR to loose territorial control, may also have potentially lost it the profit from the naturally assumed traffic growth. Again, Channon argued that similar thinking was behind the Midland Railway’s construction of the London extension.[19]

A Successful Take-Over?

Ultimately, the SDR lease mirrored Watkin’s extensions of the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire railway to some extent, as Hopkins described them as ‘expensive failures’ because they ‘were not properly weighed up as investment opportunities’.[20] While the the success of the SDR lease is hard to determine accurately, it was seemingly limited. Between 1875 and 1880, when the LSWR and Midland was investing heavily in the line,[21] passenger numbers hauled grew by 53.22 per cent, and goods tonnage hauled increased by 26.75 per cent.[22] Contrastingly, the LSWR’s passenger traffic numbers grew by 44.26 per cent and goods tonnage by 37.90 per cent over the same period. Yet, thereafter, traffic growth on the SDR stalled, and between 1885 and 1895 the passenger and goods traffic originating from the company grew by 26.94 and 14.58 per cent respectively, while the LSWR’s proportions were 53.02 and 34.47 per cent.[23] Therefore, in later decades the SDR’s own traffic growth was proportionately much lower than the LSWR’s, and its traffic would have made up proportionately less of its parent company's over time.[24] Nevertheless, the benefit of the LSWR controlling the line for its traffic from the north and South Wales may have been considerable as the SDR provided a more direct route to Southampton for it, but this cannot be determined.

Overall, however, the case of the SDR lease shows that rather than mid-Victorian railway managers and directors making calculated decisions about network expansion; the protection of territory was a very important concern for them in the period. Yet, this was despite them never being able to truly quantify what the costs and benefits of protecting this territory would be.

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[1] Williams, R.A., The London and South Western Railway, Volume 2: Growth and Consolidation, (Newton Abbot, 1973), p.173

[2] MacDermot, E.T., revised by Clinker, C.R., History of the Great Western Railway: Volume 2, (Shepperton, 1982), p.52

[3] The National Archives [TNA] RAIL 1066/1692, Sir D. Gooch to the Hon. R.H. Dutton Bart. 26 August 1875, p.44

[4] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Wyndham S. Portal. To Sir D. Gooch, 4 September 1875, p.46

[5] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Sir D. Gooch to the Hon. R.H. Dutton Bart. 26 August 1875, p.44

[6] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Archibald Scott’s evidence for Somerset and Dorset Railway Bill, Minute No. 418, p.55

[7] Williams, The London and South Western Railway, Volume 2, p.174

[8] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Sir D. Gooch to Wyndham S. Portal. 27 October 1875, p.48

[9] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Sir D. Gooch to the Hon. R.H. Dutton Bart. 26 August 1875, p.44

[10] Williams, The London and South Western Railway, Volume 2, p.174-175

[11] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Parliamentary Bills and Minutes of Evidence, etc.

[12] Williams, The London and South Western Railway, Volume 2, p.175

[13] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Archibald Scott’s evidence for Somerset and Dorset Railway Bill, Minute No. 378, p.42, 24 March 1876

[14] Channon, Geoffrey, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940: Studies in Economic and Business History, (Aldershot, 2001), p.107

[15] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Archibald Scott’s evidence for Somerset and Dorset Railway Bill, Minute No. 369, p.41, 24 March 1876

[16] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Wyndham S. Portal. To Sir D. Gooch, 4 September 1875, p.46

[17] TNA, RAIL 1066/1692, Archibald Scott’s evidence for Somerset and Dorset Railway Bill, Minute No. 375, p.42, 24 March 1876

[18] John, ‘New, disaggregated, British railway total factor productivity growth estimates, 1875 to 1912’, The Economic History Review, 64 (2011), p.639

[19] Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940, p.107

[20] Hodgkins, David, The Second Railway King: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Watkin (Llandybie, 2002)

, p.486

[21] TNA, RAIL 262/16, Somerset and Dorset Joint Line Committee, Meetings of Officers 1875-1884

[22] Board of Trade, Railway Returns for England and Wales and Scotland and Ireland, 1875, p.58-62 and 1880, p.50-54

[23] Board of Trade, Railway Returns for England and Wales and Scotland and Ireland, 1880, p.52-56 and 1885, p.52-56

[24] Board of Trade, Railway Returns for England and Wales and Scotland and Ireland, 1875, p.62 and 1880, p.54

Discovering Britain's first Railwaywomen (1840s and 1850s) - Part 2

My last post discussed the research I have done on some of Britain’s earliest railwaywomen. They were employed by four companies in the 1840s and 1850s and I looked at the positions they worked in and how they came to be appointed. In this post I will look at their wages, length of employment and how they left the service.

