Always remember "Safety First!" - Railway Employee Safety Campaigns from 1913

Safety for Britain’s railway employees before 1913 was governed by the rule books that each was obliged to carry. This had been the case since the railway’s beginnings. However, the rule book did not prevent accidents occurring, and between 1900 and 1913 the average number of railway employees killed per year was 485, with the number of injuries being 20,737. Thus, while the rule book was an established part of railway life, its instructions were failing to prevent accidents. Mike Esbester argued that this could be attributed to the formality and compulsory nature of such documents. ‘The reader was unlikely to read the solid mass of text except when compelled to do so.’[1] It wasn’t until the Great Western Railway (GWR) introduced the “Safety Campaign” in 1913, that things began to change.

The origins of the ‘Safety First’ campaign can be found in the United States. In the early 1900s, Ralph Richards, the Chicago and North Western Railroad’s (C&NWR) general claim agent, became concerned by the number of accidents within the company. As late as 1910 107 men were killed and another 9,000 were injured while at work for the company. Thus, in 1905 he published a number of articles on safety issues and in 1906 these were reproduced as a book. At the same time he attempted to get the C&NWR’s management interested a campaign, something that would become a fruitless endeavour until 1910.[2] By 1912, the ‘safety first’ campaign had become accepted amongst the management of many American railroad companies.

The GWR’s management first came interested in the ‘Safety First’ campaign in 1913 through articles in the Illinois Central Railroad Magazine, George Bradshaw’s book the Prevention of Railroad Accident and through other publications. However, the ‘safety first’ mantra was spreading within Britain’s railway administrators and commentators at the time, and the GWR’s management were simply the first to act on this interest. Thus, the GWR contacted some American railroads about their campaigns with a view to introducing something similar amongst its own employees in early 1913.

Esbester argued that the ‘Safety First’ campaign ‘reinvented safety education in Britain,’ using journalistic techniques to convey its messages. While the contents of the rule book were stuffy and unappealing, the messages provided by the campaign were attractive. Indeed, the GWR used its staff magazine, the Great Western Railway Magazine, to convey its messages as well as publications, competitions and posters. The contents focussed on such areas as safety in coupling together trains, crossing the line, dealing with electric lines (in later years), loading carts, riding on the top of carriages and not standing too close to a steam train’s exhaust pipe.

Articles were written with the employee in mind. They were straightforward for the individual to understand and used informal language that was very different from that found in the rule books. Furthermore, photography was utilised in all the material that was produced, usually showing ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ working behaviour (shown – an example from the 1920s). Additionally, capitalisation and bold text were used to highlight important points. Lastly, in 1916 the GWR introduced a pocket token about the size of a penny to be kept with loose change. This had the ‘Safety First’ motto, ‘IS IT SAFE?’ emblazoned all over it and every time an individual brought out their change it would be there to remind them of the value of safety.

Quickly after the GWR started to work on the campaign it was taken up by other British Railway companies. Indeed, the GWR shared its materials. The companies that introduced campaigns were the London and South Western, Great North of Scotland, Midland and Great North Joint, Wirral, Rhymney, Cambrian, Cardiff, and Isle of Wight Central, North Eastern and Hull and Barnsley Railways. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the diffusion of the campaign happened just as quickly in Britain as it did in America, with many of these companies adopting the campaign by 1915.

So why was the campaign introduced in 1913? Esbester concludes that a combination of two factors that precipitated its adoption. Firstly, this was a period in which the profitability of Britain’s railways was at an all-time low. Secondly, the railway companies were under intense pressure to improve the working conditions of their employees, both from government and the unions. Indeed, in 1911 there had been a national railway strike (which I wrote about here). Thus, the campaign was an attempt by the railway companies to prevent interference from the government in labour relations, placate the unions, while at the same time trying to avoid spending money on costly new safety devices.[3]

If you would like to read Mike Esbester’s article in full, it can be found HERE.

[1] Esbester, Mike, ‘Reinvention, Renewal, or Repetition? The Great Western Railway and Occupational Safety on Britain’s Railways, c.1900-c1920,’ Economic History Online, Vol.3 (2005)
[2] Aldrich, Mark, Safety First: Technology, Labour, and Business in the Building of American Work Safety, 1870-1939, (New York, 1997), p.188
[3] Esbester, ‘Reinvention, Renewal, or Repetition?’ (2005)

There are Good Ways for Unions to act - This Isn't one of Them

I believe that Unions are important. After all, I am in one. Unions exist to protect the rights of workers, to ensure that they have safe workplaces, to fight for a fair wage for a days work and to defend their members when harassed. This is why they were created, and this is what their mandate should be. Later today, I find myself venturing to London on the day of the TSSA and RMT’s third one-day tube strike. I’m actually quite lucky. I will arrive at Waterloo and will end my journey at Euston. As such, I will only use the Northern line; one of the few lines that operates a relatively good service when a strike is on. I will not, therefore, have to make one of the many difficult journeys that will be undertaken by other London commuters trying to get from A to B. And all this, because the two unions involved are not behaving like unions are supposed to.

Some weeks ago I wrote three blog entries charting the history of the 1911 railway workers strike which was conducted by Britain's four main railway unions. This action was primarily a response to the fact that the railway companies of Britain paid their employees poorly, while making them work exhaustive hours with poor safety precautions. Therefore, the strike action was a response to a set of circumstances which, by any reasonable measure, needed to be changed.

However, this strike action, which is over the closure of ticket offices, is not really about ‘safety,’ pay or even hours. I know that Bob Crow likes to bang on about safety like no tomorrow. But I believe he uses the ‘safety’ argument as a smoke screen to protect revealing his own agenda.

I cannot remember the last time that I purchased a paper underground ticket, maybe two years ago, maybe three? Why exactly do we need to keep so many ticket offices open? The short answer is that we don’t. Over the last 5 years ticket office sales have dropped by 50%, only 1 in 20 journeys start with a visit to a ticket office and 80% of journeys are now made with Oyster cards. Therefore, Transport for London’s (TfL) plans to close many ticket offices across the London Underground network seems, from an economic standpoint, entirely justified. This is an especially pertinent point when these ticket offices are funded by the taxpayer and we are in a time of economic stringency. Of course, this has meant that there will be 800 job losses, but TfL have repeatedly and categorically stated that that this will lead to no compulsory redundancies and no loss of earnings for existing staff. Therefore, the staff reductions will be brought about through ‘natural wastage.’

Yet, Bob Crow repeatedly states that the closure of ticket offices will reduce the safety of the travelling public. Yea right. Think of this, if there is a passenger-related safety issue to be dealt with, it is not the people in the booths who deal with it; it is the individuals in the main station area. Therefore, the reduction of ticket offices will have no effect on how these issues are dealt with within the station. Indeed, I suspect, given that three quarters of ticket offices were actually open on the last strike day, and that it is primarily the drivers and maintenance workers that are on strike, that ticket office workers themselves are unconcerned by the cuts.

Subsequently, if the RMT and TSSA’s members are on strike, but there will be no changes in working conditions for them as they are not the ones who will be affected by the cuts, it begs the question as to why the action has been taken? In my opinion, this is about the unions gaining the political upper hand in the face of future adversity. The RMT are one of the most militant unions, with one of the most hard-headed leaders it has had in a generation. With cuts looming, Bob Crow has long since woken up to the fact that his member's jobs will increasingly come under threat. Therefore, he has used the first industrial relations issue to start to fight his corner, to assert his political position, even though the matter at hand is in reality an issue that doesn't primarily affect the RMT's members.

Thus, he may cry out that the safety of the public is compromised, but in reality, Crow's aim can only be to force TfL into a position whereby he can fight later battles with the upper hand. If the unions won this dispute, it would be like tacit consent being given by TfL that they could not make changes regarding staffing issues without their consent. Thus, in the long run, a successful strike action would mean the RMT and TSSA's members' jobs would be more secure.