The wages the women received were highly variable within companies, between companies and even amongst individuals doing the same jobs. Out of the sixty women, Ann Berry, an office cleaner at Atherton on the London and North Western Railway (L&NWR), had the sad distinction of being the lowest paid, earning only 1 shilling a week (£2 12s per year)[1]. Interestingly, another office cleaner,  Ann Cavanagh who was based at the Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway’s Manchester offices, was the highest paid, receiving £1 1s a week (£52 12s per year).[2] However, despite Ann being the highest paid woman, in comparison with her male colleagues it was still a low amount.

Thus, women’s starting wages on the early railways were meagre. The poorest wages were given to the gatekeepers, and from a sample size of 22 the average wage was 3 shillings 3 pence per week (£6 10s per year). However, this figure is forced up by the fact that there were a number of gatekeepers earning much higher amounts than the rest. Eliza Prince, based at the Saltney gate on the Great Western Railway (GWR) was earning 7 shillings per week (£18 4s per year).[3] However, this average is also skewed by the fact that seventeen of the gatekeepers worked for the London, Brighton & South Coast Railway (LB&SCR) and fifteen of these were receiving what was clearly a standard rate of 2s 6d per week (£6 10s per year). Gatekeepers’ low wages reflected the fact that many of them were given a house as part of their work and had husbands who were also employed by the railway as platelayers or signalmen. Thus, the company did not feel the need to pay these women a higher wage.

The highest wage earners were the waiting room attendants, who on average earned 10 shillings 9 pence per week (£27 17s 2d per year). However, seven of the eight, working for the L&NWR and LB&SCR, all earned 10 shillings a week (£26 per year). Whereas, Francis Fuller, who worked as a ‘servant’ for the LB&SCR, was earning 15 shillings per week (£39 per year).[4] Possibly, the higher wages reflected the fact that attendants usually had had husbands killed on the railways, but also that these men had been in important positions, such as clerks or engine drivers.

While there are only four clerks in the sample, their wage average was 7 shillings 11 pence per week (£20 9s 6d per year). There are seemingly no patterns in their wages, possibly indicating that as the employment of women in such positions was rare, the companies decided what they were paid on a case by case basis. Lastly, cleaners earned on average 5 shillings 2 pence per week (£13 9s 3d per year). Yet, while most of these women were at the lower end of the wage spectrum, amongst the twenty-one individuals doing this job eleven different rates were paid and the only pattern that can be discerned is that the higher paid office cleaners were usually working in stations of note. For example, Ann Trant, who worked at London Bridge Station (LB&SCR), was earning 7 shillings a week (£18 4s per year)[5]. This said, some low paid cleaners at large stations have also been found, suggesting that those who were paid more were possibly in supervisory roles.

Once assigned to their posts forty-one of the women did not receive any wage increases, and for the nineteen women that did the extra income was minimal. Indeed, it was more likely that they would leave the service before they would receive a raise. The details of how twenty of the women left the service have been found. One, Jane Beattie who was an office cleaner at Sheffield on the (MS&LR), died. This was in 1877 after twenty-seven years in the service.[6] Ten resigned and given that four were in their late teens and two were in their mid-20s when they left, it suggests they did so to get married. (The ages when three left are unknown)

Nine of the women were dismissed and the reasons stated for this clearly show that the companies saw women’s labour as being far more dispensable than men’s. Indeed, the phrase ‘services dispensed with,’ or words to that effect, appear in eight of the nine cases, suggesting they were simply fired when no longer required.  The case of Esther Pearce, a gatekeeper at Berwick on the LB&SCR, is particularly interesting as the staff record clearly shows why she lost her job. After thirteen years of service she was discharged on the basis that the company appointed a man.[7] Additionally, long service did not seem to grant the women any immunity from being dispensed with when their post was no longer required. Only Elizabeth Boyd, who was a Charwoman on the MS&LR at Hull, was dismissed for any form of malpractice as she had been inattentive to her duties.[8]

Overall, a number of themes can be drawn from this information. Firstly, the wages women received were, overall, very low compared with those of their male colleagues, even in the cases of the female clerks who were the only women doing a job that men also held. Secondly, there were a considerable number of women who went into railway work before marriage. Lastly, the railway companies saw women were a source of cheap and dispensable labour.

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[1] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 410/1858, Staff register including station agents, guards, porters, ticket collectors, gangers, ladies attendants, night watchmen, police constables, bellmen, lamplighters, engine drivers, firemen, labourers, stokers, signalmen, warehousemen etc., p.258

[2] TNA, RAIL 463/305, Staff register 1, p.441

[3] TNA, RAIL 264/349, Register of uniformed staff No.1 O & P, p.252

[4] TNA, RAIL 414/569, Returns of staff employed in all departments of the company, p.438

[5] TNA, RAIL 414/770, Traffic staff: register of appointments Indexed, p.4

[6] TNA, RAIL 463/305, Staff register 1, p.189

[7] TNA, RAIL 414/770, Traffic staff: register of appointments Indexed, p.119

[8] TNA, RAIL 463/305, Staff register 1, p.392

'Preferred in Finer Weather' - Early Third Class Passenger Accommodation

I don’t often write about the rolling stock of Britain’s railway on this blog. In fact, I don’t think I have so far. I don’t know why. The development of rolling stock on Britain’s railways relate to many aspects of the social, managerial, governmental and technological history of the railway network. But, as will be shown, the earliest third class accommodation was appalling because of the profit motive of the earliest railway managers.

Unlike today, where the majority of us sit in what is now ‘standard class,’ a much smaller proportion of customers travelled by the lowest class in the earliest days of Britain’s railways. Yet, this was not necessarily by choice and the railways before 1850 were reluctant to provide third class accommodation on many services. A return from 1847 showed that in the year ending June 1846 just over 6 million 1^st class passengers were conveyed in Britain (14.07%), just under 17 million 2^nd class passengers travelled (38.66%). The rest of those conveyed were about 18.5 million 3^rd and Parliamentary class passengers (the latter of which more will be mentioned in a moment) (42.26%). However, the preference for carrying 1^st and 2^nd class passengers was logical considering they contributed £3.6 million of the £4.7 million (76.18%) of the revenue generated by passenger traffic in that year.[1]

Thus, for early railway managers providing accommodation for third class passengers forced up operating costs, reduced revenues and ultimately diminished profits. Indeed, on many railways, for example on the opening of the Hampton Court Branch of the London and South Western Railway, the company didn’t mention third class travelling arrangements at all.[2] Furthermore, many companies did not attach third class carriages to the regular passenger services, instead attaching them to goods trains. Of course, this wasn’t to say that the addition of third class carriages to a train that was ‘running light’ didn’t add profit to the overall service, but in the main, railway managers preferred to convey the more profitable first and second class traffic.

Furthermore, the low rate of return on conveying third class passengers also affected the quality of their accommodation which was, especially in winter, dreadful. Thus, early third class accommodation rarely had a roof, glazing, and almost always forced the passengers to sit on wooden seats. In short, these coaches were little more than slightly modified goods wagons.[3] However, by not spending large amounts of money on the coaches for third class travellers, railway managers were reducing the overall cost of conveying them. On the opening of the Sheffield and Rotherham Railway one reporter tried to make the best he could of the third class coaches which were ‘of common appearance but substantial in structure, and being open will probably be preferred in fine weather.’[4]

However, such poor accommodation carried with it substantial risks when an accident occurred. While individuals had come to harm falling from the coaches,[5] it was an accident on the Great Western Railway on Christmas Eve 1841 that brought the matter to the government’s attention. Late in the evening a luggage train, which was comprised of three third class coaches and some heavily loaded goods wagons, was going from Bristol Temple Meads to London Paddington and was passing through Sonning Cutting, east of Reading Station. Rains had caused a landslip which had covered the track with earth. In the dark the train hit this and derailed, causing the third class carriages, which were between the engine and the goods wagons, to be crushed. Eight people died at the scene, and one died in hospital a day later. 16 people were seriously injured.[6]