However, the problem with Crow hijacking the issue of ticket offices for is own end, is that he is now a bit like the boy that cried wolf. At the end of the day, most of the public can see the need for the ticket office changes and support them. Subsequently, in the future when the unions really need our support with some justifiable strike action because of potential cuts or job-losses, many of us just won’t care because our trust in the RMT and the TSSA will have been eroded to the point of non-existence. Many will no longer see them as protectors of their members, rather, they will be perceived as bullies that cannot face reality.

Thus, there are good ways for unions to act, and this strike action is not one of them.

The Forgotten National Railway Strike, 1911 - Part 3

With the strike over, railway workers all over the country went back to work with the promise of a Royal Commission to look into the working of the conciliation boards and the whole process of collective bargaining. The Royal Commission met in September and received evidence from all sides of the debate. The Railway managers approached the matter in different ways, from acceptance of the union position in the industry, like the case of the Sir George Gibb of the North Eastern Railway, to the obstinacy and inflexibility of Lord Claud Hamilton, Chairman of the Great Eastern Railway. These two individuals were, however, unique and most railway managers took the middle ground of not wanting to recognise the unions and trying to maintain direct communication between them and the workers in matters of discipline. The commission also received evidence from railway workers, who naturally complained about the conciliation boards, and argued for their dissolution with a formal recognition of the unions.[1]

The result of the Royal Commission was only a slightly revised conciliation and arbitration scheme. Firstly, it widened the number of topics that could be discussed. Whereas before, possible discussions were limited to hours of work and wages, the new scheme also allowed for matters of employment conditions to be tabled at the sectional boards. However, with an eye to protecting the companies’ right to discipline its own staff, the commission explicitly excluded these matters being brought up. The commission also allowed that the members of each of the board could elect a secretary from any source, even if the individual was a union official or not working within the company. This allowed the union to be involved with negotiations, but without them being formally being acknowledged by the companies.

Yet naturally, these changes did not go far enough for unions and they approached the companies’ management about altering the scheme further. Not surprisingly, the railway managers refused to see them. [2] In response the unions balloted their members about their opinion of the new conciliation scheme and the possibility of further strike action. Overwhelmingly, the railway workers of Britain voted against the royal commission’s revised conciliation scheme, and for further strike action. Faced with such opposition, and the threat of the country grinding to a halt again, the companies met union representatives in December and agreed a slightly revised plan. [3]

On top of the commission’s changes, the format of the forum for discussion was slightly changed. The 1907 scheme introduced sectional boards which contained elected representatives of both the staff and management from the relevant department. If a matter could not be decided at that level, it would go up to a general board, made up of equal numbers of staff and management, and if that did not succeed at hammering out a deal, the matter would be referred to arbitration. The altered scheme removed the general boards and moved the ‘impartial’ chairman to the sectional board. If the board could not decide on a decision, his word would be final and binding. Overall, the scheme was a quicker one, but as Pollins argued, it meant that the grades were more isolated, which in turn separated the unions.[4]

Naturally, the railway companies felt that they had given up a lot of ground. Indeed, they continued to oppose the scheme. Further, official recognition of the unions was a long way off, and the most that could be said is that Union officials could assist the workers in the capacity of secretary if they were elected. Thus, the union’s gains were small, and railwaymen remained disgruntled by their lack of bargaining power within the industry. As a result in 1913 the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) was formed by the amalgamation of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, the main protagonists in the strike action, the General Railway Workers Union and the United Pointsmen and Signalmen’s Society.

The formation of the NUR was a landmark in the history of industrial relations as it was the first union that was formed to represent all grades of an industry. Thus, its remit to represent all railway workers, irrespective of grade, and its large size, gave it greater strength at the bargaining table.[5] Thus, the NUR’s first proclamation was that it was their aim to end the conciliation scheme.[6] However, the two other railway unions, ASLEF and the Railway Clerks Association, did not partake in the merger.

The outcome of the 1911 strike was that the unions now had a place in the British railway industry. The unions had demonstrated the power of collective militancy and had forced some changes in the conciliation scheme. Wartime cut off any more progress in changing wages and working conditions and it would only be in 1919, when there was another national strike, that further concessions from the companies would be secured. However, after 1911 the unions were never ignored again.

I have heavily used to write these posts two books. David Howell's, 'Respectable Radicals: Studies in the Politics of Railway Trade Unionism,' is simply wonderful and is the comprehensive history of the Railway Unions. Harold Pollins', 'Britain’s Railways: An Industrial History,' is also good, but gives a shortened version of railway trade unionism up to the 1960s.

---

[1] Howell, David, Respectable Radicals: Studies in the Politics of Railway Trade Unionism, (Aldershot, 1999), p.14-21

[2] Pollins, Harold, Britain’s Railways: An Industrial History, (Newton Abbot, 1971), p. 138

[3] Howell, Respectable Radicals, p.124

[4] Pollins, Britain’s Railways: An Industrial History, p. 139

[5] Pollins, Britain’s Railways: An Industrial History, p. 139-140

[6] Howell, Respectable Radicals, p.217

The Forgotten National Railway Strike, 1911 - Part 2

In July and early August 1911, railway workers in various parts of the country, dissatisfied with the working of conciliation boards, unofficially went on strike. In the railway worker’s minds, the conciliation boards had been ineffective at raising wages and reducing hours, as the railway companies had found ways around the awards. Indeed, many of the railway workers had nicknamed them ‘confiscation boards.’ [1]Both Pollins and Howell argued that the root cause was because groups of railway employees, particularly in the North West, were inspired by two recent large and successful strikes that occurred amongst dock and shipping workers.[2] ‘As workers in other industries began to strike and to secure some advances, so railwaymen became even more impatient about the conciliation scheme.’[3]

Some of the first strikes were among Midland Railway workers who unofficially came out on in early August demanding increased pay and shorter hours. However, the action that had started in Liverpool soon spread to Manchester and other parts of the north and midlands, as well as other railway companies such as the London and North Western and Great Central railways. Indeed, Howell argued that the interaction between workers of different railway companies allowed these unofficial actions to spread.[4] Overall, while the precise number of workers who struck is unavailable, approximately 50,000 railway workers in Britain were on strike before union leaders got involved.[5]

On the 15^th August in Liverpool, around which the storm was now blowing, between 40 and 50 delegates from four of the five railway unions met. The delegates came from the Association of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF), The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (ASRS), the General Railway Workers Union (GRWU) and the United Pointsmen and Signalmen's Society (UPSS). Only missing, were representatives of the Railway Clerk’s Association (RCA). The first resolution they passed laid out their issues with the conciliation scheme: -

‘We hereby declare that this unfortunate condition of affairs has been created largely by the vexatious attitude of many of the railway companies towards the working of the scheme of conciliation and arbitration, agreed to in 1907 by the Board of Trade and the railway companies and this society (The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants).’

The delegates then issued an ultimatum, and agreed:

‘…to offer the railway companies twenty-four hours to decide whether they are prepared to immediately meet the representatives of these societies to negotiate a basis of settlement of the matters in dispute affecting the various grades.’[6]

Nervous about the country shutting down, and keen to avoid a strike, the government stepped in. Firstly, Asquith invited a number of railway managers to a meeting to discuss the issues, assuring them that they would be given all the support necessary to continue services as normal.[7] Indeed, Asquith declared that he would ‘use all the civil and military forces at his disposal’ to make this happen. [8] This was followed by a meeting between representatives of the Board of Trade and union officials, at which the latter laid out their grievances. Firstly, there was the long-standing complaint over the conciliation scheme, but they also demanded recognition by the railway companies. In essence, the unions had used the situation, which had not been created by them, to push this second agenda.[9]

The suggestion proffered by Asquith was the formation of a Royal Commission to investigate the workings of the conciliation scheme. The unions, worried about how long the commission would take to report and the fact that there was no guarantee that they would be recognised, rejected this offer. Thus, on the evening of the 17^th August 1911, the government and railway management’s worst fears were realised. The Times reported that ‘last evening the unions issued telegrams to all their branches ordering the men to cease work immediately. The thousands of men on strike were promptly joined by many thousands more.’[10] In response, and with a view to keeping its promise, the government deployed 58,000 troops across the network at key points, such as junctions, stations and signal boxes. In the concise words of Bagwell, ‘the strike was effective.’[11]