The accident report stated that one of the principal causes of fatality was the lack of protection afforded to the passengers within them. Indeed, many of the passengers had been thrown out of the carriage on impact.[7] As such, the Board of Trade initiated a general inquiry into the conveyance of third class passengers nationwaide, culminating in the 1844 Regulation of Railways Act. This compelled all companies that derived a third of their revenue from passenger traffic to provide one train daily calling at all stations, that did not go less than 12 miles per hour, which did not cost the traveller not more than 1d per mile and, crucially, used enclosed carriages with seats. These were called ‘Parliamentary Trains.’ Reflecting the fact that the operation of these services would be a financial burden for the railway companies, any company meeting these requirements would not have to pay taxes on the fares.[8]

While this piece of legislation was a landmark, given it was the first by government that actively intervened in railway affairs, it also showed the future of the third class carriage. Of course, the legislation did not stop the usage of open coaches immediately, and they continued to be used until as late as the early 1870s. Yet, what this story shows is that the from the very earliest days of the railway industry it was the government that had to intervene to restrict the railway’s earliest urges simply to make as much profit as possible. Indeed, it is also possible that this early intervention by the government instilled in railway management the idea that they had an obligation to the public, something that would have an effect on railway profitability in later years.

[1] House of Commons Parliamentary Papers [HCPP], 1847 (706) Railways. Summary of returns, showing the number of passengers carried on 63 railways of the United Kingdom during the year ending 30 June 1846, the fares of each class, and the receipts from each class of passengers, and for goods.

[2] The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 411/227, Traffic & Coaching Committee Minute Book, 19^th January 1849, p.301

[3] Harris, Michael, ‘Carriages,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997), p.76

[4] The Sheffield Independent, and Yorkshire and Derbyshire Advertiser, Saturday, November 03, 1838; pg. 2; Issue 908

[5] The Champion and Weekly Herald (London, England), Sunday, October 27, 1839; Issue 163.

[6] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonning_Cutting_railway_accident

[7] Accident Returns: Extract for Accident at Sonning on 24th December 1841, http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docsummary.php?docID=113

[8] Simmons, Jack, ‘Parliamentary Trains,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, p.369

Always remember "Safety First!" - Railway Employee Safety Campaigns from 1913

Safety for Britain’s railway employees before 1913 was governed by the rule books that each was obliged to carry. This had been the case since the railway’s beginnings. However, the rule book did not prevent accidents occurring, and between 1900 and 1913 the average number of railway employees killed per year was 485, with the number of injuries being 20,737. Thus, while the rule book was an established part of railway life, its instructions were failing to prevent accidents. Mike Esbester argued that this could be attributed to the formality and compulsory nature of such documents. ‘The reader was unlikely to read the solid mass of text except when compelled to do so.’[1] It wasn’t until the Great Western Railway (GWR) introduced the “Safety Campaign” in 1913, that things began to change.

The origins of the ‘Safety First’ campaign can be found in the United States. In the early 1900s, Ralph Richards, the Chicago and North Western Railroad’s (C&NWR) general claim agent, became concerned by the number of accidents within the company. As late as 1910 107 men were killed and another 9,000 were injured while at work for the company. Thus, in 1905 he published a number of articles on safety issues and in 1906 these were reproduced as a book. At the same time he attempted to get the C&NWR’s management interested a campaign, something that would become a fruitless endeavour until 1910.[2] By 1912, the ‘safety first’ campaign had become accepted amongst the management of many American railroad companies.

The GWR’s management first came interested in the ‘Safety First’ campaign in 1913 through articles in the Illinois Central Railroad Magazine, George Bradshaw’s book the Prevention of Railroad Accident and through other publications. However, the ‘safety first’ mantra was spreading within Britain’s railway administrators and commentators at the time, and the GWR’s management were simply the first to act on this interest. Thus, the GWR contacted some American railroads about their campaigns with a view to introducing something similar amongst its own employees in early 1913.

Esbester argued that the ‘Safety First’ campaign ‘reinvented safety education in Britain,’ using journalistic techniques to convey its messages. While the contents of the rule book were stuffy and unappealing, the messages provided by the campaign were attractive. Indeed, the GWR used its staff magazine, the Great Western Railway Magazine, to convey its messages as well as publications, competitions and posters. The contents focussed on such areas as safety in coupling together trains, crossing the line, dealing with electric lines (in later years), loading carts, riding on the top of carriages and not standing too close to a steam train’s exhaust pipe.