The strike didn’t last long, and only about 200,000 of the country’s 600,000 railway workers struck.[12] Indeed, on the London and South Western Railway only two members of the staff went on strike,[13] highlighting the fact that in many cases strike action was about localised disputes, rather than nation-wide injustices in employee pay and conditions. Further, it emphasised that union leadership had, not unreasonably, hijacked the unofficial strikes to make a bid for recognition in the eyes of the railway company managers.

Recognition came, in a non-official sense, on the 19^th August when for the first time the government brought together round the same table union officials and railway managers. Shortly after, the unions instructed their members and all others on strike, to return to work. The unions also accepted Asquith’s proposed Royal Commission to look at the conciliation scheme. In truth, nothing much had changed and the unions had basically accepted the scheme offered on the 17^th August. Thus, this suggests that they wished to show the government and railway companies what they were capable of.

Therefore, the strike of 1911 was only a minor ‘blip’ in the smooth running of Britain’s railway network. However, it was vital in the step towards railway companies acknowledging the existence and place of the unions within the industry. In truth, nothing much had changed, however, the unions had demonstrated their strength to act and the railway companies and government could no longer just fob them off with ad hoc arrangements and a lack of recognition.

In part 3, I will look at the immediate aftermath of the strike, the revised conciliation scheme, and the creation of Britain's first all-grades union.

---

[1] McKenna, Frank, The Railway Workers 1840-1870, (London, 1980) p.58

[2] Pollins, Harold, Britain’s Railways: An Industrial History, (Newton Abbot, 1971), p. 137

[3] Howell, David, Respectable Radicals: Studies in the Politics of Railway Trade Unionism, (Aldershot, 1999), p.112

[4] Howell, Respectable Radicals, p.113

[5] Pollins, Britain’s Railways, p.137

[6] The Times, 16^th August 1911, p.7

[7] Pollins, Britain’s Railways, p.137

[8] Bagwell, Philip, ‘Strikes,’ The Oxford Companion to British Railway History, (Oxford, 1997), p.483

[9] Pollins, Britain’s Railways, p.137

[10] The Times, 18^th August 1911, p.6

[11] Bagwell, ‘Strikes,’ p.483

[12] Pollins, Britain’s Railways, p.137

[13] The National Archives [TNA], ZPER 11/28, The South Western Gazette 1^st September 1911, p.9

The Forgotten National Railway Strike, 1911 - Part 1

The rise of the railway worker's unions in the late 19th century was inevitably going to cause conflict between them and company management at some point. Five main unions had formed by the turn of the century. These were the Association of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF), established in 1880, The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (ASRS), formed in 1871, The Railway Clerks Association (RCA) started in 1897, the General Railway Workers Union (GRWU), formed in 1889 and the United Pointsmen and Signalmen's Society (UPSS), which was begun in 1892. Thus, by the turn of the century unions were becoming an issue that the managers and directors of Britain’s Railways had to increasingly concern themselves with.

In late 1906 the ASRS initiated its ‘All Grades Campaign.’ The purpose of this was to force railway companies to provide better working conditions for its employees. Nationally, it demanded the institution of a maximum eight hour day for all those in traffic grades, and ten for all other employees. In addition, it demanded overtime payments and a ‘guaranteed week’ whereby railway employees would only work for a set period within seven days. Lastly, it campaigned for an increase of 2 shillings per individual that would not benefit from the eight hour day.

But one major barrier was in the way of achieving these goals. Simply put, the unions were not recognised by the management of the railway companies, (except in the case of the North Eastern Railway [NER]) and throughout 1907 Britain’s railway directors refused to meet with union officials. Faced with this staunch resistance, the ASRS decided to ballot its members in October 1907 on strike action. Predictably, and to no one’s surprise, 76,925 ASRS members voted for the action, with a paltry 8,733 opposing it. Yet, buy the time that this overwhelming result had been declared, the president of the Board of Trade, David Lloyd George, had started to intervene to avoid the country grinding to a halt.