Articles were written with the employee in mind. They were straightforward for the individual to understand and used informal language that was very different from that found in the rule books. Furthermore, photography was utilised in all the material that was produced, usually showing ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ working behaviour (shown – an example from the 1920s). Additionally, capitalisation and bold text were used to highlight important points. Lastly, in 1916 the GWR introduced a pocket token about the size of a penny to be kept with loose change. This had the ‘Safety First’ motto, ‘IS IT SAFE?’ emblazoned all over it and every time an individual brought out their change it would be there to remind them of the value of safety.

Quickly after the GWR started to work on the campaign it was taken up by other British Railway companies. Indeed, the GWR shared its materials. The companies that introduced campaigns were the London and South Western, Great North of Scotland, Midland and Great North Joint, Wirral, Rhymney, Cambrian, Cardiff, and Isle of Wight Central, North Eastern and Hull and Barnsley Railways. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the diffusion of the campaign happened just as quickly in Britain as it did in America, with many of these companies adopting the campaign by 1915.

So why was the campaign introduced in 1913? Esbester concludes that a combination of two factors that precipitated its adoption. Firstly, this was a period in which the profitability of Britain’s railways was at an all-time low. Secondly, the railway companies were under intense pressure to improve the working conditions of their employees, both from government and the unions. Indeed, in 1911 there had been a national railway strike (which I wrote about here). Thus, the campaign was an attempt by the railway companies to prevent interference from the government in labour relations, placate the unions, while at the same time trying to avoid spending money on costly new safety devices.[3]

If you would like to read Mike Esbester’s article in full, it can be found HERE.

[1] Esbester, Mike, ‘Reinvention, Renewal, or Repetition? The Great Western Railway and Occupational Safety on Britain’s Railways, c.1900-c1920,’ Economic History Online, Vol.3 (2005)
[2] Aldrich, Mark, Safety First: Technology, Labour, and Business in the Building of American Work Safety, 1870-1939, (New York, 1997), p.188
[3] Esbester, ‘Reinvention, Renewal, or Repetition?’ (2005)

Royal Trains for three Victorian Royal Weddings

What with all the fervour surrounding the Royal Wedding, I thought that I would look through some 19th century newspapers for evidence of how the Victorian railways played a role in royal weddings of the past.

The first wedding I encountered was Princess Victoria’s (Queen Victoria’s Daughter) marriage to Prince Frederick William of Prussia on the 25th January 1858. This took place at the Chapel Royal in St. James’ Palace. After the Wedding Breakfast at Buckingham Palace, the couple left for Windsor. In 1858 Windsor had two stations owned by two companies, and the couple were carried by the Great Western Railway (GWR) from Paddington Station. Leaving the station at 5pm, they arrived at Windsor at pm and were greeted by dignitaries, fireworks, the firing of a canon and a guard of honour.[1] A few days later the couple travelled back to Paddington, and then by the South Eastern Railway (SER) to Gravesend where they were to depart for Prussia. All through their journey crowds gathered at the stations they passed to cheer them on, and on arrival at Gravesend Station they were greeted by speeches and cheers.[2]

At the same time, many from around the nation wished to celebrate the wedding and excursion trains were provided to London. Indeed, this was a period when the railway industry was just starting to exploit large events for financial gain by running 'specials' to them. Thus, it is known that the London and South Western Railway (L&SWR) provided special excursion trains from Southampton to ‘enable sight-seers to witness the preparations for the marriage ceremony.’[3] Other instances of special trains have not, however, been found. Yet, it is plausible that they did exist.