At first he met railway company representatives on the 25th October, after which, on the 6th of November, the union officials were brought in. In one room he negotiated with the railway company managers and in another he dealt with the union officials. This allowed there to be negotiations, but without the railway companies having to formally acknowledge the union’s existence. The union was presented with a scheme that had been devised by Lloyd George and the company officials, and which had been drafted by the Central Railway’s General Manager, Sam Fay.[1] The outcome, while not overwhelmingly endorsed by railway officials, meant that the union could feel like they were making progress regarding their demands.[2]

The two principals of the scheme were conciliation and arbitration. [3] The scheme specified that there would be conciliation boards (sectional and general) that were to be formed from amongst the different types of workers within railway companies. The boards were comprised of elected officials from amongst the men and an equal number of representatives from the management.[4] So, in the case of the London and South Western Railway’s sectional board for the Permanent Way staff, the representatives at a December 1908 meeting were as follows:-

Present on the company’s side of the board:-

Mr. J.W. Jacomb-Hood – Chief Resident Engineer (Chair)

Mr. C. Johns – Permanent Way Assistant Engineer

Mr. A.W. Szlumper – London District Engineer

Mr. O.A.G. Edwards – Central District Engineer

Mr. W. Granger – Western District Engineer

Mr. A.H. Johnson – Signals and Telegraph Engineer

Mr. W. Cocks – Permanent Way Superintendent

Mr. G. Stredwick - Permanent Way Superintendent

Mr J. Goddard – Inspector

Mr. W. Buckmaster – Waterloo (Secretary)

Present on the men’s side of the board:-

Mr. B. Wicks – Assistant Foreman Clapham Junction (Chair)

Mr. E.D. Osborne – Platelayer, Nine Elms

Mr. E. Holtom – Foreman Platelayer, Chiswick (Secretary)

Mr W. Parker – Platelayer, Northam

Mr. W. Rickman – Platelayer, Lymington Town

Mr. H. Salter – Platelayer, Lapford[5]

The prime purpose of the boards was to negotiate on key points regarding wages and hours of work. If an issue could not be resolved at sectional level, it could be referred to a Central Conciliation Board that was made up of nominees from amongst the company’s managers and representatives of the employees on the sectional board. However, if negotiations stalled at this stage, issues could be referred to arbitration.

Across the industry many negotiations went to arbitration. Yet, after this process was complete many railway companies found way to circumvent arbitrator’s awards, which even then were not viewed as favourable by the employees. Indeed, this was backed up by the Board of Trade’s own returns which, rather than showing an increase in average wages amongst railway staff, showed slight decline between 1907 and 1910. Further, the conciliation boards could not discuss other issues regarding working conditions, and had to stick to the topics of hours of work and wages. Lastly, and to add insult to injury, by 1911 all the railway companies’ (except the NER) still did not recognise the unions. Thus, railway workers increasingly saw the conciliation scheme as being ineffectual. This, therefore, was the backdrop to the 1911 general railway worker’s strike.[6] This is discussed in Part 2 HERE.

---

[1] Pollins, Harold, Britain’s Railways: An Industrial History, (Newton Abbot, 1971), p. 135

[2] Howell, David, Respectable Radicals: Studies in the Politics of Railway Trade Unionism, (Aldershot, 1999), p.12-14

[3] Howell, Respectable Radicals, p.12-14

[4] Pollins, Britain’s Railways, p.134-135

[5] Dorset History Centre [DHC], D/WIB/Z/10, Reports, circulars and correspondence, mainly concerning employment; article on conditions of service reprinted from The Railway News, undated. [Some printed], Notice of Proceedings at Meeting of the Sectional Conciliation Board (Section D., Permanent Way Staff), Held at the Company’s General Offices, Waterloo Station, on Saturday, December 19^th, 1908, p.1

[6] Pollins, Britain’s Railways, p.135-136