In July 1862 another of Queen Victoria’s daughters, Princess Alice, got married to Prince Louis of Hesse at Osborne House on the Isle of Wight. Because of the death of Prince Albert in December 1861, the Royal Family was still in mourning. For this reason the wedding was not common knowledge amongst the public. After the event, the couple travelled from the pier at Gosport to Vauxhall by the L&SWR. ‘So little did the public know about the event’ reported The Sheffield & Rotherham Independent, that when the 5pm Southampton to London express train was shunted into a siding to let the royal train pass, the passengers had the strong impression that there had been an accident ahead. Indeed, when informed of the purpose of the stoppage they refused to believe it. Yet, reassurance came when they saw the royal coaches ‘with the visitors at the wedding seated in it, all at mourning.’[4]

Prince Edward, Queen Victoria’s eldest son and the future King Edward III, was married on the 10th March 1863 to Princess Alexandra of Denmark in St. George's Chapel at Windsor Castle. Alexandra had arrived only four days previously at Gravesend and had been conveyed by the SER to the Bricklayers Arms Station. She was then transported Windsor by the GWR from Paddington.[5] After the wedding the couple departed for Southampton via Basingstoke by the GWR. Jackson’s Oxford Journal reported that ‘the passage of the train from Windsor was welcomed at every station through which it passed by a display of flags, words of welcome and floral decorations.’ On arrival at Southampton the royal carriage was detached from the train, and to the sound of cheers six horses pulled it into the docks. It was from here that they took the Royal Yacht to the Isle of Wight and Osborne House.[6]

Unlike the wedding of Princess Alice, Edward’s wedding, like Prince William’s, was celebrated by many around the country. Naturally, some people wanted to visit Windsor and special trains were laid on by the GWR from Paddington. However, the number conveyed is unknown.[7] In addition, festivities were held nation-wide. In Edinburgh bonfires were lit, famous buildings and monuments were illuminated and fireworks were let off. As such, special trains were run to the city from Newcastle, Dundee and Glasgow, with return workings run after the illumination had finished.[8] Thus, special trains were laid on throughout the country to transport individuals to regional events.

Overall, Britain’s railways clearly played a role in broadening the appeal of royal weddings and making royal couples into celebrities in early Victorian Britain. Stations, particularly, were the focal points for the celebrations, as they were the only places where many people could see the royal couples personally. Indeed, in all of these cases, bar that of Princess Alice’s marriage, royals were subject to celebrations at either end of their journeys, as well as at the stations through which they passed. Additionally, railways had the effect of allowing those that lived far away from the weddings to celebrate where the ceremonies were, or at regional festivities. Thus, while not all weddings were located in easily accessible places, like Windsor, the special trains detailed here indicate that there was significant interest in them. Thus, I have to ask, did the railways start the hype around the royal weddings that we have today?

[1] The Essex Standard, and General Advertiser for the Eastern Counties, Wednesday, January 27, 1858; Issue 1415
[2] The Bristol Mercury, Saturday, February 6, 1858; Issue 3542
[3] Daily News, Friday, January 22, 1858; Issue 3647
[4] The Sheffield & Rotherham Independent, Thursday, July 03, 1862; pg. 4; Issue 2412
[5] Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle etc, Saturday, March 7, 1863; Issue 3309
[6] Jackson's Oxford Journal Saturday, March 14, 1863; Issue 5733
[7] The Sheffield & Rotherham Independent, Wednesday, March 11, 1863; pg. 7; Issue 2626
[8] Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper, Sunday, March 8, 1863; Issue 1059

The Values of Victorian Railway Company Staff Magazines

In my last blog post I talked about how the Great Western (GWR) and London and South Western Railway’s (L&SWR) staff magazines’ had different establishing agendas and how this may have reflected different cultures amongst the companies’ clerks who started and wrote them. In this post I will show where the content of the two company’s staff magazines’, the South Western Gazette (SWG) and the Great Western Railway Magazine and Temperance Union Record (GWRM), converged in one important respect. This will reveal that clerks within both companies had very similar, if not identical, perspectives on railway work that were the result of their career prospects.

One of the most important benefits of being a clerk within any Victorian railway company was the unique promotional opportunities. In the case of the L&SWR I have identified that of 70 Traffic Department senior managers appointed between 1850 and 1922, only 3 (4.3%) had started their careers in non-clerical grades (two porters and a ticket inspector). The remaining 67 all had started with the L&SWR as either junior (or apprentice) clerks or senior clerks.[1] Additionally, Goruvish has shown that of 88 Railway Company Chief Executive Managers appointed between 1850 and 1922, only 10% came from ‘Engineering’ departments.[2] The rest came from Administrative (30%) or Traffic Departments (60%). The only failing of this research, for my purposes, is that it doesn’t identify from what positions that CEMs from Traffic Departments came from. However, we can be almost certain that all those Chief Executive Managers from administrative departments were originally clerks. Overall, however, the evidence suggests that clerks could become managers and other employees rarely received such chances.

Therefore, the fact that the majority of senior L&SWR and GWR managers came from the ranks of the clerical staff, means that their employment outlooks were highly likely be aligned with the goals for the company that senior management had. These goals included profit maximisation, loyalty and efficiency. As a result, the clerk edited staff magazines from both companies reflected this informal association.

Firstly, in both magazines criticism of the policies of the companies was prohibited. In the first issue of the SWG the editorial warned potential contributors that they did not 'think it wise' to include articles which were 'tending to a criticism of the South Western Company's policy, or the action of the company's officials.'[3] [italics in original] Subsequently, in August 1881, a contributor named 'Uno' was reminded in print that his unspecified grievances against the management would not be published.[4] While the same sort of explicit statements were not found in the GWRM, in the first issue the editorial stated that the magazine would ‘not meddle with politics, or with subjects leading to excited controversy, for those can be found ad libitum elsewhere.’[5] Thus, while it did’ not explicitly that reporters could not send in criticism of the company, it implied that ‘controversy’ which this form of correspondence would come under, was not welcome. Therefore, by excluding from these magazines’ pages competing narratives of the companies’ performance and management, the alignment of the views of the clerks and senior management is plain to see.

Secondly, both publications prominently featured financial and traffic information within their pages. From the first issue of the SWG in June 1881, up to the January 1886 number, it printed monthly details of the company's revenue, any increases or decreases compared with the corresponding month of the previous year, and the amount of revenue earned per mile of track opened. Furthermore, these statistics were usually to be found in a position of prominence on page one of each edition.[6] Similarly, the GWRM published throughout its first year (and possibly beyond) information on the GWR’s Stock and Share capital and the traffic receipts of the company in the previous month compared with the corresponding month in the previous two years. While not on the first page of the publication, these figures were in a prominent position in the magazine taking up half of a page.[7] Further, both publications published details of their companies’ half-yearly reports and of the proprietors’ meetings. Thus, the inclusion and prominent position of the traffic and financial information betrayed the fact that both editorial teams, like management, saw the success of the company in financial terms and wished to express to the readership of the centrality of profit in company activities.

The last indicator that the clerks identified with the views of management can only be found in the SWG. In June 1882 the Gazette commented on the fact that the salaried (and predominately clerical) staff had been 'left out in the cold' with regard to pay rises, while the waged grades had received increases. Responding to this, the author stated that 'it is another incontestable proof of the vital importance to the staff of good traffic returns...we trust that for the future all will do their utmost to make the line popular so the present prosperity may long continue.' This implied that employees’ wages were dependent on individual productivity and efficient working. Additionally, it held up as an example the self-sacrificing clerical staff, positioning them within the as understanding the importance of the company's financial success to their employment.[8]As such, the article was projecting the views held by the clerical staff and, by default, the management, that profit was the key consideration of company operations. It is unknown whether a similar expression was made in the GWRM (I only have one year’s worth), but hopefully further research will reveal if this was so.

While I still have a lot to do on railway company magazines, from the evidence above I can tentatively say that the clerks of both the L&SWR and GWR expressed views in their publications which were aligned with their respective companies’ managements. However, the degree to which these were held by all the companies’ clerks is unknown and to determine this is also the aim of further research.

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[1] Data collected from: The National Archives [TNA], RAIL 411/491 to RAIL 411/497 and RAIL 411/499 to RAIL 411/502

[2] Gourvish, Terence .R., ‘A British Business Elite: The Chief Executive Managers of the Railway Industry, 1850-1922,’ Business History, Vol. XLVII, No.3 (Autumn, 1973), p.305

[3] TNA, ZPER 11/1, South Western Gazette, June 1881, pp.5

[4] TNA, ZPER 11/1, South Western Gazette, August 1881, pp.8

[5] TNA, ZPER 19/2, Great Western Railway Magazine and Temperance Union Record, November 1888, p.1

[6] TNA, ZPER 11/1, South Western Gazette, June 1881, pp.1

[7] TNA, ZPER 19/2, Great Western Railway Magazine and Temperance Union Record, November 1888, p.7

[8] TNA, ZPER 11/1, South Western Gazette, June 1882, pp.2